Criminal Law — Counsel for defendant — Waiver — Signed written statement alone — Absence of comprehensive examination by trial judge — Habeas corpus — Repetitious petitions — Criteria for valid waiver more fully explained by Supreme Court after dismissal of earlier petition.
1. A defendant's signed written statement, in which he pleads guilty to the charge against him, waives the right to counsel, and states that he understands the nature of the charge against him as well as the maximum penalty which can be imposed, cannot alone establish that he waived his right to counsel understandingly and intelligently.
2. Only after a sufficiently penetrating and comprehensive examination can the judge be assured that the accused's waiver of counsel was intelligent and understanding.
3. In this case, the Commonwealth contended that the matter concerning waiver of counsel was raised by a previous petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed. Subsequent to the dismissal of the earlier petition, however, the criteria for a valid waiver of counsel were more fully explained by the Supreme Court.
It was Held that although, ordinarily, repetitious petitions might be dismissed without a hearing, a rehearing on the question involved was not unwarranted in the instant case.
ERVIN, P.J., dissented because relator signed an express waiver of counsel.
Submitted September 13, 1965.
OPINION PER CURIAM, November 11, 1965:
Relator's petition for writ of habeas corpus was dismissed without a hearing. On appeal, he alleges that he signed a prepared statement in which he entered a plea of guilty to arson. The "Guilty Plea" form stated that relator voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and that he understood the nature of the charge against him as well as the maximum penalty which could be imposed.
Only after a sufficiently penetrating and comprehensive examination can the judge be assured that the accused's waiver of counsel was intelligent and understanding. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the judge did examine the accused in accordance with this requirement. Under our decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Ross v. Botula, 206 Pa. Super. 1, 211 A.2d 42 (1965), it will be necessary for the lower court to ascertain the circumstances under which this written waiver was obtained.
The Commonwealth contends that this matter concerning waiver of counsel was raised by a previous petition for writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed on October 29, 1963. Ordinarily, repetitious petitions may be dismissed without a hearing. Subsequent to the dismissal of the earlier petition, however, the criteria for a valid waiver of counsel were more fully explained by our Supreme Court. A rehearing on this question is not unwarranted in light of this consideration. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Cavell, 206 Pa. Super. 11, 211 A.2d 22 (1965).
Accordingly, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County is vacated, and the record is remanded to that court with directions to hold a hearing on the petition.
ERVIN, P.J., dissents because relator signed an express waiver of counsel.