Criminal law — Constitutional law — 6th and 14th Amendments — Lack of counsel — Police interrogation — Failure to warn accused — Rule of Escobedo v. Illinois — Retroactive effect.
1. While the request for the assistance of counsel by a suspect during an accusatory investigation is not a conclusive factor in determining the admissibility of a confession under the rule stated in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, such rule should not be applied retrospectively to convictions finally sustained prior to the announcement of the rule on June 22, 1964.
2. Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, followed. [151] Criminal law — Constitutional law — 6th and 14th Amendments — Criminal prosecutions — Preliminary hearing — Lack of counsel.
3. In the absence of a showing of prejudice arising therefrom, the fact that a person charged with crime does not have counsel at the preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate does not, in itself, constitute lack of due process or violation of any constitutional guarantee. [151]
Criminal law — Practice — Criminal procedure — Confession — Lack of challenge — Effect — Waiver.
4. When a defendant in a criminal trial permits his confession, or other statement, to be introduced in evidence without raising any issue concerning its voluntariness, that issue is waived and need not be passed upon in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. [151]
Mr. Justice COHEN dissented.
OPINION PER CURIAM, September 29, 1965:
In 1956, petitioner, while represented by counsel, entered a general plea of guilty to the charge of murder. A hearing was held to determine the degree of guilty at which time a signed statement made by petitioner was introduced without objection, and he was found guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Petitioner presently challenges his conviction in reliance on the decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964). He further alleges a pretrial deprivation of the right to counsel on the basis of the decision in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050 (1963). Finally, petitioner challenges the admissibility of his signed statement, alleging that it was obtained by means of duress and coercion.
Having concluded in Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965), that the mandate of Escobedo is not to be given retrospective application, Negri is here controlling.
The record fails to disclose any prejudice arising from petitioner's lack of representation at the preliminary hearing and, therefore, no violation of petitioner's constitutional rights resulted. See Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 416 Pa. 321, 206 A.2d 283 (1965).
Finally, no objection having been raised to the introduction of petitioner's signed statement at the plea hearing, petitioner may not now assert its invalidity. Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Sanders v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 380, 207 A.2d 789 (1965).
Order affirmed.
Mr. Justice COHEN dissents.