McDONALD v. STATE

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

23694.

Attorney(S)

Jack N. Gunter, for appellant. Herbert B. Kimzey, Solicitor General, for appellee. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, William L. Harper, Assistant Attorney General, Joel M. Feldman, for party at interest not party to record.

Judges

QUILLIAN, Justice.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Homer McDonald was indicted in March 1966 in Habersham Superior Court for a misdemeanor. The charge arose from his acquisition of a motor vehicle on June 28, 1965, with a specified serial number, which he subsequently sold and disposed of as wreckage and salvage. He was alleged to have failed to mail and deliver the certificate of title and the manufacturer's serial plate to the State Revenue Commissioner as required by Georgia law. The defendant filed a special plea and demurrers attacking the constitutionality of the statute under which he was indicted. The trial court overruled the defendant's demurrers and sustained the State's demurrers to the special plea. The defendant appealed these rulings.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the indictment was sufficiently specific and properly couched in the language of the statute to withstand a general demurrer.
Whether the statute under which the defendant was indicted is unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce.
Whether the statute violates state and federal due process clauses.
Whether the requirement to send the certificate of title and manufacturer's serial plate to the Revenue Commissioner constitutes an illegal seizure of private property without just compensation under the Fourth Amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The indictment was defective for failing to allege that the defendant wilfully failed to mail or deliver the certificate of title, as required by the statute.
The statute imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, though no specific constitutional provision was cited in the plea or demurrer.
The statute violates state and federal due process clauses, including provisions related to insurance settlements and discretionary refusal by the Revenue Commissioner to re-issue certificates and serial plates.
The requirement to send the certificate of title and serial plate amounts to an illegal seizure of private property without just compensation, violating the Fourth Amendment.

Appellee's Arguments

The indictment was properly framed in statutory language and sufficiently alleged unlawful conduct, which is the substantial equivalent of wilfulness.
The constitutional challenge regarding interstate commerce was inadequately specified and therefore not properly raised.
The due process challenges were either irrelevant to the facts of the case or speculative and hypothetical, lacking merit.
The certificate of title and manufacturer's serial plate are quasi-public documents and do not constitute protected private property under the Fourth Amendment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791 (113 S.E.2d 609)	Indictment sufficiency and statutory language adherence	Confirmed that indictment was properly couched in statutory language and not subject to general demurrer.
Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 (124 S.E.2d 269)	Indictment sufficiency	Supported the court's view that the indictment was adequate despite omission of the word "wilfully."
Schulman v. State, 94 Ga. App. 489 (95 S.E.2d 343)	Indictment sufficiency	Reinforced that substance over nomenclature controls in pleading.
Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 180 (11 S.E.2d 782)	Rule that substance controls over form in pleadings	Supported the court's interpretation that "unlawfully" sufficed in place of "wilfully."
Chance v. Planters c. Co-op., 219 Ga. 1, 5 (131 S.E.2d 541)	Substance controls over nomenclature in pleadings	Reiterated the principle applied to the indictment's language.
Howenstine v. U.S., 263 F 1, 4	Interpretation of "wilfully" in indictments	Used to support the equivalence of "unlawfully" to "wilfully."
Harding v. State, 94 Ark. 65 (126 S.W. 90)	Interpretation of "wilfully" in indictments	Supported the court's construction of the indictment language.
Dobbs v. Bullard, 149 Ga. 553 (101 S.E. 122)	Requirement to specify constitutional provisions in challenges	Applied to reject the defendant’s vague constitutional challenge to the statute.
Almand v. Pate, 143 Ga. 711 (85 S.E. 909)	Constitutional challenge specificity	Supported the principle that constitutional challenges must specify the provision alleged to be violated.
City of Macon v. Anderson, 155 Ga. 607 (117 S.E. 753)	Constitutional challenge specificity	Reinforced the rule applied to the defendant’s plea and demurrer.
Jackson v. State, 64 Ga. 344	Limitations on demurrers attacking indictments	Used to reject demurrers that introduce extrinsic matter (speaking demurrers).
Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827 (92 S.E. 637)	Limitations on demurrers attacking indictments	Supported the court’s refusal to consider extrinsic matters in demurrers.
South Ga. Gas Co. v. Ga. Public Service Comm., 214 Ga. 174 (104 S.E.2d 97)	Standing to challenge constitutionality of statute	Applied to hold that the defendant must show infringement of rights by the statute’s enforcement.
Civil Service Bd. v. MacNeill, 201 Ga. 643 (40 S.E.2d 655)	Standing and ripeness in constitutional challenges	Supported the court’s conclusion that speculative challenges lack merit.
U.S. v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905	Property interest in title certificates and serial plates under Fourth Amendment	Held that such quasi-public documents are not protected private property.
Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91	Property interest under Fourth Amendment	Supported the court’s conclusion on the status of title certificates and serial plates.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the sufficiency of the indictment, holding that it was properly drafted in the language of the statute and thus not subject to general demurrer. The omission of the word "wilfully" was not fatal because the indictment alleged the defendant acted "unlawfully," which the court construed as substantially equivalent to wilfulness, consistent with established pleading principles emphasizing substance over form.

Regarding the constitutional challenge that the statute burdened interstate commerce, the court found the defendant's demurrer and special plea insufficient because they failed to specify the constitutional provision allegedly violated, a necessary requirement to raise such a challenge.

The defendant's due process challenges were rejected on two grounds: first, a claim related to insurance settlements was irrelevant to the indictment's allegations and improperly introduced extrinsic matter; second, concerns about the Revenue Commissioner's discretionary authority were deemed speculative and academic, lacking any demonstrated infringement on the defendant's rights.

The court also rejected the defendant's Fourth Amendment argument that sending the certificate of title and serial plate constituted illegal seizure without just compensation, reasoning that these documents are quasi-public and do not qualify as protected private property under the constitutional provision.

Accordingly, the trial court's rulings overruling the defendant's demurrers and sustaining the State's demurrers to the special plea were affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

The court upheld the indictment and rejected the constitutional challenges raised by the defendant. The direct effect is that the defendant's indictment and prosecution under the statute stand, with no relief granted on constitutional grounds. The opinion does not establish new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

McDONALD v. THE STATE.

QUILLIAN, Justice.

Homer McDonald was indicted during the March 1966 term of Habersham Superior Court and charged with a misdemeanor, in that on June 28, 1965, he acquired a certain motor vehicle with described serial number and sold and disposed of it as wreckage and salvage and did "fail to mail and deliver" the certificate of title and manufacturer's serial plate from the motor vehicle to the State Revenue Commissioner as required by law. See Ga. L. 1961, pp. 68, 83, superseded by Ga. L. 1965, pp. 264, 265 ( Code Ann. § 68-420a); Ga. L. 1961, pp. 68, 88, as amended, Ga. L. 1965, pp. 304, 314 ( Code Ann. § 68-431a).

The defendant filed a special plea and demurrers to the indictment, which attacked the statute under which the indictment was brought as being unconstitutional for various reasons, as included in the following syllabus. The trial judge overruled the defendant's demurrers and sustained the State's demurrers to the special plea. From these judgments the defendant appeals. Held:

1. The indictment was couched in the language of the statute and hence was not subject to general demurrer. Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791 (3) ( 113 S.E.2d 609); Eubanks v. State,

217 Ga. 588 (1) ( 124 S.E.2d 269); Schulman v. State, 94 Ga. App. 489 ( 95 S.E.2d 343). In this connection, the defendant argues that the statute requires that one wilfully fail to mail or deliver the certificate of title to the Revenue Commissioner, and the omission of the terminology "wilfully" in the indictment was fatal. It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls. Girtman v. Girtman, 191 Ga. 173, 180 (4) ( 11 S.E.2d 782); Chance v. Planters c. Co-op., 219 Ga. 1, 5 ( 131 S.E.2d 541). The indictment plainly and unambiguously charged that the defendant acted "unlawfully" in failing to mail or deliver the papers, which allegations we construe to be the substantial equivalent of charging that the defendant acted wilfully. Howenstine v. U.S., 263 F 1, 4; Harding v. State, 94 Ark. 65 ( 126 S.W. 90).

2. The defendant, by special plea and also a ground of demurrer, attempts to show that the statute is unconstitutional as being a burden on interstate commerce. However, neither the plea nor the ground of demurrer specifies any constitutional provision as the one the defendant contends is being violated. Hence, the rule is applicable: "A question of the constitutionality of a legislative act is not raised by a demurrer in which no particular clause or part of the Constitution is sufficiently stated or pointed out." Dobbs v. Bullard, 149 Ga. 553 ( 101 S.E. 122); Almand v. Pate, 143 Ga. 711 (2) ( 85 S.E. 909); City of Macon v. Anderson, 155 Ga. 607 (4) ( 117 S.E. 753).

3. By demurrer the defendant contends the statute is unconstitutional in that it violates the state and federal due process clauses.

(a) In one ground the defendant attacks the provision in the Act dealing with insurance settlements, but nothing in the indictment purports to place the alleged criminal transaction in that category. A demurrer may properly attack only those defects which appear on the face of the indictment. Where a demurrer seeks to add extrinsic matter, it must fail as a speaking demurrer. Jackson v. State, 64 Ga. 344; Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827 ( 92 S.E. 637).

(b) In another ground, the defendant complains that the Revenue Commissioner might arbitrarily refuse to re-issue certificates of title and manufacturers' serial plates. This portion of the statute is not relevant to the issues of this case and the attack made upon it is entirely speculative, hypothetical and academic in nature. "Before a statute can be attacked by anyone on the ground of its unconstitutionality, he must show that its enforcement is an infringement upon his right of person or property, and that such infringement results from the unconstitutional feature of the statute upon which he bases his attack." South Ga. Gas Co. v. Ga. Public Service Comm., 214 Ga. 174, 175 (1) ( 104 S.E.2d 97), and cases therein cited. Civil Service Bd. v. MacNeill, 201 Ga. 643, 648 (2) ( 40 S.E.2d 655). There is no merit in these grounds of demurrer.

4. The defendant contends that requiring him to send the Revenue Commissioner the certificate of title and the manufacturer's serial plate constitutes an illegal seizure of private property without just compensation in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the indictment alleges that the defendant disposed of the "motor vehicle," the only purportedly valuable property here involved is the title certificate and the serial plate. Such quasi-public documents do not constitute property within the protection of the constitutional provision. See U.S. v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905, and Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91.

The trial judge did not err in overruling the defendant's demurrers to the indictment nor in sustaining the State's demurrers to the special plea.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 13, 1966 — DECIDED OCTOBER 6, 1966.