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Docket Number

No. 30,630.

Attorney(S)

Don R. Money, and Money, Orr Bridwell, of Indianapolis, for appellant. John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and James Manahan, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Judges

RAKESTRAW, J.

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Smart Summary

Wynn v. State of Indiana (No. 30,630) — Supreme Court of Indiana, filed March 9, 1966

Trial Court: Marion Criminal Court, Division No. 2 (Saul I. Rabb, Judge)

Decision: Opinion by Rakestraw, J.; Myers, C.J., and Arterburn, J., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result; Achor, J., not participating.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Dane Eugene Wynn was indicted and tried for second degree murder in the Marion Criminal Court, Division No. 2. After a jury trial he was found guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life. The appellant filed a motion for new trial, the sole specification of which was that the verdict was contrary to law. On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The evidence, as recited by the court in the light most favorable to the State, indicated that the appellant and the decedent met behind a tavern with others while discussing getting beer; the decedent was handling a baloney sandwich; the appellant called the decedent a name, an argument followed, the appellant produced a knife and stabbed the decedent; the knife pierced the decedent's heart and the decedent died shortly thereafter.

The record also contained conflicting testimony: the appellant testified the stabbing was accidental (he inadvertently threw out his arm and the decedent must have run into the knife) and claimed he did not know he had stabbed the decedent; other testimony indicated the decedent had picked up and broken a bottle and struck at the appellant, although two witnesses said they saw nothing in the decedent's hand.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, on appeal, the Supreme Court may weigh the evidence or must consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict.
Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for second degree murder despite conflicts in the testimony.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant contended the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder.
The appellant asserted that he acted in self-defense or that the stabbing was accidental — he testified he inadvertently threw his arm and did not know he had stabbed the decedent.
The appellant emphasized testimony that the decedent had struck at him with a broken bottle, arguing he was being assaulted and merely defended himself.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments beyond presentation of the evidence favoring the State.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Schlegel v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 1, 150 N.E.2d 563	The principle that on appeal the court will not weigh the evidence but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict below.	The court cited Schlegel to state and support the standard of appellate review applied in this case: it would not reweigh conflicting testimony but would view the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
Music v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 54, 161 N.E.2d 615	The same appellate-review principle: appellate courts do not weigh evidence and consider only that evidence which supports the verdict.	The court relied on Music as additional authority for the proposition that credibility determinations and conflicts in testimony are for the jury, not the appellate court.
Estes v. State (1964), 244 Ind. 691, 195 N.E.2d 471	Reiteration of the rule that appellate courts will not reweigh evidence and must view the evidence most favorably to the verdict.	The court invoked Estes to reinforce the applicable standard of review in concluding that, despite conflicts, the evidence could support the jury's verdict.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the appellant's sole specification of error (the verdict was contrary to law) and noted the appellant's principal contention on appeal: insufficiency of the evidence.

Applying the well-established appellate standard (cited authorities), the court emphasized that it would not weigh evidence on appeal but would consider only evidence most favorable to the verdict. The court explained that it could not assess witness demeanor or credibility from the transcript and that credibility determinations were for the jury.

The court then summarized the evidence favorable to the State: the encounter behind a tavern, the argument after the appellant called the decedent a name, the appellant's drawing of a knife and stabbing which pierced the decedent's heart, and the decedent's rapid death.

The opinion acknowledged considerable conflicting evidence, including the appellant's account that the stabbing was accidental and testimony that the decedent assaulted the appellant with a broken bottle (contradicted by witnesses who saw no bottle). The court found these conflicts and credibility issues were for the jury to resolve.

Beyond oral testimony, the court identified physical circumstances the jury could consider: the murder weapon was a Boy Scout knife that required effort to open (allowing an inference that the defendant was prepared to use it); the fatal wound pierced the heart, indicating considerable force inconsistent with the appellant's accidental-stabbing narrative; and a photograph showed a superficial cut tracking to the fatal wound, which the jury could view as probative of intent or malice and as contradicting the appellant's story of accident or self-defense.

Weighing the permissible inferences in the State's favor and deferring to the jury's role in resolving conflicts and assessing credibility, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the trial court was Affirmed.

Implications:

The appellant's conviction for second degree murder and life sentence were upheld.
The decision reiterates the established appellate standard that the Supreme Court of Indiana will not reweigh conflicting evidence but will view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict and leave credibility determinations to the jury.
The opinion did not announce or purport to establish a new legal doctrine; its effect is the direct affirmation of the trial court's judgment in this case.

Report note in the opinion: Reported in 214 N.E.2d 644.

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WYNN v. STATE OF INDIANA.

1. APPEAL — Determination — Weighing Evidence. — On appeal the Supreme Court will not weigh the evidence, but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict below. p. 248.

2. CRIMINAL LAW — Murder — Sufficiency of Evidence — Conflicting Evidence. — Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of second degree murder even though it was conflicting. p. 249.

RAKESTRAW, J.

The appellant was charged by indictment with second degree murder. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of second degree murder, and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life. The appellant's sole specification of error is the overruling of his motion for new trial, and the motion for new trial contained only the specifications that the verdict was contrary to law. The appellant in his brief argues only that the evidence was insufficient for conviction.

The evidence most favorable to the state indicates that the defendant and the decedent met with certain others behind a tavern and were discussing getting some beer to drink. The decedent was fixing or eating a baloney sandwich. The defendant called the decedent a name, and argument ensued, and the defendant drew a knife and stabbed the decedent. The knife pierced the decedent's heart, and the decedent died within a short time.

There was a great deal of other evidence presented in the case. The defendant testified that he inadvertently threw out his arm and that the decedent must have run into the knife, and that he did not know that he had stabbed the decedent. There was testimony that the decedent had picked up a bottle, broken it, and struck at the defendant with the broken bottle, though two witnesses testified they saw nothing in deceased's hand. On appeal, the appellant strenuously argues that he was being assaulted by the decedent and that he merely defended himself.

It is well settled that on appeal this court will not weigh the evidence, but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict below. Schlegel v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 1. 374, 150 N.E.2d 563; Music v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 54, 161 N.E.2d 615; Estes v. State (1964), 244 Ind. 691, 195 N.E.2d 471.

This court is not in a position to weigh the evidence. We do not have before us the witnesses. From the transcript, it is impossible to tell whether the witnesses are apparently testifying sincerely and honestly, or whether they are obviously attempting to give the "right" story. Even from the transcript, however, it is obvious that there is considerable contradiction and confusion among the defense witnesses. It was up to the jury to determine which witnesses could be believed.

In addition to the conflicting oral evidence, there are certain other circumstances which the jury could take into consideration. The murder weapon was a boy scout knife which required some effort to open. Thus the jury could infer that the defendant was in a position of readiness to use the knife. The knife blade pierced the decedent's chest and went into his heart. This could imply to the jury that a considerable force was used in the stabbing and would tend to negate the story of the defendant. One of the photographs introduced into evidence shows the decedent's body. It reveals that there is a considerable superficial cut around the left side of the decedent's chest going to the place where the fatal wound was inflicted. This circumstance could be considered by the jury in determining the defendant's intent, in inferring malice, and in contradicting his story of accidental stabbing or his contention of self-defense.

Despite the considerable conflict in the testimony, it 2. appears there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

Myers, C.J., Arterburn, J., concur. Jackson, J., concurs in result. Achor, J., not participating.

NOTE. — Reported in 214 N.E.2d 644.

WYNN v. STATE