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Green v. State, No. 185, September Term, 1965 (Decided June 6, 1966)

Factual and Procedural Background

Vernon L. Green was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, before Judge Dulany Foster, on an indictment charging rape in the first count and common law assault (based on the same facts) in the third count. The case was tried without a jury. The trial court found Green guilty on both counts and imposed a five-year sentence on the rape count and a concurrent two-year sentence on the assault count. Green appealed, advancing questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the assault conviction merged into the rape conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Was the evidence legally sufficient to support the trial court's verdict on the first count (rape)?
  2. Did the offense of common law assault merge into the offense of rape such that the assault conviction should be vacated?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The evidence was insufficient to establish the element of penetration (pointing to medical testimony that the prosecutrix's hymen was not ruptured).
  • Conflicting testimony existed between two of the State's witnesses (Patricia Thomas and the prosecutrix), undermining the State's case.
  • At trial Green asserted that the sexual intercourse was consensual and that he did not choke, threaten, or force the prosecutrix; on appeal he also argued lack of penetration (which the court described as inconsistent with the consent defense).

Appellee's (State's) Position

  • The State relied on the prosecutrix's testimony and the defendant's admissions to establish penetration and the elements of rape.
  • The State conceded that the assault should be merged into the rape conviction (i.e., conceded the correctness of appellant's merger contention).
  • The State noted that medical testimony that the hymen was not ruptured did not defeat proof of penetration because rupture of the hymen is not required to prove penetration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Craig v. State, 214 Md. 546, 136 A.2d 243 Hymenal rupture is not necessary to prove penetration. Used to reject appellant's contention that medical evidence of an unruptured hymen defeated proof of penetration.
McKenzie v. State, 236 Md. 597, 204 A.2d 678 On weighing credibility, the trier of fact is not bound by a State witness's testimony when considering other evidence. Applied to explain that although the State could not impeach its own witness, the court could weigh Patricia Thomas's testimony against the prosecutrix's testimony and resolve credibility.
McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 Standard for reversing bench trial convictions: reversal requires a showing of no legally sufficient evidence from which guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could be found. Quoted and applied as the legal standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury trial.
Johnson, Etc. v. State, 238 Md. 528, 209 A.2d 765 The prosecutrix's testimony alone may be legally sufficient and need not be corroborated. Relied upon to support the conclusion that the prosecutrix's testimony alone supplied legally sufficient evidence of rape.
Spencer v. State, 235 Md. 129, 200 A.2d 643 A trial court is not obligated to believe a defendant's denial of criminal conduct. Used to state that the trial court was not required to accept Green's denial of coercion.
Ponder v. State, 227 Md. 570, 177 A.2d 839 Similar principle that the court need not believe the defendant's testimony. Also cited to support the point that the court could disbelieve Green's testimony.
Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 182 A.2d 815 Modern test for merger: whether one crime necessarily involves the other. Cited to explain the applicable modern concept of merger of offenses.
Veney v. State, 227 Md. 608, 177 A.2d 883 Same modern merger concept: test is whether one crime necessarily involves the other. Applied to determine whether assault merged into rape.
Tucker v. State, 237 Md. 422, 206 A.2d 691 Example/authority regarding merger analysis under Maryland law. Cited as supporting authority for merging the assault into the rape where elements overlapped.
Marks v. State, 230 Md. 108, 185 A.2d 909 Another authority addressing merger or related sentencing issues. Cited as precedent consistent with the court's merger conclusion.
Bennington v. Warden, 190 Md. 752, 59 A.2d 779 Additional authority on the relationship of offenses for merger purposes. Referenced as part of the line of cases supporting merger where lesser offense elements are essential to the greater offense.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first set out the facts as developed at trial: the prosecutrix's testimony that Green grabbed her in a bedroom, choked and threatened her, forced her legs apart and, against her will, inserted his penis into her vagina; the prosecutrix's flight and immediate report to a friend; Dr. Boggio's examination four hours later showing a faint neck bruise and a small break with fresh bleeding in the hymenal ring but no complete rupture; and Green's admission (in a written post-arrest statement introduced by the State and in trial testimony) that he had inserted the head of his penis into the prosecutrix's vagina while denying force, choking, or threats and asserting consent.

Addressing appellant's sufficiency arguments, the court observed that the defense of consent presented at trial was inconsistent with the appellate "no penetration" argument, undermining the latter. The court held that the medical observation that the hymen was not completely ruptured was immaterial because it has never been necessary that the hymen be ruptured to prove penetration (citing Craig v. State). Given the prosecutrix's testimony and Green's admissions, the court concluded the element of penetration was proven.

Regarding witness conflicts, the court acknowledged that some State witness testimony (Patricia Thomas) tended to support the defendant's version. Nevertheless, the court explained that while the State could not impeach its own witness, it was not absolutely bound by that witness's testimony to the exclusion of the prosecutrix's testimony. The trier of fact was entitled to weigh credibility and resolve conflicts (citing McKenzie and related authority), and the appellate court would not disturb the trial court's credibility determinations absent a showing the evidence was legally insufficient (citing McCray).

On merger, the court accepted the appellant's contention (conceded by the State) that the assault merged into the rape. The court described the modern Maryland test for merger as whether one crime necessarily involves the other (citing Bennett and Veney). Because the facts establishing the assault were essential elements of the rape, the court concluded the assault was not a distinct offense and therefore was merged into the rape conviction (citing Tucker, Marks, Bennington and related cases).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the judgment as to the first count (rape) and vacated the judgment as to the third count (common law assault). Costs were apportioned: three-fourths to be paid by the State and one-fourth by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the rape conviction and five-year sentence remain in force; the concurrent two-year sentence for assault was vacated.
  • The court applied established Maryland principles (including that a prosecutrix's testimony alone may suffice and that hymenal rupture is not necessary to prove penetration) and did not purport to create new law; no broader novel precedent was claimed in the opinion.

GREEN v. STATE

RAPE — The Defense Of Consent To The Intercourse Made In The Court Below And The "No Penetration" Argument Made On Appeal Held To Be Inconsistent. p. 79

RAPE — Proof Of Penetration — Not Necessary That The Victim's Hymen Be Ruptured To Prove Penetration — The Element Of Penetration Was Held Proven Here. pp. 79-80

RAPE — Evidence Of — Where Much Of A State's Witness's Testimony Tended To Support The Defendant's Testimony Rather Than The Victim's It Was Held That Although The State Could Not Impeach Its Own Witness, It Was By No Means Absolutely Bound By The Witness's Testimony To The Exclusion Of The Testimony Of The Victim — It Was For The Trier Of Fact To Weigh The Testimony Of The Witness And Determine Her Credibility And His Determination Of Such Issues Will Not Be Disturbed On Appeal. p. 80

RAPE — Evidence Of, Held Legally Sufficient Here Based On The Testimony Of The Prosecutrix Alone, Which As A Matter Of Law Need Not Be Corroborated — Trial Court Was Under No Obligation To Believe The Defendant's Denial Of The Crime. p. 80

CRIMINAL LAW — Crime Of Assault Held Merged Into The Crime Of Rape In This Case — The Evidence Here Showed That The Two Crimes Were Not Separate And Distinct And The Facts Used To Establish The Lesser Offense Of Assault Were Essential Elements In Establishing The Greater Offense Of Rape, And Thus The Assault Was Merged Into The Rape. pp. 80-81

H.C. Decided June 6, 1966.

MARBURY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant Vernon L. Green was brought to trial under an indictment which charged him in the first count with rape of one Beverly Alston and in the third count, based on the facts set forth in the first count, with common law assault on the same victim. The case was heard before Judge Dulany Foster, sitting without a jury, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, and the defendant-appellant was found guilty on both the first and third counts. Judge Foster imposed a sentence of five years in the Maryland Correctional Institution under the first count, and two years in the same institution under the third count, both sentences to run concurrently.

On this appeal the appellant raises two questions: (1) Was the evidence legally sufficient to support the verdict of the trial court on the first (rape) count, and (2) did the offense of assault become merged into that of rape.

On March 1, 1965, at about 6:30 in the evening, Vernon Green was visited at his home by a male friend, one Carlton Jones, the latter being accompanied by the eighteen year old prosecuting witness, Beverly Alston, whom Green had never met before, and Beverly's girl friend, Patricia Thomas. Green was then joined by another male friend, and the five youths proceeded to talk and listen to phonograph records. The group disbanded at about 9:00 p.m., but they all agreed to meet soon thereafter at a downtown Baltimore restaurant.

After the party had regrouped at the designated restaurant, apparently at about 10:00 p.m., Carlton Jones recruited a male by the name of Bell who drove them out to an Elks Home. The defendant-appellant went into the Home while the others remained in the car and he emerged some time later in the company of several male companions, who, along with Green squeezed into Bell's vehicle — the total occupants of which then numbered nine boys and the two girls.

After driving around for about an hour, it was decided, pursuant to Bell's suggestion, that the group should all repair to Bell's residence at 2122 Herbert Street. After arriving at the Bell home, at about 12:30 a.m. (March 2, 1965), records were played and some of the group sang songs.

According to the testimony of Beverly Alston the following events then transpired: After Beverly observed her girl friend and Carlton Jones depart for one of the upstairs bedrooms, she decided to go upstairs to use the bathroom facilities. Unaccompanied, she ascended the stairs and located the bathroom which was within a back bedroom. When she came out of the bathroom into the bedroom Green stood before her with his penis in his hand; he grabbed her and forced her onto the bed; she screamed; the defendant pulled her hair, then choked her and threatened to kill her if she screamed again; a long struggle then ensued and the defendant forced her legs apart and against her will inserted his penis into her vagina. She testified that while the defendant was on top of her Bell came into the bedroom and talked to Green but she did not ask for Bell's assistance in repelling the attacker because (1) she did not feel that Bell would be likely to come to her aid if she so requested, and (2) she was afraid of the defendant Green. Green asked Bell to leave the room and when he refused, the defendant got up and left the bedroom.

Beverly Alston further testified that she then went downstairs but that no one was there except Bell, who had followed her; she asked Bell to unlock the front door so that she could go outside to vomit, and when the door was opened she fled to the nearby abode of her friend, one Bernice Mason. Miss Mason testified that the prosecutrix immediately reported to her that the "boy that I was with tonight * * * almost choked me to death" and that he had "tried" to rape her. Police were immediately summoned and the defendant was placed under arrest.

Dr. Boggio, a medical doctor employed by the Baltimore City Police Department, who examined the prosecutrix four hours after the alleged rape occurred, testified that his examination disclosed a faint bruise forming on the girl's neck, that her hymen was "relatively intact" but he observed a small area of fresh bleeding from a small break in the hymenal ring. He testified that there had not been a complete penetration of the hymen but there "could possibly have been a partial penetration," inasmuch as the "hymen was dilated to admit one finger."

At his trial, Green's defense was that he had the consent and full cooperation of the prosecutrix when they were engaged in the act of sexual intercourse. He testified that he had become friendly with Beverly Alston during the hours he had been with her before his arrest, and that when they arrived at Bell's residence she had consented to go up to the bedroom with him. In a written statement taken immediately after his arrest, which was introduced into evidence by the State without objection, and in his oral testimony before the court, Green admitted inserting the head of his penis into the prosecutrix's vagina, but he specifically denied that he had choked, threatened or forced her in any way to have such relations with him. He testified that he and the prosecutrix were interrupted "three or four times" by Bell while in the bedroom, and that after the last interruption he (Green) left and went over to the adjoining bedroom to talk to Carlton Jones and Patricia Thomas. Green testified that after about fifteen minutes in the other bedroom, he heard Beverly Alston scream (from downstairs) for his help; he asked what was the matter and Bell was heard to reply "nothing"; he did not bother to further investigate, and about fifteen minutes later he heard the front door slam. He then went downstairs and Beverly Alston was gone. Green theorized that the reason that the prosecutrix accused him of rape was because he had not come to her aid when she had called for him.

Patricia Thomas, who was called by the State, but in retrospect was by no means a friendly witness for it, testified that she never heard Beverly cry for help while the latter was in the back bedroom with Green; that while the two were in the back bedroom she saw Bell, as well as two other males, whom she was unable to identify, enter that room several times; that she later, while Green was chatting with her and Jones in the front bedroom, heard Beverly scream for help from downstairs.

Besides the defendant himself, the defense produced one Calvin Williams, who, like the defendant, was the possessor of an extensive criminal record. Williams testified that he was in the group at the Bell residence and that at one point in the evening he had gone upstairs and observed the defendant and Beverly sitting on the bed engaged in conversation, and that in his opinion Beverly could have gotten up and walked out of the open door if she had wanted to. Carlton Jones was also called to testify for the defense and he reiterated in all material aspects the testimony of Patricia Thomas.

The appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the rape count because (1) there was insufficient evidence of penetration, and (2) two of the State's own witnesses (Patricia Thomas and the prosecutrix) told conflicting stories. Appellant's first point is without merit since it is obvious that the defense of consent to the intercourse, which was made in the court below, and the "no penetration" argument made here on appeal are manifestly inconsistent. In any event, the appellant stresses the testimony of Dr. Boggio to the effect that the prosecutrix's hymen was not ruptured when he examined her. But this testimony is immaterial inasmuch as it has never been necessary that the victim's hymen be ruptured in order that the element of penetration be proven. See Craig v. State, 214 Md. 546, 549, 136 A.2d 243. In the light of the prosecuting witness's testimony, plus the defendant's own admissions, there can be no doubt that the element of penetration was proven. Appellant's second point is based upon the fact that much of a State's witness's (Patricia Thomas') testimony tended to support the defendant's version of the events which transpired in the Bell home rather than Beverly Alston's. Although the State could not impeach its own witness, it was by no means absolutely bound by her testimony to the exclusion of the testimony of the prosecutrix. It was for the trier of the facts to weigh the testimony of Patricia Thomas and to determine her credibility (see McKenzie v. State, 236 Md. 597, 603, 204 A.2d 678) and his determination of such issues will not be disturbed on appeal.

In McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 15, 202 A.2d 320, this Court used the following language which is also apposite here:

"For this Court to reverse a judgment entered in a case tried by the lower court without a jury, it must be shown that there was no legally sufficient evidence, or proper inferences therefrom, from which the court could find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Here there was such legally sufficient evidence of the crime of rape based on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone, which as a matter of law need not be corroborated. Johnson, Etc. v. State, 238 Md. 528, 536, 209 A.2d 765. Although Green denied that he coerced Beverly Alston to have sexual intercourse with him, the court was, of course, under no obligation to believe him. Spencer v. State, 235 Md. 129, 200 A.2d 643; Ponder v. State, 227 Md. 570, 177 A.2d 839.

Appellant's second contention, which is that the crime of assault merged into the crime of rape, has merit. The State in its brief and oral argument concedes the correctness of this contention. Most jurisdictions, including Maryland, have abolished the common law doctrine of merger and the true test under the modern concept of merger of offenses, is whether one crime necessarily involves the other. Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 182 A.2d 815; Veney v. State, 227 Md. 608, 177 A.2d 883. The evidence in the instant case shows that the two crimes in question were not separate and distinct and that the facts used to establish the lesser offense of assault were essential elements in establishing the greater offense of rape, and thus the assault was merged into the rape. See Tucker v. State, 237 Md. 422, 206 A.2d 691; Marks v. State, 230 Md. 108, 185 A.2d 909; Bennington v. Warden, 190 Md. 752, 59 A.2d 779.

The verdict and judgment on the first count will therefore be affirmed, but the verdict and concurrent two year sentence on the third count will be vacated.

Judgment as to count one affirmed.

Judgment as to count three vacated.

Three-fourths of the costs to be paid by the State and the remaining one-fourth by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

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GREEN v. STATE
(Jun 6, 1966)