AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Memorandum Opinion Summary — Stephenson, Chief Judge (Sept. 1, 1966)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs John F. Tinker (age 15), Mary Beth Tinker (age 13) and Christopher Eckhardt (age 15), represented by next friends, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking nominal damages and an injunction against the Des Moines Independent Community School District, its Board of Directors and certain administrative officials and teachers. Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

In December 1965 school officials learned that several students intended to wear black arm bands to express views relating to the war in Vietnam. The school district promulgated a regulation prohibiting the wearing of arm bands on school facilities. After the regulation was adopted, the named plaintiffs (and two younger siblings of the Tinkers, Paul and Hope, who also wore arm bands) wore black arm bands to their respective schools, knowing of the regulation. Each plaintiff testified that the arm bands were worn to mourn those who had died in the Vietnam war and to support Senator Robert F. Kennedy's proposal regarding a truce for Christmas Day 1965. After varying periods at school, each of the plaintiffs was sent home for violating the arm band regulation. They later returned to school after the Christmas holidays and did not wear arm bands then.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the school district's regulation forbidding the wearing of arm bands on school facilities deprived the plaintiffs of constitutional rights secured by the First Amendment's freedom of speech clause, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The opinion reports that plaintiffs relied on recent Fifth Circuit opinions (Burnside v. Byars and Blackwell v. Essaquena County Board of Education) involving the wearing of "freedom buttons" in schools, which the plaintiffs cited in support of their position that the regulation was not reasonable and that their First Amendment rights were infringed.

The opinion does not set out a detailed, itemized presentation of the defendants' separate legal arguments in the record beyond the school officials' articulated objective to maintain a disciplined classroom atmosphere and the promulgation and enforcement of the arm band regulation for that purpose.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) That an individual's right of free speech is protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court invoked Gitlow to state the baseline constitutional principle that First Amendment protections apply against the states.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Burnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) That symbolic acts such as wearing an arm band are protected by the First Amendment's free speech clause. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that wearing an arm band is a form of symbolic expression within First Amendment protection.
Stromberg v. People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) Support for the proposition that symbolic expression falls within First Amendment protection. Used along with other precedents to demonstrate that symbolic acts are protected speech.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) Example that First Amendment protections are not absolute; a court may uphold restrictions in some contexts. Quoted among authorities to show limits on free speech protections.
Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) Support for the proposition that First Amendment protections are not absolute. Cited to show that free speech limitations have been recognized in certain contexts.
Pocket Books, Inc. v. Walsh, 204 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1962) Another instance cited to show that First Amendment protections are not absolute. Included in the list of authorities illustrating that speech protections may be limited.
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) Articulates a balancing test: whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the danger. The court quoted this language as a way to frame the inquiry into whether a regulation abridging speech is justified by the governmental objective.
Burnside v. Byars, 5th Cir., 363 F.2d 744 (July 21, 1966) Held that a school regulation prohibiting "freedom buttons" was not reasonable where the exercise of expression did not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline; stated that school officials cannot infringe on students' right to free and unrestricted expression where such expression does not materially and substantially interfere with discipline. The plaintiffs cited Burnside; the court acknowledged the decision but noted it was not binding and explicitly declined to limit school officials' authority to only those instances where a material or substantial interference actually occurs.
Blackwell v. Essaquena County Board of Education, 5th Cir., 363 F.2d 749 (July 21, 1966) Another Fifth Circuit decision concerning wearing of "freedom buttons" in schools. The plaintiffs cited this case as supporting their position; the court recognized it but treated it as non-binding authority for this court.
John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964) Illustrates that decisions of another Circuit (here, the Fifth Circuit) are not binding on the Eighth Circuit/district courts within its jurisdiction. The court cited John Deere Co. to justify not treating the Fifth Circuit's Burnside/Blackwell decisions as binding precedent in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps grounded in the factual context presented in the record and the legal authorities cited:

  1. Constitutional framework: The court began by recognizing that First Amendment free speech rights are applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Gitlow) and that symbolic acts (such as wearing an arm band) fall within First Amendment protection (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Burnette and Stromberg).
  2. Limits on speech: The court acknowledged established authorities demonstrating that First Amendment protections are not absolute (citing Dennis, Near and Pocket Books) and invoked the balancing approach articulated in United States v. Dennis (183 F.2d 201) — asking whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies the invasion of speech necessary to avoid the danger.
  3. Role and duties of school officials: The court emphasized that school officials have responsibility and an obligation to maintain a scholarly, disciplined classroom atmosphere and to prevent anything that might be disruptive. The court stated that, unless actions of school officials are unreasonable, courts should not interfere with their determinations.
  4. Factual context and anticipation of disruption: The court placed significant weight on the broader and contemporaneous controversy over the Vietnam war, including public protests and draft-card burning incidents, and on the fact that the school board had held a hearing at which both sides were vocal before adopting the rule. Given this heated environment, the court found it reasonable for school officials to anticipate that the wearing of black arm bands might provoke reactions and comments from other students likely to disturb classroom discipline.
  5. Balancing interests and deference: While recognizing that the arm bands themselves might not be disruptive, the court found that anticipation of disturbance provided a reasonable basis for the regulation. The court rejected the view that school officials' actions must be confined only to instances of material and substantial interference (as suggested by the Fifth Circuit cases cited by plaintiffs) and instead afforded school officials wide discretion to adopt measures reasonably calculated to prevent anticipated disruptions.
  6. Narrowness of the infringement: The court noted that the plaintiffs' freedom of speech was infringed only to a limited extent because they remained free to wear the arm bands off school premises and to participate in orderly classroom discussion of the subject.
  7. Conclusion of reasonableness: Based on the foregoing legal framework, the facts surrounding the controversy, and deference to school officials' responsibility to preserve classroom discipline, the court concluded the arm band regulation was reasonable under the circumstances and did not deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to free speech.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court denied the plaintiffs' request for an injunction and nominal damages and ordered that judgment be entered accordingly.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision: Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief and nominal damages were rejected; the school district's regulation prohibiting arm bands on school premises was upheld as reasonable in the circumstances presented.
  • The court did not adopt the narrower rule articulated in the cited Fifth Circuit decisions (that restrictions are unreasonable unless there is a material and substantial interference). Instead, the court afforded broader discretion to school officials to adopt preventative measures when a disruption could reasonably be anticipated.
  • The opinion does not announce that it is establishing a novel, binding precedent beyond the case's disposition; it simply upholds the regulation as reasonable on the facts before the court and notes that Fifth Circuit decisions cited by plaintiffs are not binding on this court (citing John Deere Co. v. Graham).

John F. TINKER and Mary Beth Tinker, minors, by their father and next friend, Leonard Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, minor, by his father and next friend, William Eckhardt, Plaintiffs, v. The DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHENSON, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs instituted this action against the Des Moines Independent Community School District, its Board of Directors and certain administrative officials and teachers thereof in an attempt to recover nominal damages and obtain an injunction pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

The events giving rise to this controversy took place in December 1965. During the second week of that month, it came to the attention of certain school officials that several students intended to wear black arm bands for the purpose of expressing their beliefs relating to the war in Viet Nam. A regulation was then promulgated by officials of the defendant school district prohibiting the wearing of arm bands on school facilities. After the regulation had been established, the plaintiffs, John Tinker, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, wore black arm bands to their respective schools. Each of the plaintiffs testified that their purpose in wearing the arm bands was to mourn those who had died in the Viet Nam war and to support Senator Robert F. Kennedy's proposal that the truce proposed for Christmas Day, 1965, be extended indefinitely. The plaintiffs herein were all aware of the regulation prohibiting the wearing of arm bands when they wore them to school. After being in their schools for varying lengths of time, each plaintiff was sent home by school officials for violating the regulation prohibiting the wearing of arm bands on school premises. Each plaintiff returned to school following the Christmas holidays. They did not wear arm bands at that time.

Plaintiff John F. Tinker, age 15, attended North High; plaintiff Mary Beth Tinker, age 13, attended Warren Harding Junior High; plaintiff Christopher Eckhardt, age 15, attended Roosevelt High; Paul and Hope Tinker, age 8 and 11 respectively, younger brother and sister of plaintiffs John and Mary Beth Tinker also wore arm bands to their respective schools.

The question which now must be determined is whether the action of officials of the defendant school district forbidding the wearing of arm bands on school facilities deprived the plaintiffs of constitutional rights secured by the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment. An individual's right of free speech is protected against state infringement by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925). The wearing of an arm band for the purpose of expressing certain views is a symbolic act and falls within the protection of the first amendment's free speech clause. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Burnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); Stromberg v People of State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). However, the protections of that clause are not absolute. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951); Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931); Pocket Books, Inc. v. Walsh, 204 F. Supp. 297 (D.Conn. 1962). The abridgement of speech by a state regulation must always be considered in terms of the object the regulation is attempting to accomplish and the abridgement of speech that actually occurs. "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the `evil', discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).

Officials of the defendant school district have the responsibility for maintaining a scholarly, disciplined atmosphere within the classroom. These officials not only have a right, they have an obligation to prevent anything which might be disruptive of such an atmosphere. Unless the actions of school officials in this connection are unreasonable, the Courts should not interfere.

The Viet Nam war and the involvement of the United States therein has been the subject of a major controversy for some time. When the arm band regulation involved herein was promulgated, debate over the Viet Nam war had become vehement in many localities. A protest march against the war had been recently held in Washington, D.C. A wave of draft card burning incidents protesting the war had swept the country. At that time two highly publicized draft card burning cases were pending in this Court. Both individuals supporting the war and those opposing it were quite vocal in expressing their views. This was demonstrated during the school board's hearing on the arm band regulation. At this hearing, the school board voted in support of the rule prohibiting the wearing of arm bands on school premises. It is against this background that the Court must review the reasonableness of the regulation.

A subject should never be excluded from the classroom merely because it is controversial. It is not unreasonable, however, to regulate the introduction and discussion of such subjects in the classroom. The avowed purpose of the plaintiffs in this instance was to express their views on a controversial subject by wearing black arm bands in the schools. While the arm bands themselves may not be disruptive, the reactions and comments from other students as a result of the arm bands would be likely to disturb the disciplined atmosphere required for any classroom. It was not unreasonable in this instance for school officials to anticipate that the wearing of arm bands would create some type of classroom disturbance. The school officials involved had a reasonable basis for adopting the arm band regulation.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs' freedom of speech is infringed upon only to a limited extent. They are still free to wear arm bands off school premises. In addition, the plaintiffs are free to express their views on the Viet Nam war during any orderly discussion of that subject. It is vitally important that the interest of students such as the plaintiffs in current affairs be encouraged whenever possible. In this instance, however, it is the disciplined atmosphere of the classroom, not the plaintiffs' right to wear arm bands on school premises, which is entitled to the protection of the law.

Plaintiffs cite two recent opinions from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in support of their position. Burnside v. Byars, 5th Cir., 363 F.2d 744, July 21, 1966; Blackwell v. Essaquena County Board of Education, 5th Cir., 363 F.2d 749, July 21, 1966. These cases involved the wearing of "freedom buttons" in Mississippi schools. In holding in one of the cases that the school regulation prohibiting the wearing of such buttons was not reasonable, the Court stated that school officials "cannot infringe on their students' right to free and unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the Constitution, where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms do not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Burnside v. Byars, supra, 363 F.2d at 749. While the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit are entitled to respect and should not be brushed aside lightly, they are not binding upon this Court. John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1964). After due consideration, it is the view of the Court that actions of school officials in this realm should not be limited to those instances where there is a material or substantial interference with school discipline. School officials must be given a wide discretion and if, under the circumstances, a disturbance in school discipline is reasonably to be anticipated, actions which are reasonably calculated to prevent such a disruption must be upheld by the Court. In the case now before the Court, the regulation of the defendant school district was, under the circumstances, reasonable and did not deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to freedom of speech.

The plaintiffs' request for an injunction and nominal damages are denied. Judgment will be entered accordingly.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEP. COMMUNITY SCHOOL DIST., (S.D.Iowa 1966)
(Sep 1, 1966)