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Walker v. State (Court of Appeals of Maryland, Decided February 11, 1965)

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 11, 1959, Marshall's Cut Rate Liquor Store in Baltimore City was robbed at gunpoint at approximately 8:00 p.m. The store manager, Robert Heyman, and a clerk, James Watson, were present. Money and watches were taken: $30 from the two employees, a little over $2,400 from the cash register, and watches valued at about $75 from a display case. Cornelius Walker, Jr. (the appellant) was arrested, tried, and on December 23, 1959, convicted of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon and sentenced to twenty years.

Walker appealed and this Court affirmed the conviction (Walker v. State, 223 Md. 243, 164 A.2d 287). He then pursued post-conviction relief in state court alleging use of evidence illegally obtained; that petition was denied and leave to appeal was denied (Walker v. Warden, 226 Md. 653, 172 A.2d 407), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Walker next filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland alleging unlawful detention because his conviction rested on unlawfully seized goods. The District Court found waiver and that the search was not illegal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed (Walker v. Pepersack, 316 F.2d 119), relying on its view in Hall v. Warden (313 F.2d 483) that Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643) applied retroactively. The Fourth Circuit remanded to the District Court, which ordered that Walker be released or retried. The State elected retrial.

At the retrial held September 13, 1963, the State did not introduce the tangible evidence that the Fourth Circuit had found to be illegally obtained. Walker was again convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to twenty years from November 11, 1959. He appealed from that judgment; this opinion affirms the conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after a federal appellate decision condemning tangible evidence seized in an illegal search, the State may retry the defendant using eyewitness testimony and other lawful evidence (the appellant characterized such testimony as "intangible evidence" allegedly traceable to the illegal search).
  2. Whether the appellant's arrest was lawful, given that the arrest was prompted by information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and whether an illegal arrest (if it had occurred) would bar trial and conviction for the charged offense.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the State was not justified in relying on eyewitness testimony and similar evidence at the second trial because that testimony constituted "intangible evidence" traceable to the illegal search condemned by the Fourth Circuit.
  • The appellant argued that he had been the victim of an illegal arrest, implying that the illegality of the arrest affected the prosecution or the admissibility of evidence and warranted relief.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's (State's) separate legal arguments beyond the State's election to retry and the court's discussion of the law concerning retrial, probable cause and the consequences of an illegal arrest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Walker v. State, 223 Md. 243, 164 A.2d 287 The prior direct appeal in which this Court affirmed the appellant's 1959 conviction. Cited to summarize procedural history: this Court previously affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.
Walker v. Warden, 226 Md. 653, 172 A.2d 407; cert. denied, Walker v. Warden, 368 U.S. 960, 7 L.Ed.2d 391 Denial of post-conviction relief in state proceedings and denial of leave to appeal to this Court; certiorari denied by U.S. Supreme Court. Used in background to show the sequence of state post-conviction proceedings and the denial of certiorari.
Walker v. Pepersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir.) Reversal of the District Court's disposition and application of the Fourth Circuit's view that Mapp v. Ohio should be applied retroactively (relied on Hall v. Warden). Explains the federal appellate decision that led to remand and the District Court's order that the State retry or release the appellant, precipitating the retrial at issue.
Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.) Held that Mapp v. Ohio was to be applied retroactively. Identified as the Fourth Circuit authority relied upon in Walker v. Pepersack to treat the exclusionary rule of Mapp as retroactive.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 Established the exclusionary rule mandating suppression of illegally seized evidence at state criminal trials. Referred to as the foundational decision whose retroactivity was applied by the Fourth Circuit via Hall, forming the basis for the condemnation of tangible evidence seized in the earlier search.
Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 Authority for the proposition that information from a responsible official source can constitute probable cause and reasonable grounds for arrest. The Court relied on this precedent to conclude that the FBI's telephone call and letter to the Baltimore Police Department constituted probable cause and reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant.
Matthews v. State, 237 Md. 384 Supports the principle that an illegal arrest, standing alone, does not preclude trial and conviction for the offense charged. The Court cited Matthews to reject appellant's claim that an illegal arrest would itself prevent prosecution or a valid conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recounting the procedural history culminating in the Fourth Circuit's determination that certain tangible evidence had been the fruit of an illegal search and therefore condemned under the exclusionary rule derived from Mapp v. Ohio. After the federal appellate proceedings, the District Court ordered that the appellant be released or retried; the State elected retrial.

The Court analyzed two principal contentions raised by the appellant at the retrial appeal:

  1. Admissibility of testimony described by appellant as "intangible evidence" traceable to the illegal search: The Court distinguished between tangible evidence (the physical items seized and condemned by the Fourth Circuit) and the eyewitness testimony and other lawful evidence used at retrial. The Court noted that none of the tangible evidence found to have been illegally obtained was introduced at the retrial. It rejected the appellant's assertion that testimony of victims and of a witness (Estelle Jackson, who testified that Walker brought watches and money to her home) was inadmissible because it was "traceable" to the illegal search. The Court held that the federal condemnation of tangible evidence did not preclude retrial using victim testimony and other lawful evidence.
  2. Legality of arrest and consequences if illegal: The Court examined the record and found that the Baltimore Police Department received a telephone call followed by a letter from the Federal Bureau of Investigation connecting the appellant with the robbery. The Court treated this information, coming from a responsible official source, as constituting probable cause and reasonable grounds to arrest, relying on Farrow v. State. The Court further observed that, even were the arrest to be considered illegal, prior Maryland authority (Matthews v. State) establishes that an illegal arrest would not, of itself, preclude trial and conviction for the charged offense.

In sum, the Court applied the exclusionary-rule principles to the tangible items (which were excluded), but explained that the exclusion of those tangible items did not require suppression of victim testimony or other lawful evidence nor bar retrial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the appellant's conviction on retrial (September 13, 1963) is upheld and the twenty-year sentence remains in force. The Court's decision clarifies, consistent with the reasoning stated in the opinion, that (1) exclusion of tangible evidence found to be the fruit of an illegal search does not by itself bar a lawful retrial using victim testimony and other admissible evidence, and (2) information from a responsible official source (here, the FBI) can constitute probable cause to arrest; and (3) even an illegal arrest would not automatically preclude prosecution and conviction for the offense. The opinion does not announce or purport to establish a new legal rule beyond these applications to the facts of this case.

WALKER v. STATE

CRIMINAL LAW — Tangible Evidence Resulting From Illegal Search Proscribed But Testimony Of Victims And Other Lawful Evidence Admissible On Retrial. The appellant in the instant case was tried and convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to twenty years. His case was subsequently remanded by the Federal Court and on retrial, he was again convicted and sentenced to twenty years. The Court stated that at the second trial, none of the tangible evidence found by the Federal Court to have been illegally obtained, was introduced against appellant. The conviction was based upon evidence including eyewitness' testimony which the appellant claimed was "intangible evidence" traceable to the illegal search proscribed by the Federal Court. However, the Court held that although the Federal Court had condemned tangible evidence which was the fruit of the illegal search, this by no means meant that he could not be retried, using testimony of the victims and other lawful evidence. pp. 517-519

ARREST — Was Legal Here — Information Coming From A Responsible Official Source Connecting Appellant With The Robbery Constituted Probable Cause And Reasonable Grounds For Arrest — An Illegal Arrest Would Not Of Itself Preclude Trial For And Conviction Of The Offense. p. 519

H.C. Decided February 11, 1965.

MARBURY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

On November 11, 1959, Marshall's Cut Rate Liquor Store in Baltimore City was robbed at gunpoint at approximately eight o'clock p.m. Robert Heyman, the manager, and a clerk, James Watson, were in the store at the time. A total of $30.00 was taken from these men and a little over $2400 was taken from the store's cash register. Watches valued in the aggregate of $75 were missing from a display case in the store following the robbery. As the result of this robbery, the appellant, Cornelius Walker, was arrested, tried and convicted on December 23, 1959, of robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon charged in the first count of the indictment, and sentenced to twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary.

Walker appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Walker v. State, 223 Md. 243, 164 A.2d 287. He next filed a petition for Post Conviction relief in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, alleging that evidence illegally obtained had been used to secure his conviction. This petition was denied, and we also denied his application for leave to appeal. Walker v. Warden, 226 Md. 653, 172 A.2d 407. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Walker v. Warden, 368 U.S. 960, 7 L.Ed.2d 391.

He next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that he was being unlawfully detained as a result of conviction and sentence obtained through the use of unlawfully seized goods. The District Court found that the appellant had waived a right to raise this question since he failed to raise it on direct appeal in this Court, and also found that there was no basis for holding that the search was illegal. That decision was subsequently reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Walker v. Pepersack, 316 F.2d 119, in which that court relied on its views in Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483, which held to be retroactive the decision of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. The Fourth Circuit remanded the petition to the District Court. That court subsequently ordered that Walker either be released or retried. The State elected to and did retry Walker on September 13, 1963. He was again found guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary from November 11, 1959. From that judgment and sentence this appeal is taken.

At the trial of September 13, 1963, none of the tangible evidence, found by the United States Court of Appeals to have been illegally obtained, was introduced against Walker. The conviction was based upon evidence including the testimony of the victims of the robbery, and of Estelle Jackson who testified that Walker, on the evening of the robbery and subsequent to it, had brought to her home certain watches and money similar in nature to those taken from the robbed premises.

Appellant contends that the State was not justified in relying on the eyewitness' testimony to prove its case at the second trial. He claims that this testimony, which he characterizes as "intangible evidence" was traceable to the illegal search proscribed by the Fourth Circuit. We do not agree. The evidence condemned by the federal court consisted of tangible evidence which was the fruit of the illegal search, causing the court to remand the case to the District Court to afford the State a reasonable opportunity to retry the appellant. This by no means meant that he could not be retried, using testimony of the victims and other lawful evidence.

Appellant argued that he was the victim of an illegal arrest. We find no merit in this contention. The record discloses that a telephone call, followed by a letter, was received by the Police Department of Baltimore City from the Federal Bureau of Investigation containing information connecting the appellant with the robbery. This information, coming from a responsible official source, constituted in itself probable cause and reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant. Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434.

Moreover we have repeatedly held the fact that the arrest, even if illegal, would not of itself preclude a trial for and conviction of the offense charged. Matthews v. State, 237 Md. 384.

Judgment affirmed.

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WALKER v. STATE
(Feb 11, 1965)