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Attorney(S)
  • George L. Russell, Jr., with whom was Richard K. Jacobsen on the brief, for the appellant. Jon F. Oster, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Attorney for Baltimore City, and William T.S. Bricker, Assistant State's Attorney, on the brief, for the appellee.
Judges
  • OPPENHEIMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
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citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • George L. Russell, Jr., with whom was Richard K. Jacobsen on the brief, for the appellant. Jon F. Oster, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Attorney for Baltimore City, and William T.S. Bricker, Assistant State's Attorney, on the brief, for the appellee.
Judges
  • OPPENHEIMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Samuel Gee was convicted of statutory burglary in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on October 9, 1956, and sentenced to the Maryland Reformatory for Males for three years. The court ordered that he be sent to the Patuxent Institution for study and evaluation under Article 31B. On March 18, 1957, after a hearing, he was found to be a defective delinquent and committed to Patuxent, with the balance of his sentence suspended. He received subsequent defective delinquency hearings (December 18, 1958; November 21, 1962) and was recommitted. He filed a federal habeas petition that was denied without prejudice (Dec. 31, 1962). On February 20, 1963 he filed a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act in the Criminal Court of Baltimore; relief was denied on September 20, 1963, and he was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland on February 10, 1965. In his post-conviction petition he asserted that his commitment to Patuxent was illegal because the underlying burglary conviction—an essential condition for commitment under the Defective Delinquency Act—violated his constitutional rights (he was not advised of, nor provided, counsel at his 1956 trial).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a criminal conviction obtained prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, in which the defendant was not advised of or provided counsel, must be vacated as violative of constitutional rights.
  2. Whether an underlying criminal conviction that is constitutionally infirm can render a commitment under the Defective Delinquency Act illegal and therefore support relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.
  3. Whether post-conviction relief attacking the constitutionality of a prior conviction is available where the original sentence has expired but the petitioner remains confined as a defective delinquent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted that his commitment to Patuxent was illegal because his statutory burglary conviction (Oct. 9, 1956) violated his constitutional rights: he was neither advised of his right to counsel nor provided counsel at trial.
  • He sought vacation of the underlying conviction, release from custody, and a new trial on the original criminal charge with the right to counsel preserved.

State's Arguments

  • The State conceded that at the 1956 criminal trial the appellant had not been advised of his right to counsel nor provided counsel.
  • The State argued that because the appellant's original sentence had expired, his detention as a defective delinquent was civil in nature and the issue of the right to counsel was moot; the State relied on Marshall v. Director for the proposition that serving a sentence and subsequent detention under a commitment can render habeas relief moot as to the underlying sentence.
  • The State also argued pragmatically that, if the conviction were vacated and the appellant could not be retried because the sentence had been served, he would be at large despite having been found a defective delinquent and being an alleged danger to society.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 There is a constitutional requirement that the State provide counsel in cases, such as burglary, where the defendant is charged with a crime carrying significant incarceration. The Court relied on Gideon to conclude the appellant's 1956 conviction—where he received no counsel—violated constitutional rights.
Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d 563 (1965) Held that Gideon applies retroactively and convictions prior to Gideon in which the defendant was not provided counsel must be vacated. The Court cited Manning for retroactivity and the requirement that pre-Gideon convictions without counsel be vacated.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 614 (1965) Referenced in connection with retroactivity considerations. The Court cited Linkletter as additional authority on retroactivity considerations (see citation "See also").
Simon v. Director, 235 Md. 626, 201 A.2d 371 (1964) Infractions of constitutional rights that may render a criminal conviction a nullity are grounds for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. The Court relied on Simon to support that post-conviction relief is available to attack constitutional infractions rendering a conviction void, even if the petitioner is not then serving the sentence attacked.
Laird v. Director, 237 Md. 178, 205 A.2d 238 (1964) Related authority regarding post-conviction relief (cited alongside Simon). Cited as supporting authority for availability of post-conviction relief for constitutional infractions.
Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961) If a person has not been convicted of one of the crimes enumerated in Article 31B § 6, his commitment as a defective delinquent is illegal. The Court applied Height to hold that a valid conviction of an enumerated offense is an essential prerequisite to a lawful commitment under the Defective Delinquency Act; without a legal conviction, commitment is invalid.
Marshall v. Director, 215 Md. 622, 137 A.2d 661 (1958) Addressed effect of expiration of sentence on habeas corpus petitions where the prisoner is detained under commitment to Patuxent; holding that serving sentence did not entitle the petitioner to a writ when detained under a commitment. The State relied on Marshall to argue mootness; the Court distinguished Marshall, noting Marshall did not involve attack on the legality of the original conviction and thus did not control here.
Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 121 A.2d 698 (1956) Discussed legislative history and purpose of the Defective Delinquency Act, including that not all defective delinquents can or should be committed to Patuxent. The Court cited Eggleston to support the proposition that the Act was not intended to provide for the commitment of all persons who may be defective delinquents and to address the State's public-safety concern.
Gee v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 231 Md. 610, 188 A.2d 565 (1963) Procedural history: prior application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Referenced as part of the case's procedural history.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the petitioner's claim that his commitment as a defective delinquent was unlawful because it depended upon a statutory burglary conviction obtained in 1956 in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. The State conceded that at the 1956 trial the appellant had not been advised of his right to counsel nor provided counsel.

The Court relied on Gideon v. Wainwright to establish that the State is constitutionally required to provide counsel in burglary cases and cited Manning for the proposition that Gideon applies retroactively, requiring vacation of pre-Gideon convictions obtained without counsel. The Court further noted that infractions of constitutional rights that may render a criminal conviction a nullity are grounds for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act (citing Simon and Laird).

The Court analyzed the Defective Delinquency Act, explaining that commitment to Patuxent requires a prior conviction of one of the enumerated offenses (Article 31B, § 6) and that statutory burglary is one such offense. Relying on Height, the Court observed that if a necessary prior conviction is lacking or invalid, the commitment is illegal.

The State's contention that the matter was moot because the appellant's original sentence had been served and that defective delinquency proceedings are civil in nature was considered. The Court distinguished Marshall, explaining that Marshall did not involve an attack upon the legality of the original conviction; Marshall addressed only the effect of the expiration of a sentence where the commitment itself was not challenged. By contrast, the appellant here attacked the constitutionality of the conviction that provided the basis for his commitment.

Given: (1) the conceded absence of counsel at the 1956 trial; (2) the retroactive effect of Gideon as explained in Manning; and (3) the holding that constitutional infractions rendering a conviction void may be attacked under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, the Court concluded that the appellant's underlying conviction was invalid. Because that conviction was an essential element for a lawful commitment under the Defective Delinquency Act, the appellant's current detention was unlawful.

The Court acknowledged the State's concern that vacating the conviction might leave the appellant at large despite findings of dangerousness, but observed (citing Eggleston and legislative studies) that the Defective Delinquency Act was not intended to provide commitment of all persons who might be defective delinquents. The Court did not resolve any question about the effect of sentence expiration if the State elects to retry the appellant; it granted the remedy appropriate to vindicate the appellant's constitutional right to counsel at a new trial.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court reversed the order denying the petitioner's application for post-conviction relief, vacated the appellant's burglary conviction of October 9, 1956, granted a new trial on the criminal charge, and remanded with instructions to the Director of the Patuxent Institution to release the petitioner from further custody.

Implications: The direct consequences are that the appellant must be released from Patuxent and is entitled to a new trial in which his right to counsel is preserved. The decision applies established precedent (Gideon and related Maryland cases) to vacate a pre-Gideon conviction obtained without counsel when that conviction is an essential predicate to civil commitment under the Defective Delinquency Act. The opinion does not announce a new legal doctrine beyond applying existing constitutional and post-conviction principles to the facts of this case.

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GEE v. STATE

DEFECTIVE DELINQUENTS — Where Criminal Conviction Violated Appellant's Constitutional Rights, And Conviction Was Essential Element Of Legality Of His Commitment As Defective Delinquent, Appellant's Present Detention As Such Was In Violation Of Law And He Was Entitled To His Release. Under the decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, there is a constitutional requirement imposed upon the State that a defendant be represented by counsel in a burglary case. This requirement applies retroactively, and a conviction prior to Gideon in which the defendant was not provided with counsel must be vacated. The appellant in the present statutory burglary case, at his pre- Gideon trial, was neither advised of his right to counsel nor provided with counsel, and since his conviction was in violation of his constitutional rights and was an essential element of the legality of his commitment as a defective delinquent, the Court held that his present detention at Patuxent Institution was in violation of law and that he was entitled to be released. While the State argued that because the appellant had served his sentence, he could not now be retried for his offense, would be at large and an actual danger to society, even though he had been found to be a defective delinquent, the Court stated that the Defective Delinquency Act was never meant to provide for the commitment of all persons who may be defective delinquents. pp. 605-609

POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT — Infractions Of Constitutional Rights Which May Render Criminal Conviction A Nullity Are Grounds For Relief Under. p. 607

CRIMINAL LAW — Conviction In Violation Of Constitutional Rights — Appellant Entitled To New Trial On Criminal Charge To Endeavor To Establish His Innocence With His Constitutional Right To Counsel At Trial Preserved. p. 610 Decided July 30, 1965.

OPPENHEIMER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this petition for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, the petitioner claims that his commitment to Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent was illegal because his conviction of statutory burglary, the crime which made his commitment possible under the Defective Delinquency Act, was in violation of his constitutional rights and therefore of itself illegal.

The history of the prior proceedings in which the Appellant was involved is succinctly set forth by the State, as follows:

"The Appellant was convicted of burglary in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on October 9, 1956, and was sentenced to the Maryland Reformatory for Males for three years. The Court also ordered that the Appellant be sent to the Patuxent Institution for study and evaluation under Article 31B of the Annotated Code of Maryland. On March 18, 1957, after a hearing in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, the Appellant was found to be a defective delinquent and was committed to the Patuxent Institution, the balance of his sentence being suspended.
The Appellant received a second hearing as a defective delinquent on December 18, 1958, and he was again found to be a defective delinquent. On May 18, 1961, he filed a petition for a reconsideration of that finding, but the Court dismissed his petition without prejudice.
He received a third hearing as a defective delinquent in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on November 21, 1962, and was recommitted to the Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent. He then filed an Application for Leave to Appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland which was denied on March 8, 1963. See Gee v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 231 Md. 610, 188 A.2d 565 (1963).
Appellant also filed an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland which was denied without prejudice on December 31, 1962.
Thereafter, the Appellant filed a petition for relief in the Criminal Court of Baltimore under the Post Conviction Procedure Act on February 20, 1963. A hearing was held and on September 20, 1963, the Court denied relief and dismissed the petition. On September 24, 1963, the Appellant filed his Application for Leave to Appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland from the Order denying him relief and dismissing his petition. On February 10, 1965, the Applicant's Application for Leave to Appeal was granted."

The State concedes that at his criminal trial in 1956, the Appellant was neither advised of his right to counsel nor provided with counsel. Under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) there is a constitutional requirement imposed upon the State of representation of a defendant by counsel in a case where the defendant has been charged with burglary. Manning v. State, 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d 563 (1965). Manning also held that Gideon applies retroactively and that a conviction prior to Gideon in which the defendant was not provided with counsel must be vacated. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 614 (1965). Infractions of constitutional rights that may render a criminal conviction a nullity are grounds for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. Simon v. Director, 235 Md. 626, 201 A.2d 371 (1964). See Laird v. Director, 237 Md. 178, 205 A.2d 238 (1964).

The Defective Delinquency Act provides that a request may be made that a person be examined for possible defective delinquency if he has been convicted and sentenced in a court of this State for a crime or offense coming under certain named categories. A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary is one of the crimes named. Code (1957), Article 31B, § 6. Statutory burglary is such a misdemeanor. If a person has not been convicted of one of the crimes enumerated in Section 6 (or of two of certain offenses not here involved) his commitment as a defective delinquent is illegal. Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961).

The State contends that because the Appellant's original sentence has expired, the Appellant's detention is only as a defective delinquent; that defective delinquency proceedings are, as we have repeatedly held, civil in nature, involving no issue as to guilt or innocence of any crime of which the person involved has been convicted in the past; and that therefore the question which Appellant raises with respect to his right to counsel is moot. In support of its argument the State relies upon Marshall v. Director, 215 Md. 622, 137 A.2d 661 (1958).

In Marshall, the appellant had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 31, 1957, at which time he was being detained in Patuxent Institution pending his trial as to whether or not he was a defective delinquent. He had been convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and sentenced to one year in the Maryland House of Correction on November 3, 1955. On November 9, 1955, it was ordered that he be transferred to Patuxent Institution for the purpose of examination as to whether he was a defective delinquent. On August 5, 1957, he was tried and found to be a defective delinquent, and was committed to Patuxent on that day. His sentence for his criminal offense had expired, but we held that he was being confined as a result of the order of commitment, and that therefore the question of the legality of his incarceration as of July 31, 1957, when his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was received, was moot. No question of the deprivation of any constitutional rights of the appellant in his original conviction was involved. We held only that the fact that his sentence had been served did not entitle him to the writ because he was being detained under the order committing him as a defective delinquent. Marshall is not in conflict with Height. In Height, as here, the question was whether a commitment as a defective delinquent was legal when a necessary condition of commitment had not been met; in Marshall, it was not the legality of the necessary prior conviction which was in issue, but only the effect of the expiration of the sentence for the offense after a legal commitment as a defective delinquent. The serving of the sentence is immaterial as to the constitutionality of the original conviction, and without a legal conviction, the commitment is invalid whether or not the sentence has been served.

In Simon v. Director, supra, the appellant, committed to Patuxent Institution after a conviction of sodomy, applied for post conviction relief. He alleged, inter alia, that his criminal conviction was the result of an illegal arrest and illegal search and seizure. The court below apparently took the view that the commitment and recommitment to Patuxent precluded attack upon the convictions and sentences the petitioner was not then serving. We held that a petition for post conviction relief may be filed at any time, under the Act, although the petitioner is not then detained under the sentence attacked, and granted leave to appeal. Judge Henderson, for the Court, said: "Of course, he cannot have a retrial on an issue of guilt or innocence, but he may raise questions concerning the jurisdiction of the trial court, or alleged infractions of constitutional rights that may render the trial a nullity."

Because the Appellant's criminal conviction was in violation of his constitutional rights and because that conviction was an essential element of the legality of his commitment as a defective delinquent, we hold that his present detention is in violation of law, and that he is entitled to be released.

The State argues that, because the Appellant has served his sentence, he cannot now be retried for his criminal offense, and that therefore, he will be at large, although he has been found to be a defective delinquent under Section 5 of the Defective Delinquency Act, and to be an actual danger to society. That Act was never meant to provide for the commitment of all persons who may be defective delinquents. See Height v. State, supra, at 256-57, and Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 513-14, 121 A.2d 698 (1956).

In its 1947 session, the Legislature passed a joint resolution authorizing and directing the appointment of a Commission to study Medico Legal Psychiatry. This Commission was duly appointed by the Governor and made its report in 1948. A special Advisory Committee had been appointed by the Board of Correction, consisting of seven Maryland psychiatrists and psychologists, which issued its report in January, 1949. The Legislative Council of Maryland appointed a Committee on Medico Legal Procedure, which made its report in December, 1950; attached thereto is Research Report No. 29 of the Research Division of the Legislative Council. In Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 514, 121 A.2d 698 (1956), we said that the Defective Delinquency Act was the end result of several years of study by these three bodies. Research Report No. 29 contains the following statement, at 6 and 7:
"There is no measurement of the cost and losses to society and to innocent families caused by preventable crimes, such as the James case, the Duker case, and other similiar tragedies. The recommendations here made, if enacted, would prevent at least some of these crimes in the future without the sacrifice of any basic individual rights."
That report also gives the joint recommendations of the Commission to study Medico Legal Psychiatry and the Advisory Committee of the Board of Correction. The fifth recommendation of that Commission and Committee is set forth at p. 8 of Research Report No. 29 and reads in part as follows:
"It is agreed that the institution should not be planned to contain all the criminal defectives, whether mental or emotional."
After the passage of the Defective Delinquency Act, the Legislative Council appointed a Commission to Study and Evaluate Patuxent Institution, of which Chief Judge Roszel C. Thomsen of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, was Chairman. The report of this Commission is dated January 25, 1961. That report contains the following statement at p. 14:
"Not all defective delinquents can be apprehended or committed to Patuxent. Unfortunately, despite the operation of the law and Patuxent's part therein, heinous crimes will be perpetrated in the future as they have been in the past. In our opinion, however, without the law, these crimes would be substantially greater in number and in tragic results."
In March, 1964, Governor Tawes appointed another Commission to Study Changes and Basis of Selection for Patuxent Institution, of which Judge Thomsen again was chairman. The Interim Report of that Commission, dated December 17, 1964, contains the following statement at p. 7:
"It has also been recognized from the inception of the project that not all persons who are defective delinquents can or should be committed and that no institution such as Patuxent can hope to treat all defective delinquents."

The Act, as our decisions point out, protects the rights of individuals as well as those of society. Valid convictions of one or more of the offenses enumerated in the Act have been deemed by the Legislature to be an essential condition before commitment to Patuxent can be ordered.

In the argument before us, counsel for the Appellant asked that a new trial on the original criminal charge be granted. This the Appellant is entitled to; he has the right to endeavor to establish his innocence with his constitutional right to counsel at the trial preserved. The effect of the serving of the sentence imposed as the result of the original trial, if the State wishes to retry the Appellant, is not before us.

Order denying petitioner's application reversed, and case remanded for the entry of an order instructing the Director of the Patuxent Institution to release petitioner from further custody; petitioner's conviction of burglary in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on October 9, 1956 vacated and new trial granted.

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GEE v. STATE
(Jul 30, 1965)