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Case: PETERS v. PETERS
Citation / Docket No.: No. 5-3244
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date: Opinion delivered September 14, 1964
Lower Court: Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Second Division; Guy E. Williams, Chancellor; modified and affirmed.
Attorneys: Kenneth Coffelt (for appellant); Judith Rogers (for appellee).

Factual and Procedural Background

The divorce decree entered May 1, 1962, required appellant Clyde Peters to pay appellee Mildred Peters $50.00 per week as permanent alimony (from which she was to support their daughter), to pay all past and future medical and hospital bills for appellee and the minor child, and to pay all obligations outstanding as of February 12, 1961. On August 20, 1963, appellant filed a motion to modify the decree alleging changed conditions. Appellee filed a counter-motion alleging appellant had refused to make required support payments and to pay medical bills, asking that appellant's motion be dismissed, that payments be increased by $10.00 per week until arrearages were paid, and that she be awarded attorney's fees.

After a hearing the trial court denied appellant's motion and sustained appellee's, entering judgment for arrearages in the sum of $1,100.00 on October 2, 1963. Appellant appealed from that order.

Relevant factual development: at the time of the 1962 decree appellant worked about 70 hours per week and earned approximately $250.00 per week. He later arranged with a credit union to have his pay distributed to appellee and creditors but subsequently became ill and had no earning capacity during April–July 1963. The illness reduced his earning capacity by about one-half (at least temporarily). At the time of the hearing he was unemployed after garnishment proceedings for a medical debt incurred by his teenage daughter. The record does not reflect a diminution in appellee's needs; appellee is shown to be gainfully employed at a meager salary.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether changed conditions (notably appellant's illness and resulting reduction in earning capacity) warranted modification of the prior alimony decree.
  2. Whether appellee's attorney should be allowed release of a $100 deposit previously made with the Supreme Court and be awarded an additional $100 attorney's fee for services on appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Appellant filed a motion requesting modification of the divorce decree on the ground of changed conditions (specifically his illness and reduced earning capacity).

Appellee's Arguments

  • Appellee countered that appellant had refused to make required support payments and to pay doctor bills as ordered by the court.
  • She asked that appellant's motion be dismissed, that payments be increased $10.00 per week until arrearages are paid, and that attorney's fees be awarded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Boniface v. Boniface, 179 Ark. 738, 17 S.W.2d 897 That "The chancery court has the unquestioned power . . . to alter the allowance of alimony ... being governed by the circumstances of the particular case." The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the chancery court may modify alimony where changed circumstances (here, appellant's illness and reduced earning capacity) exist.
Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-1213 (Repl. 1962) Statutory authority cited alongside case law for the court's power to alter alimony allowances. Used in conjunction with Boniface to justify the court's exercise of its power to modify the alimony order on a showing of changed conditions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reviewed the record de novo. It summarized the pertinent facts: appellant's prior high earnings at the time of the decree (about $250.00 per week), his financial arrangement with a credit union to satisfy debts and alimony, his subsequent illness during April–July 1963 which left him with no earning capacity during those months and reduced his earning capacity thereafter by roughly one-half, and his unemployment at the time of the hearing following garnishment proceedings.

The Court observed that the record did not show any reduction in appellee's needs; appellee remained gainfully employed on a modest salary. Given these circumstances, the Court concluded that changed conditions did exist and that the trial court erred in failing to find such changed conditions.

Quoting Boniface v. Boniface and citing Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-1213 (Repl. 1962), the Court reiterated that a chancery court has the authority to alter the allowance of alimony as governed by the circumstances of the particular case. Applying that principle to the facts before it, the Court determined modification was warranted.

On that basis the Court reduced the alimony obligation for the period during which appellant's illness necessitates limited employment and directed the Chancellor to require resumption of full compliance with the original decree upon a showing that appellant is able to resume full employment. The Court also addressed arrearages and attorney's fees: it ordered that $10.00 per month be applied to accumulated arrearages upon resumption of full employment and granted the appellee's attorney release of a previously deposited $100 plus an additional $100 attorney's fee for services on appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Arkansas modified and affirmed the decree of the trial court.

The Court (majority opinion by Associate Justice Jim Johnson) held that changed conditions—specifically appellant's illness and substantially reduced earning capacity—warranted modification of the alimony award. The opinion directs a reduction "in the amount of alimony to $2500 per week during such time as appellant's illness continues" as stated in the opinion, and provides that upon a showing that appellant can resume full employment the Chancellor shall order resumption of full compliance with the divorce decree together with $10.00 per month to be applied to accumulated arrearages. The Court also granted release of $100 previously deposited with the Supreme Court for payment of brief cost and attorney's fee and awarded an additional $100 in attorney's fees to appellee's attorney for services on appeal.

Direct consequences for the parties: appellant's alimony obligation is reduced for the duration of his limited earning capacity due to illness; arrearages remain subject to repayment under the directed $10.00 per month contribution upon resumption of full employment; appellee's attorney receives the specified fee awards and release of the deposit.

The opinion notes a concurrence/dissent posture: Justice McFADDIN would have affirmed the decree in its entirety; Justice ROBINSON did not participate. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authority (Boniface and the cited statute) to the facts of this case.

PETERS v. PETERS

1. DIVORCE — RIGHTS OF PARTIES — MODIFICATION OF DECREE DUE TO CHANGED CONDITIONS. — Changed conditions due to appellant's illness which necessitated limited employment held to warrant reduction of alimony; full compliance with the decree and an additional $10 per month for accumulated arrearages directed upon a showing that appellant is able to resume full employment. 2. DIVORCE — ALLOWANCE OF FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. — Motion of appellee's attorney for release of $100 previously deposited with the Supreme Court granted and an additional attorney's fee of $100 awarded for services on appeal.

JIM JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a denial of a petition for reduction of alimony payments.

A divorce decree was entered May 1, 1962, by the Pulaski Chancery Court in which appellant Clyde Peters was ordered to pay appellee Mildred Peters the sum of $50.00 per week as permanent alimony (out of which she was to support their daughter), together with all past and future medical and hospital bills of appellee and their minor child as well as all obligations outstanding as of February 12, 1961. Thereafter on August 20, 1963, appellant filed a motion requesting a modification of the decree, alleging changed conditions. Appellee countered with a motion alleging appellant had refused to make support payments and pay doctor bills in accordance with the order of the court, praying that appellant's motion was dismissed, for attorney's fee and that the payments be increased $10.00 per week until all arrearages are paid.

At the conclusion of a lengthy hearing on these motions, the trial court held that appellant's request for modification should be denied and his motion dismissed, and that the motion of appellee should be sustained. Judgment in the sum of $1,100.00 for arrearages was entered October 2, 1963. from such order and judgment comes this appeal.

At the time of the divorce decree in 1962, appellant was working about 70 hour's a week and earning some $250.00 per week. Even so, the family indebtedness which appellant was required by the divorce decree to pay was considerable. Soon after the divorce appellant entered into a financial arrangement with a credit union, depositing his full check, receiving enough personally for a simple existence, the credit union paying out the balance to appellee and various of their creditors. For some time appellant appeared to make a diligent effort under the circumstances to comply with the orders of the court. Then appellant became ill, and during April, May, June and July, 1963, had no earning capacity at all. The illness resulted in his earning capacity being cut approximately in half, at least temporarily. At the time of the hearing on the motions, appellant was unemployed and had been for several weeks, following garnishment proceedings brought by a creditor on a medical debt incurred by his teenage daughter unbeknownst to appellant.

The record does not reflect that appellee's needs have diminished since the divorce, however it was shown that appellee is gainfully employed, albeit at a meager salary.

The state of the record being thus, we cannot escape the conclusion that the trial court erred in failing to find that such changed conditions exist as to warrant a modification of the divorce decree.

"The chancery court has the unquestioned power . . . to alter the allowance of alimony at any allowed being governed by the circumstances of the particular case." Boniface v. Boniface, 179 Ark. 738, 17 S.W.2d 897. Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-1213 (Repl. 1962).

After a careful review of the record on trial de novo we conclude that the circumstance" of this particular case warrant a reduction in the amount of alimony to $2500 per week during such time as appellant's illness continues. to necessitate limited employment. Upon a showing that appellant is able to resume full employment the Chancellor is directed to order resumption of full compliance with the orders contained in the the divorce decree together with $10.00 per month to be applied to the accumulated arrearages.

The motion of appellee's attorney for the release of $100.00 previously deposited with this court for the payment of brief cost and attorney's fee is granted. All additional attorney's fee in the amount of $100.00 for services on this appeal is awarded appellee's attorney.

Modified and affirmed.

Justice McFADDIN would affirm the decree in its entirety.

Justice ROBINSON not participating.

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PETERS v. PETERS
(Sep 14, 1964)