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Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Fred I. Simon, with whom were Noah A. Hillman and Rouse, Morton Beardmore on the brief, for appellant. J. Hodge Smith for appellee.
Judges
  • OPPENHEIMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Fred I. Simon, with whom were Noah A. Hillman and Rouse, Morton Beardmore on the brief, for appellant. J. Hodge Smith for appellee.
Judges
  • OPPENHEIMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Smart Summary

Beck v. Beck, Court of Appeals of Maryland — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Litigation concerning the appellant's competency and the administration of his affairs began in April 1961. On April 7, 1961, the appellee filed a petition under Section 135, Article 16, Code (1957), alleging the appellant's incompetency to manage his estate and asking for appointment as trustee of the estate. A supplemental petition (April 14, 1961) sought an order to have summons served on the appellant in the manner provided by Section 135 where the alleged incompetent resides with the petitioner. Judge Anderson signed an order directing summons to be served on a Viola Morris; record indicates Viola Morris was served. On May 1, 1961, Judge Pugh signed a decree appointing the appellee trustee of the appellant's estate.

On June 24, 1963, the appellant filed a petition to remove the appellee as trustee of his estate, alleging the May 1, 1961 decree was void because he had no notice of the May 1 proceedings and that the decree was procured by fraud; he also alleged irregularities in management of his estate and asserted his competency. Following that petition, on August 9, 1963, the trial court entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate the appellant's present and past mental competency and alleged irregularities in the conduct of his affairs by his wife, and instructing the guardian to set a jury trial to determine competency. On September 11, 1963, the court entered an order appointing the appellee committee or trustee of the appellant's person and ordered the appellant transferred to Springfield State Hospital, pending compliance with the August 9 order.

The appellant appealed both orders. The appellee moved to dismiss both appeals. This Court initially denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice to further consideration. The present opinion decides the appealability and validity of the two orders, grants appellee's motion to dismiss as to the August 9 order, denies the motion as to the September 11 order and sets that order aside, and remands the case for further proceedings. Costs of the appeal were to be divided equally.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of August 9, 1963 (appointing a guardian ad litem to investigate competency and directing a jury trial) was an interlocutory order not appealable before final judgment.
  2. Whether the order of September 11, 1963 (appointing the appellee committee/trustee of the appellant's person and ordering transfer to a state hospital) was final in nature and therefore appealable.
  3. Whether the September 11, 1963 order was void for lack of jurisdiction over the person because the appellant had not been given reasonable notice and opportunity to contest the petition.
  4. Whether the May 1, 1961 decree appointing the appellee trustee of the appellant's property, alleged to have been obtained by fraud and without notice, was properly before this Court for relief at this stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant alleged the May 1, 1961 decree appointing the appellee trustee of his property was void because he had no notice of the proceedings and that the decree was procured by fraud.
  • The appellant alleged irregularities in the management of his estate by the appellee and asserted his own competency.
  • The appellant appealed both the August 9 and September 11, 1963 orders.

Appellee's Arguments

  • The appellee moved to dismiss both appeals.
  • With respect to the September 11 order, the appellee argued that although the order was final in form it was interlocutory in nature and designed merely to expedite a jury trial on the appellant's sanity and did not prejudice the appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ex Parte Johnson, 215 Md. 391, 138 A.2d 347 (1958) Interlocutory orders relating to trial procedure are not appealable before final judgment. Applied to hold the August 9, 1963 order interlocutory and not appealable.
Moale v. Smith, 86 Md. 683, 37 A. 370 (1897) Support for the proposition that interlocutory orders are not appealable. Applied in conjunction with other authorities to dismiss the appeal from the August 9 order.
Matter of Easton, 214 Md. 176, 133 A.2d 441 (1957) Discusses statutory scheme for appointment of committee/trustee and that courts may determine mental capacity without a jury under related sections. Used to describe statutory context and authority for judicial action in protecting persons of unsound mind.
Ex Parte Nicholas, 142 Md. 601, 121 A. 627 (1923) Jurisdiction over the person is essential; alleged non compos mentis must have reasonable notice and opportunity to contest. Applied to conclude the September 11 order was void for lack of notice and opportunity to the appellant.
Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, 104 Md. 472, 65 A. 320 (1906) Same as Ex Parte Nicholas regarding notice and opportunity and also cited re: relief against decrees obtained without notice or by fraud. Applied to support the conclusion that the September 11 order was inoperative and to describe circumstances under which a decree may be set aside.
Clark v. Bryan, 16 Md. 171 (1860) Authority bearing on invalidity of proceedings lacking jurisdiction or notice. Applied as authority for declaring the September 11 order void when notice was not given.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) Fundamental principle that jurisdiction over the person is required for a court to render binding orders. Applied to support the conclusion that the September 11 order was inoperative and void for lack of personal jurisdiction/notice.
Green v. Green, 182 Md. 571, 35 A.2d 238 (1944) Decrees induced by fraud or entered without notice may be set aside; sets out procedures for obtaining evidentiary hearings on such claims. Referenced to explain that the May 1, 1961 decree might be set aside if fraud and lack of notice are affirmatively proved, but the court below had not yet held hearings.
Straus v. Rost, 67 Md. 465, 10 A. 74 (1887) Authority concerning relief from judgments or decrees for defects such as lack of notice or fraud. Referenced with other authorities regarding the possibility of setting aside the May 1 decree if proofs establish fraud or want of notice.
Adelberg v. Stryjewski, 200 Md. 346, 89 A.2d 592 (1952) Related authority on relief from judgments and procedural methods. Cited as additional authority on setting aside decrees obtained without proper notice or induced by fraud.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court separated its analysis as to the two orders appealed.

(1) August 9, 1963 order: The court found this order "clearly interlocutory in nature" because it addressed only the method of trying the competency issue (appointment of a guardian ad litem and setting a jury trial) and left the parties' rights on the merits unadjudicated. Because such an order is not appealable prior to final judgment and is not among the interlocutory orders made appealable by Maryland statute or rule (Md. Rule 887; Section 7, Article 5, Code (1957)), the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from the August 9 order was granted.

(2) September 11, 1963 order: The court determined this order was final in nature because it appointed the appellee as committee/trustee of the appellant's person and thereby fixed the parties' rights; such an order is therefore appealable. The appellee's contention that the order was effectively interlocutory because it was designed merely to facilitate a jury determination of sanity was considered but rejected as controlling: irrespective of the motive for the order, the appointment of a custodian of the person fundamentally affected the appellant's rights.

However, the court then analyzed the validity of the September 11 order and concluded that jurisdiction over the person is essential in proceedings to appoint a committee or trustee for a person alleged to be non compos mentis. The person alleged to be non compos mentis must be given reasonable notice and an opportunity to contest the petition. The court found that no such notice or opportunity was given to the appellant before entry of the September 11 order; consequently, that order is inoperative and void (citing authorities including Ex Parte Nicholas, Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, Clark v. Bryan, and Pennoyer v. Neff).

Regarding the May 1, 1961 decree appointing the appellee trustee of the appellant's property, the appellant's claim that the decree was obtained by fraud and without notice was considered. The court held that the validity of that decree was not properly before this Court at this stage because no timely appeal had been taken under Maryland Rule 812. The court observed that, if fraud and lack of notice are affirmatively proved, the decree may be set aside (citing Green v. Green, Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, Straus v. Rost, and Adelberg v. Stryjewski), but the trial court had not yet heard testimony nor made a final determination on the appellant's allegations. The court noted that alleged irregularities (for example, the trustee's sale of business assets) could be challenged when the trustee's accounts are filed and exceptions are taken.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from the August 9, 1963 order (finding that order interlocutory and not appealable), and denied the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from the September 11, 1963 order and set that order aside (finding the order was final in nature but void for lack of personal jurisdiction/notice). The case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion, and the costs of the appeal were ordered divided equally between the parties.

Implications:

  • The August 9, 1963 order (appointment of guardian ad litem and direction to set a jury trial on competency) is not appealable at this stage and the appeal as to that order was dismissed.
  • The September 11, 1963 order (appointment of appellee as committee/trustee of the appellant's person and commitment to Springfield State Hospital) was set aside as inoperative and void because the appellant was not given reasonable notice and opportunity to contest the petition; this directly restores that aspect of the appellant's position pending further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
  • The May 1, 1961 decree appointing the appellee trustee of the appellant's estate was not finally adjudicated by this Court in these proceedings; relief from that decree for fraud or lack of notice remains potentially available but was not resolved here because the trial court had not yet conducted the necessary evidentiary hearings and no timely appeal had been taken.
  • No novel legal rule was announced; the Court applied existing statutory and case law principles regarding appealability, jurisdiction over the person, notice requirements, and the availability of relief from decrees obtained without notice or by fraud.
Show full summary ...

BECK v. BECK

APPEAL — Interlocutory Orders Not Appealable Before Final Judgment Where Not Excepted By Statute — Motion To Dismiss Granted. It was held in the instant case that where the order appealed from related only to the method of trying the issue of the appellant's competency, and left the rights of the parties on the merits entirely unadjudicated, it was clearly interlocutory in nature. Such an order is not appealable before there has been a final judgment and it was not one of the specified interlocutory orders from which appeals were allowed by statute. Therefore, the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from that order was granted. pp. 263-264

APPEAL — Order Appointing Trustee Of Appellant's Person Fundamentally Affected Appellant's Rights, Regardless Of Reason For Passage Of Order, And Therefore Was Final In Nature And Appealable. In the instant case it was held that an order which appointed the appellee as committee or trustee of the appellant's person, fixed the rights of the parties and was final in nature and therefore was appealable. The Court noted that the appellee's petition on which the order was signed stated that one of the reasons for the relief prayed was to cooperate with the court in seeking a jury determination of the appellant's sanity. Thus, the appellee contended that, while the order may have been final in form, it was interlocutory in nature and did not prejudice the appellant but was only designed to expedite the jury trial as to his sanity. However, the Court stated that irrespective of the reason for the passage of the order, it fundamentally affected the appellant's rights by the appointment of a custodian of his person. pp. 264-265

INSANE PERSONS — Proceedings For Appointment Of Trustee — Jurisdiction Over Person Required — Reasonable Notice And Opportunity To Defend Necessary, But Appellant Was Not Given Such — Order Appointing Trustee Was Void. In proceedings for the judicial appointment of a committee or trustee for the person or property of a person non compos mentis, jurisdiction over the person is essential. The person alleged to be non compos mentis must have reasonable notice of the proceedings and opportunity afforded to him to contest the truth of the allegations in the petition. In the case at bar it was held that no such notice or opportunity was given the appellant before the passage of the order of September 11, 1963, appointing the appellee committee or trustee of the appellant's person and ordering him transferred to the Springfield State Hospital, and that therefore, that order was inoperative and void. p. 265

APPEAL — Of Decree — Was Not Properly Before Court Of Appeals Where Timely Appeal Was Not Taken From Decree And Where There Had Not Yet Been A Hearing Or Final Determination Made On Appellant's Allegations Of Fraud. In the instant case the appellant contended that a decree of the court below was obtained by fraud and without notice and should be declared a nullity. However, it was held that the validity of that decree was not properly before the Court at this stage of the proceedings. An appeal from the decree was not filed within the time prescribed by Maryland Rule 812, but, the Court stated that if fraud in inducing the court to take jurisdiction and lack of notice were affirmatively proved, the decree may be set aside. However, the court below had not yet heard testimony on the appellant's allegations nor made any final determination with respect to them. pp. 265-266

H.C.

Decided October 14, 1964.

OPPENHEIMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appeals were taken by the appellant, an alleged incompetent, from orders of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, passed on August 9, 1963, and September 11, 1963. The order of August 9 appointed a guardian ad litem for the appellant, to investigate his present and past mental incompetency and alleged irregularities in the conduct of his affairs by his wife, the appellee. The order instructed the guardian to set a trial for the determination of the appellant's competency by a jury. The order of September 11 appointed the appellee committee or trustee of the appellant's person, and ordered him transferred to the Springfield State Hospital at Sykesville, pending compliance with the order of August 9.

The appellee moved to dismiss both appeals. On March 2, 1964, this Court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice to further consideration of the appealability of each of the orders after the hearing of the appeal on the merits.

There has been litigation involving the competency of the appellant and the administration of his affairs since April, 1961. On April 7, 1961, the appellee filed a petition under Section 135, Article 16, Code (1957), alleging the incompetency of the appellant to manage his estate and asking for her appointment as trustee of that estate. A supplemental petition was filed on April 14, 1961, alleging that arrangements were being made to have the appellant removed from Harrisburg State Hospital in Pennsylvania to the home of the appellee in Silver Spring, Maryland, and praying an order of the court to have summons served upon the appellant in the manner provided by Section 135 in cases where the alleged incompetent resides with the petitioner. Judge Anderson, sitting in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, signed an order directing that summons be served on a Viola Morris, who resided near the appellee in Silver Spring, Maryland. It appears of record that Viola Morris was duly served, and on May 1, 1961, Judge Pugh signed a decree appointing the appellee trustee of the estate of the appellant. On June 24, 1963, the appellant filed in the Circuit Court a petition to remove the appellee as trustee of his estate and asking for a show cause order. In that petition the appellant alleged that the May 1, 1961 decree appointing the appellee as trustee of his estate was void for the reason that he had no notice of the May 1 proceedings and that the decree was procured by fraud. He also alleged certain irregularities in the management of his estate by the appellee, and asserted his competency. Following this petition, the order of August 9 was passed.

That order was clearly interlocutory in nature. It related only to the method of trying the issue of competency, and left the rights of the parties on the merits entirely adjudicated. Such an order is not appealable before there has been a final judgment. Ex Parte Johnson, 215 Md. 391, 138 A.2d 347 (1958); Moale v. Smith, 86 Md. 683, 37 A. 370 (1897). It is not one of the specified interlocutory orders from which appeals are allowed by statute. Md. Rule 887; Section 7, Article 5, Code (1957). As to the order of August 9, the appellee's motion to dismiss must be granted.

The order of September 11, 1963, on the other hand, was final in nature and therefore appealable. In appointing the appellee as committee or trustee of the appellant's person, it fixed the rights of the parties. It is true that the appellee's petition on which the order was signed states that one of the reasons for the relief prayed is to cooperate with the court in seeking a jury determination of the appellant's sanity. The appellee argues that, while the order may be final in form, it is interlocutory in nature and does not prejudice the appellant but is only designed to expedite the jury trial as to his sanity. Irrespective of the reason for the passage of the order, however, it fundamentally affects the appellant's rights by the appointment of a custodian of his person.

The judicial appointment of a committee or trustee for the person or property of a person non compos mentis is expressly authorized by Section 132, Article 16, Code (1957). The history of that section and other related sections, as well as the jurisdiction of equity courts in the matter before the legislation was enacted, has been thoroughly discussed by Judge Prescott for the Court in Matter of Easton, 214 Md. 176, 133 A.2d 441 (1957). Under these sections, the court, in taking certain actions for the protection of persons of unsound mind, may determine the question of mental capacity without the aid of a jury. Matter of Easton, supra. Jurisdiction over the person, however, is essential. The person alleged to be non compos mentis must have reasonable notice of the proceedings and opportunity afforded to him to contest the truth of the allegations in the petition. Ex Parte Nicholas, 142 Md. 601, 121 A. 627 (1923); Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, 104 Md. 472, 65 A. 320 (1906). No such notice or opportunity was given the appellant before the passage of the order of September 11, 1963. That order, therefore, is inoperative and void. Clark v. Bryan, 16 Md. 171 (1860); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).

The appellant also contends that the decree of May 1, 1961, appointing the appellee committee or trustee of his property, was obtained by fraud and without notice and should be declared a nullity by this Court. The validity of that decree, however, is not properly before us at this stage of the proceedings. An appeal from that decree was not filed within the time prescribed by Rule 812, Maryland Rules, but, if fraud in inducing the court to take jurisdiction and lack of notice are affirmatively proved, the decree may be set aside. Green v. Green, 182 Md. 571, 35 A.2d 238 (1944); Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, supra; Straus v. Rost, 67 Md. 465, 10 A. 74 (1887). See Adelberg v. Stryjewski, 200 Md. 346, 89 A.2d 592 (1952). However, the court below has not heard testimony on the appellant's allegations nor made any final determination with respect to them. In its order of August 9, 1963, the court lists a number of pleadings filed by the appellant's counsel in which attacks are made on the validity of the decree of May 1, 1961 and actions taken with respect to the appellant's property by the trustee under that decree; but the court states: "This Court has taken no action on any of these matters and no date has been set for a hearing thereon." It is unclear from the proceedings in this case that the appellant has asked for the taking of testimony in respect of the alleged invalidity of the May 1, 1961 decree in either of the ways set forth in Green v. Green, supra.

One of the trustee's actions to which the appellant specifically objects is the sale of his business assets. That sale, in due course, must be reported in an account by the trustee. In exceptions to that account, when filed, the appellant can properly raise any objections with respect to the alleged irregularities. Testimony as to the alleged jurisdictional defects going to the validity of the May 1, 1961 decree can be heard in the manner set forth in Green v. Green, supra.

Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from the order of August 9, 1963 is granted; appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal from the order of September 11, 1963 is denied and order set aside. Case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion; costs of this appeal to be divided equally between appellant and appellee.

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BECK v. BECK
(Oct 14, 1964)