Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Submitted by Julius E. Schindler for appellant. Submitted by Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, John C. Cooper, III, Assistant Attorney General, and Donald W. Mason, State's Attorney for Allegany County, for appellee.
Judges
  • BARNES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Submitted by Julius E. Schindler for appellant. Submitted by Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, John C. Cooper, III, Assistant Attorney General, and Donald W. Mason, State's Attorney for Allegany County, for appellee.
Judges
  • BARNES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Walters v. State (Court of Appeals of Maryland, Decided April 19, 1966)

Factual and Procedural Background

Donald L. Walters was tried in the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Judge Naughton) in a non-jury trial on a two-count criminal information charging robbery (first count) and assault (second count). The trial court found Walters not guilty on the robbery count and guilty on the assault count. He was sentenced to five years in the Maryland Penitentiary. On appeal, counsel for Walters contended that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict. Walters, representing himself, later raised additional contentions (regarding identification procedures, arrest without warrant, and prosecution on a criminal information), which the Court notes were not raised below but addresses in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for assault in a bench trial.
  2. Whether the court should consider pro se contentions (not raised at trial) regarding: (a) alleged improper extrajudicial identification procedures; (b) arrest without a warrant; and (c) propriety of prosecution on a criminal information charging robbery.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (by court-appointed counsel)

  • The evidence was legally insufficient to convict Walters of assault.

Appellant's Pro Se Contentions

  • Denial of due process through "slipshod" methods employed by Cumberland police in the identification of Walters by the victim (extrajudicial identification procedures).
  • Denial of due process because Walters was arrested without a warrant.
  • Prosecution upon a criminal information charging robbery was improper because robbery is a common-law felony and, the appellant asserts, prosecution by information without grand jury waiver was improper.

Appellee's Position (as reflected in the Court's analysis)

  • The victim's in-court identification, together with circumstances (area described as extremely well lit and an extrajudicial identification the following morning), provided legally sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
  • Extrajudicial identification testimony by the victim is admissible to corroborate and bolster her credibility; the trial judge was informed of the circumstances and could weigh credibility.
  • The arrest without a warrant was justified because the police had probable cause to believe a robbery had occurred and that Walters was the assailant.
  • Although prosecution for robbery by information might raise procedural concerns (robbery characterized as a common-law felony), Walters was acquitted on the robbery count; the assault conviction (a misdemeanor) was properly prosecuted by information under Maryland Rule 708.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650, 210 A.2d 722, 723-724 (1965) The standard of review in bench trials: the trial court's judgment will not be set aside on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the court's opportunity to judge credibility. Used to frame the applicable deference to the trial court's factual findings and credibility assessments in this non-jury trial.
Wesbecker v. State, 240 Md. 41, 212 A.2d 737 (1965) Support for the standard of review in bench trials (consistent treatment of bench-trial review). Cited as additional authority reinforcing deference to the trial court's credibility determinations.
Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 206 A.2d 138 (1965) Also cited for the bench-trial standard and, separately, for post-conviction/collateral-attack considerations. Invoked both to support the standard of review and to justify disposing of unpreserved issues now because they might be raised later in collateral proceedings.
Davis v. Warden, 235 Md. 637, 201 A.2d 672 (1964) The proposition that identification by the victim is ample evidence to sustain a conviction. Relied upon to hold that the victim's identification was legally sufficient to convict Walters.
Rakes v. State, 227 Md. 172, 175 A.2d 579 (1961) Supports the sufficiency of victim identification to sustain conviction. Cited with Davis as authority that the victim's identification suffices for conviction.
Gregoire v. State, 211 Md. 514, 128 A.2d 243 (1957) The testimony of a victim, unlike that of an accomplice, requires no corroboration. Applied to reject any claim that the victim's testimony required corroboration to sustain the assault conviction.
Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917 (1956) Similar authority that victim testimony needs no corroboration. Reinforced the point that victim testimony alone may be sufficient for conviction.
Shipley v. State, 220 Md. 463, 468, 154 A.2d 708, 711 (1959) The trial judge is not bound to accept alibi testimony. Applied to uphold the trial judge's rejection (or nonacceptance) of alibi testimony, especially where it conflicted with the defendant's prior statements.
Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174, 146 A.2d 29, 32 (1958) A witness' testimony regarding a prior extrajudicial identification should be admitted to corroborate and bolster credibility; distinguishable from third-party hearsay of extrajudicial ID which must be made under proper circumstances. Used to justify admitting the victim's testimony about her extrajudicial identification and to explain the trial judge's role in assessing its weight and credibility.
Graham v. State, 239 Md. 521, 212 A.2d 287 (1965) Defines the probable cause standard required for warrantless arrests (reasonably trustworthy information and reasonable grounds to believe the person is guilty). Cited to support the court's conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Walters without a warrant.
Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80 (1960) Also cited for the definition and elements of probable cause for warrantless arrest. Used with Graham to conclude the elements for probable cause were present here.
Jones v. State, 242 Md. 95, 218 A.2d 7 Referenced among cases concerning probable cause and arrest authority. Listed as additional authority in the probable cause discussion.
Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 204 A.2d 500 (1964) Cited in connection with issues that might be raised in post-conviction proceedings. Included as authority supporting the court's practice of addressing unpreserved issues that could be litigated collaterally.
Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 126 A.2d 576 (1956) Statement that robbery is a common-law felony (and thus implicates grand jury waiver requirements under Maryland Rule 709). Used to explain the procedural point that prosecution for robbery by information may be improper absent a waiver, but the point was moot as the defendant was acquitted on the robbery count.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by applying the well-established standard of review for bench trials: a trial court's judgment will not be set aside on the evidence unless it is clearly erroneous, with due regard given to the trial court's opportunity to judge witness credibility (Jacobs v. State and related cases). The Court found that the prosecuting witness, Mrs. Jennie Mae Mollinary, positively identified Walters in open court as her assailant. Although the assault occurred shortly after midnight, police testimony described the location as "extremely well lit," and Mrs. Mollinary had made an extrajudicial identification of Walters the morning after the assault when taken to Walters' residence.

The Court relied on precedent establishing that identification by a victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction, and that victim testimony does not require corroboration (Davis v. Warden, Rakes v. State, Gregoire v. State, Basoff v. State). Thus, Mrs. Mollinary's testimony was legally sufficient to convict.

Regarding alibi evidence, the Court noted that Walters had given oral and written statements placing himself in various locations that conflicted with the alibi testimony provided at trial (by William Cottrell). On this point the Court cited authority that the trial judge is not bound to accept alibi testimony, especially when it conflicts with the defendant's prior statements (Shipley v. State), and concluded the judge could properly reject or discredit the alibi.

Walters' pro se points were not preserved at trial and thus ordinarily were not properly before the appellate court (Maryland Rule 885). The Court nonetheless addressed them to anticipate possible collateral attack. First, the Court rejected the claim that the extrajudicial identification was inadmissible: testimony by a witness about a prior extrajudicial identification may be admitted to corroborate and bolster the witness' credibility (Judy v. State), and the trial judge had been fully informed of the circumstances and properly exercised his credibility-assessing function.

Second, the Court concluded the warrantless arrest was lawful because the circumstances (the victim's purse missing after the assault and her identification of Walters) gave the arresting officer reasonably trustworthy information and reasonable grounds to believe a robbery had been committed and that Walters was guilty—satisfying the probable cause standard (Graham v. State, Mulcahy v. State, and related authorities).

Third, the Court acknowledged that prosecution for robbery by information may raise procedural problems because robbery was characterized as a common-law felony (Hayes v. State) and, under Maryland Rule 709, prosecution of a felony by information requires a waiver of grand jury action. However, Walters was acquitted on the robbery count, so any procedural defect as to that count caused him no prejudice. The assault conviction, a misdemeanor, was properly prosecuted by information under Maryland Rule 708.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Direct effect: The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction for assault and the sentence imposed. The trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations were upheld under the bench-trial standard of review. The Court rejected the appellant's insufficiency claim and, after addressing unpreserved pro se contentions, found no reversible error regarding the extrajudicial identification, the warrantless arrest, or the procedure for prosecuting the assault count by information.

No new legal rule or broader precedent was announced; the Court applied existing Maryland authorities to resolve the appeal.

Show full summary ...

WALTERS v. STATE

CRIMINAL LAW — Assault — Evidence Was Sufficient To Convict — Identification By The Victim Is Ample Evidence To Sustain A Conviction And Needs No Corroboration — The Trial Judge Is Not Bound To Accept Alibi Testimony, Especially Where It Conflicts With A Defendant's Own Prior Statements. pp. 237-238

APPEAL — Where A Case Is Tried Without A Jury, The Trial Court's Judgment Will Not Be Set Aside On The Evidence Unless Clearly Erroneous And Due Regard Will Be Given To The Opportunity Of The Lower Court To Judge The Credibility Of The Witnesses. p. 237

APPEAL — Contentions Not Raised Below Are Not Properly Before The Court On Appeal. p. 238

IDENTIFICATION — Extrajudicial — Witness' Testimony Pertaining To — Should Be Admitted For The Purpose Of Corroborating The Witness And Bolstering His Credibility — The Trial Judge Here Was Fully Informed Of The Circumstances Surrounding The Extrajudicial Identification In This Case And It Was His Proper Function To Determine The Credibility And Weight Of The Testimony — His Determination Will Not Be Set Aside Unless Clearly Erroneous. p. 239

ARREST — Without A Warrant — Police Here Held To Have Had Probable Cause To Believe That The Felony Of Robbery Had Been Committed And That The Defendant Had Committed It. pp. 239-240

CRIMINAL LAW — Defendant's Contention That His Prosecution Upon A Criminal Information Charging Robbery Was Improper Since Robbery Is A Common Law Felony Held To Be Without Merit Because He Was Not Found Guilty Under The Robbery Count — Defendant Had No Ground To Object To Prosecution Of The Assault And Battery Count Upon An Information Since The Crime Of Which He Was Convicted Is A Misdemeanor And The Procedure Was Proper Under Maryland Rule 708. p. 240

H.C.

Decided April 19, 1966.

BARNES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant, Donald L. Walters, the defendant below, was convicted in a trial by the court sitting without a jury on the second count of a criminal information charging assault. He was found not guilty on the first count of the information charging robbery. Walters was sentenced to five years in the Maryland Penitentiary. On this appeal Walters contends by his court appointed counsel, that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict.

In Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650, 210 A.2d 722, 723-724 (1965) we repeated what we have said many times before, that:

"* * * [W]here the case is tried before the trial court without a jury, the trial court's `judgment will not be set aside on the evidence unless clearly erroneous and due regard will be given to the opportunity of the lower court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.'"

See also Wesbecker v. State, 240 Md. 41, 212 A.2d 737 (1965); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 291, 206 A.2d 138, 143 (1965).

The prosecuting witness, Mrs. Jennie Mae Mollinary, positively identified Walters in open court as her assailant. While the assault occurred at night (12:30 A.M.), Officer Hutt of the Cumberland, Maryland police department testified that it took place in an extremely well lit area. Mrs. Mollinary, moreover, testified in regard to an extrajudicial identification of Walters made by her on the morning following the assault when she was taken by a police officer to Walters' residence.

Identification by the victim is ample evidence to sustain a conviction. Davis v. Warden, 235 Md. 637, 201 A.2d 672 (1964); Rakes v. State, 227 Md. 172, 175 A.2d 579 (1961) and cases cited therein. The testimony of a victim, unlike that of an accomplice, needs no corroboration. Gregoire v. State, 211 Md. 514, 128 A.2d 243 (1957); Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917 (1956). The testimony of Mrs. Mollinary was legally sufficient to convict.

After his arrest, Walters furnished Lieutenant See of the Cumberland, Maryland police department with an oral statement concerning his activities on the night the assault took place. He stated that he was at the home of William A. Cottrell between 10:30 and 11:00 P.M., then at two bars until 1:00 A.M., after which he went to the home of a Mr. and Mrs. Canfield. William Baker, a county investigator, interrogated Walters. An unsigned statement was taken in which Walters claimed to have been at the Cottrell home from 12:30 A.M. to 2:00 A.M. on the night of the assault. Mr. Cottrell, whose daughter is married to Walters' brother, gave alibi testimony placing Walters in Mr. Cottrell's home from 12:25 A.M. to 2:00 A.M.

All the evidence is to be considered together, and the trial judge is not bound to accept alibi testimony. Shipley v. State, 220 Md. 463, 468, 154 A.2d 708, 711 (1959). This is especially true where, as here, alibi testimony conflicts with a defendant's own prior statements.

Walters, in proper person, raises the following points on this appeal:

(1) denial of due process through slipshod methods employed by Cumberland police in the identification of Walters by the victim,

(2) denial of due process because he was arrested without a warrant,

(3) illegal prosecution on a criminal information.

These points were not raised below and are not properly before this Court on appeal. Maryland Rule 885; Basoff v. State, supra. As these issues might be raised in a post conviction proceeding, we will dispose of them now in anticipation of a possible later collateral attack on the conviction. See Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 292, 206 A.2d 138, 144 (1965); Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 204 A.2d 500 (1964).

Walters' first contention is without merit. We assume Walters claims that the extrajudicial identification of him by Mrs. Mollinary was obtained under conditions of unreliability and unfairness since it was made informally without resort to a police lineup, and no other individuals were presented in a group from whom Mrs. Mollinary identified her assailant. The answer to this argument is that a witness' testimony as to a prior extrajudicial identification "should be admitted for the purpose of corroborating the witness and bolstering his credibility * * *." Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174, 146 A.2d 29, 32 (1958). This situation should be distinguished from that in which a police officer or some third party testifies as to an extrajudicial identification made in his presence by an eye-witness. The testimony in that case would be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, and the testimony must have been made under "proper circumstances precluding the suspicion of unfairness or unreliability." Judy v. State, supra and numerous authorities and cases cited therein.

The trial judge was fully informed of the circumstances surrounding the extrajudicial identification in this case. It was his proper function to determine the credibility of the witness and to attach that weight to her testimony which he thought proper. His determination will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.

Walters' second contention likewise affords him no ground for relief. Mrs. Mollinary was carrying a purse at the time of the assault. After her assailant fled, the purse was gone. Although she did not actually see him carry the purse away, the police had probable cause, under the circumstances, to believe that a robbery had been committed. When Mrs. Mollinary identified Walters as her assailant the police officer accompanying her had good cause to believe that Walters was guilty of the felony of robbery, and this would justify taking Walters into custody without a warrant.

For "probable cause" to exist when making an arrest without a warrant the arresting officer must have "reasonably trustworthy information" to warrant a man of "reasonable caution" to believe that the offense had been committed and "reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested is guilty" of that offense. Graham v. State, 239 Md. 521, 212 A.2d 287 (1965); Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80 (1960). See also Jones v. State, 242 Md. 95, 218 A.2d 7, and the cases cited therein. All the elements necessary for "probable cause" were present in this case. Walters' arrest was not illegal.

In regard to Walters' third contention, his prosecution upon a criminal information charging robbery was improper since robbery is a common law felony ( Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 126 A.2d 576 (1956)), and under Maryland Rule 709 an accused may not be prosecuted for a felony upon a criminal information unless he has first waived his right to action by the grand jury. Apparently, such a waiver was not obtained by the State. Walters, however, was found not guilty under the robbery count. Since the prosecuting witness did not actually see Walters carry away her purse, the trial judge was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a robbery had been committed and that the purse had not been merely lost during the assault.

Walters has no ground to object to prosecution of the assault and battery count upon an information. The crime of which he was convicted is a misdemeanor, and the procedure was proper under Maryland Rule 708.

Judgment affirmed.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.
Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

Comments

WALTERS v. STATE
(Apr 19, 1966)