TURNER v. UNION OF COLORED LABORERS

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Docket Number

No. 14587.

Attorney(S)

Herman W. Mead, Houston, for appellant. F. Warren Hicks, Houston, for appellee.

Judges

COLEMAN, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant, Sallie Mae Turner, widow of John Turner, brought suit against appellee, the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas, seeking death benefits allegedly owed due to her husband's membership in the organization. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict favorable to appellant. However, the trial court granted appellee's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment that appellant take nothing. This appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas, as a general organization (the "grand lodge"), was obligated to pay death benefits to appellant as beneficiary of John Turner.
Whether appellant properly sued the correct legal entity responsible for the death benefits under the organization's constitution and governing documents.
Whether the organization qualifies as a fraternal benefit society under Texas Insurance Code Articles 10.01 and 10.03.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant contended that her husband was a member in good standing of the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas, the grand lodge, and therefore the grand lodge was liable for death benefits.
She sued the general organization under its exact name, implying the grand lodge was the proper defendant.

Appellee's Arguments

The grand lodge denied liability, asserting that John Turner was "unfinancial" or delinquent in dues, thus disqualifying him from death benefits.
The grand lodge argued that the obligation to pay death benefits rested with the local lodge (Lodge No. 2), not the grand lodge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gillette Motor Transport Company et al. v. Whitfield, 160 S.W.2d 290	Distinguishing between misnomer and mistake in identity of parties sued.	Used to support the conclusion that appellant sued the wrong entity and that the grand lodge was not liable for the death benefits.
Wichita Falls Southern Ry. Co. v. Foreman, 109 S.W.2d 549	Legal distinction between entities and proper party identification in lawsuits.	Reinforced the court's holding that the local lodge, not the grand lodge, was the proper party responsible for death benefits.
West v. Johnson, 129 S.W.2d 811, writ ref.	Clarification on legal entity identity and party liability.	Supported the court’s reasoning regarding the distinct legal status of the local lodge versus the grand lodge.
Krenek v. Epps Super Market No. 2, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 753	Distinction between parties and the consequences of suing an incorrect entity.	Used to affirm that there was a mistake in identity, not a misnomer, and thus the judgment against the grand lodge was proper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the organizational structure and constitution of the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas, noting that it is composed of multiple local lodges with a Supreme Council that does not represent the membership democratically. The constitution makes clear that death benefits are to be paid by the local lodges, not the grand lodge. There was no evidence that the grand lodge had any obligation or control over the funds of the local lodges or that it had agreed to pay death benefits. The court concluded that appellant sued the wrong legal entity; the proper defendant would have been Lodge No. 2, the local lodge to which John Turner belonged. The court further held that the organization does not qualify as a fraternal benefit society under the Texas Insurance Code due to the absence of a representative form of government. The precedent cases cited supported the distinction between misnomer and mistake in identity of parties, affirming that the grand lodge was not liable for the death benefits and that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was appropriate.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The court held that the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas (the grand lodge) is not liable for death benefits owed to the appellant because such obligations rest with the local lodge (Lodge No. 2). The appellant sued the incorrect legal entity, resulting in a failure to prove the grand lodge’s liability. The direct effect is that appellant recovers nothing from the grand lodge. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding organizational liability and proper party identification in lawsuits.

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Sallie Mae TURNER, a Widow, Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT UNION OF COLORED LABORERS OF TEXAS, Appellee.

COLEMAN, Justice.

Appellant brought suit against appellee for death benefits claimed due to her from appellee by reason of the death of her husband, John Turner. The case was submitted to a jury which answered all issues favorably to appellant. The trial court sustained appellee's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment that appellant take nothing.

The judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. The Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas is an organization composed of ten or more local lodges formed for the purpose of giving 'material aid to its members in sickness and distress and to further the interest of the negro race in all fields or liens of endeavor.' The constitution of the organization, which was introduced into evidence by appellant, reflects that it was founded by a group of seventeen men, who made themselves the Supreme Council and promulgated the constitution. This document provides that the Supreme Council shall consist of seventeen members and shall be composed of the organizers and such councilmen as the Council may elect to membership. Members of the local lodges, therefore, have no voice in selecting the membership of the Supreme Council. The organization does not qualify as a fraternal benefit society in that it does not have a representative form of government as defined by Articles 10.01 and 10.03 of the Insurance Code of Texas, V.A.T.S.

The evidence shows that John Turner was a member of the organization and of Lodge No. 2. Each lodge has its own officers. A member may transfer from one lodge to another only on approval of the lodge to which transfer is desired.

Article X of the Constitution of the Union, entitled 'Death benefits', provides:

"Section 1. No branch of this organization shall pay death benefits to any member who fails to pay the Burial Fund assessments within thirty (30) days after initiation.

"Section 2. No branch shall pay death benefits to any beneficiary when said member fails for (30) days after death of a member to pay such sum that may be required of them by the branch of which they are members.

"Section 4. A member paying his or her Burial Fund assessment upon date of initiation will be entitled to Death benefits if death occurs before the expiration of thirty (30) days a sum shall be paid in proportion to the expired days of membership; for example, if death occurs within fifteen (15) days, the payment would be one-half as much as would be payable in thirty (30) days. If death occurs after thirty (30) days, then the Lodge will pay a sum which will be considered a full benefit. Members shall be assessed for death payments in keeping with the above article.

"When notification of the death of a member has been posted upon a bulletin board located at place of regular meetings for thirty (30) days following death of member, this shall be taken as a conclusive evidence of notification. Members out of this city shall be furnished written notce by the Secretary of the branch in which they have membership.'

The only reasonable construction of these provisions is that each local lodge shall pay death benefits, in an amount to be determined by the lodge, to the beneficiary of a member who dies, such member having timely paid all burial fund and death benefit assessments.

The evidence establishes that the death benefit assessment is $1.00. There is no evidence as to how beneficiaries are named or determined. Apparently no certificates are issued. In any event, no certificate naming a beneficiary of containing a promise to pay death benefits in any amount or to any particular person was introduced into evidence.

While the constitution gives the Supreme Council certain powers to discipline members, as well as lodges, that refuse to be governed by the laws, rules and regulations, there is nothing in the constitution giving the Supreme Council control over the funds of the Local Lodge, and there is no evidence of any other laws, rules or regulations.

We think appellant's cause of action, if any she has, is against Independent Union of Colored Laborers, Lodge No. 2, and not against the organization generally. The constitution provides for payment by the Local Lodge of such benefits as it might establish as death benefits. Neither the Grand Council, the other Lodges, nor the general membership, have contracted expressly, or impliedly by reason of membership in the organization, to pay death benefits to John Turner's beneficiary. This was the obligation of Lodge No. 2 and its membership.

In appellant's brief the following statement is found:

"Appellants cause of action was reflected in her petition. It was based upon contention that her husband John Turner was a member in good standing of the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas and she sued such organization, which was the exact name of the grand lodge of the organization.

"Appellee, the grand lodge, known as the Independent Union of Colored Laborers of Texas answered by way of general denial and by further special defense that John Turner was 'unfinancial' or in other words he was delinquent in his dues.'

We take it by these statements appellant takes the position that she properly sued the general organization, or as she puts it, the grand lodge, and that the grand lodge properly answered her suit. In such case the judgment of the trial court is correct because she failed to prove that the grand lodge had agreed to pay death benefits.

Lodge No. 2 is a distinct legal entity from the parent organization. Appellant sued a legal entity, which answered the suit. There was no misnomer. There was a mistake in identity. The wrong party was sued. Gillette Motor Transport Company et al. v. Whitfield, Tex.Civ.App., 160 S.W.2d 290; Wichita Falls Southern Ry. Co. v. Foreman, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 549; West v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 811, writ ref.; Krenek v. Epps Super Market No. 2, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 377 S.W.2d 753.

Judgment affirmed.