MITCHELL v. THE SHOALS, INC, N.Y., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

John P. Carson and Sidney Jacobi for appellant. Richard E. Shandell and Marvin Lechtman for respondent.

Judges

Stanley H. Fuld

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 2, 1960, after dinner, the plaintiff Yvonne Mitchell, her escort Robert Taylor, and another couple went to The Shoals, a Staten Island restaurant, for drinks and dancing. Mitchell consumed several drinks and passed out, remaining asleep for the rest of the evening. Taylor, drinking "double" bourbons straight, became intoxicated and noisy. Despite being told not to serve Taylor any more alcohol, the bartender served him additional drinks. Around 1:00 A.M., the group left; Mitchell, still asleep, was placed in the front seat, and Taylor drove despite his intoxication. Approximately nine miles away, Taylor lost control of the vehicle, crashing it and causing Taylor's death and Mitchell's serious injuries.

Mitchell sued The Shoals under New York's Dram Shop Act (Civil Rights Law, § 16, now General Obligations Law, § 11-101). The jury returned a verdict in her favor, awarding $30,000, reduced to $24,000 after a $6,000 settlement with Taylor's estate. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment by a divided vote, leading to this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a plaintiff who was herself intoxicated but did not cause or procure the intoxication of another who caused her injury can recover damages under New York's Dram Shop Act.
Whether the bartender or tavern keeper can be held liable for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person who subsequently causes injury to another intoxicated patron.
The appropriateness of the trial court's jury instruction regarding contributory negligence in the context of a Dram Shop Act claim.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, 19 A.D.2d 523, affd. 14 N.Y.2d 792	Establishes that the intoxicated person cannot recover under the Dram Shop Act for injuries to himself.	Confirmed that the plaintiff, though intoxicated, was not barred from recovery because she did not cause the intoxication of the other party.
Scatorchia v. Caputo, 263 App. Div. 304	Supports the principle that an intoxicated person cannot sue for their own injuries under the statute.	Reinforced the limitation on recovery to those injured by another intoxicated person, not the intoxicated person themselves.
Holcomb v. Hornback, 51 Ill. App.2d 84	Example of a jurisdiction where mere participation in drinking bars recovery under Dram Shop Acts.	Distinguished from New York’s approach; court declined to adopt such a restrictive rule.
Guardado v. Navarro, 47 Ill. App.2d 92, 96	Similar to Holcomb, holds that participation in drinking may preclude recovery.	Cited as contrast; court did not follow this stricter approach.
Morton v. Roth, 189 Mich. 198, 202	Another example of a court limiting recovery where plaintiff participated in drinking.	Used to illustrate that New York’s statute is interpreted more liberally.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the language and history of New York's Dram Shop Act, emphasizing that the statute permits recovery by any person injured "by reason of the intoxication" of another, except the intoxicated person themselves. The plaintiff, although having consumed alcohol and become intoxicated, did not cause or procure the intoxication of Taylor, the person whose intoxication led to her injury. The court rejected the notion that a plaintiff’s mere participation in drinking bars recovery, requiring instead that the plaintiff play a more affirmative role in causing the other’s intoxication to be denied recovery. The bartender’s conduct in continuing to serve an obviously intoxicated Taylor despite admonitions was a sufficient basis for liability. The court also found that the trial court’s erroneous instruction on contributory negligence was harmless and did not affect the outcome.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages under the Dram Shop Act because she did not cause or procure the intoxication of the person who injured her, and the defendant restaurant was properly held liable for unlawfully serving alcohol to an intoxicated patron.

The order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed with costs. The decision clarifies that mere participation in drinking does not bar recovery under New York’s Dram Shop Act unless the plaintiff affirmatively caused the other’s intoxication. No new precedent beyond the application of the statute to these facts was set, and the direct effect is the affirmation of the plaintiff's right to recover damages.

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YVONNE L. MITCHELL, Respondent, v. THE SHOALS, INC., Appellant.

Chief Judge FULD.

On February 2, 1960, after having dinner together, the plaintiff, Yvonne Mitchell, her escort, Robert Taylor, and another couple drove to The Shoals, a restaurant on Staten Island, at about 9:00 P.M. for "a few drinks" and some dancing. Between dances, they had their drinks. Miss Mitchell, after consuming several, passed out and remained asleep for the rest of the evening. Taylor, who was on a diet of "double" bourbons "straight", became drunk and noisy. At one point, after he had fallen to the floor, the bartender was told not to let him have anything more to drink. Despite this admonition and Taylor's obviously intoxicated condition, the bartender — responding with "don't bother me; he is having a good time * * * let him enjoy himself" — served him three or four more double straight bourbons. The two couples left the restaurant at about 1 o'clock in the morning. The plaintiff, still asleep, was assisted to the car and placed in the front seat and Taylor, not to be dissuaded from driving, got behind the wheel and drove off. He apparently lost control of the car some nine miles from the restaurant; it left the roadway and crashed into a building. He was killed and the plaintiff was seriously injured. She brought this action for damages, under New York's version of the "Dram Shop Act" (Civil Rights Law, § 16, now General Obligations Law, § 11-101), against the defendant restaurant. The jury returned a verdict in her favor, and a divided Appellate Division affirmed the resulting judgment.

The verdict was for $30,000; however, since the plaintiff had settled her claim against Taylor's estate for $6,000, the judgment was reduced, by that amount, to $24,000.

The Alcoholic Beverage Control Law renders it a crime for any person to sell or deliver any alcoholic beverage to one who is intoxicated or under the influence of liquor (§§ 65, 130, subd. 3), and section 16 of the Civil Rights Law, as it read in 1960, recited in part that

"Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any person who shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication; and in any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages."

Although the statute — its forerunner goes as far back as 1873 (L. 1873, ch. 646; see Note, 8 Syracuse L. Rev. 252) — does not give the inebriated person a cause of action if he is himself injured (see Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, 19 A.D.2d 523, affd. 14 N.Y.2d 792; Scatorchia v. Caputo, 263 App. Div. 304), it does entitle any one else injured "by reason of the intoxication" of such person to recover damages from the party dispensing the liquor. There is no justification, either in the language of the legislation or in its history, for exonerating the latter simply because he had also served, and brought about the inebriety of, the third person who was hurt. As long as the latter does not himself cause or procure the intoxication of the other, there is no basis, under the statute, for denying him a recovery from the party unlawfully purveying the liquor.

In the case before us, the plaintiff had herself become drunk while drinking with Taylor but she had not, in any sense, caused or procured his intoxication. She had neither purchased the drinks nor encouraged him to take more than he could weather. The plaintiff had simply had a few drinks and passed out before her escort's inebriacy became really serious. This did not amount to a guilty participation in his intoxication. To deny her a remedy because her own alcoholic capacity was limited would impair, if not go a long way toward defeating, the purpose of the statute.

In two or three states, the courts have held that the plaintiff's mere participation in drinking with the person whose drunkenness caused the injury may be sufficient to prevent recovery under the Dram Shop Acts of those states. (See, e.g., Holcomb v. Hornback, 51 Ill. App.2d 84; Guardado v. Navarro, 47 Ill. App.2d 92, 96; Morton v. Roth, 189 Mich. 198, 202.) We need not, and do not, go that far. It is our view that the injured person must play a much more affirmative role than that of drinking companion to the one who injures him before he may be denied recovery against the bartender or tavern keeper who served them. The plaintiff before us comes within the coverage of the statute and the defendant was properly held accountable.

It is only necessary to add that, although the trial court was in error in casting its charge in terms of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it is apparent from what has already been written that the error was harmless and may be disregarded (CPLR 2001, 2002).

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Judges BURKE, BERGAN and KEATING concur with Chief Judge FULD; Judges VAN VOORHIS and SCILEPPI dissent and vote to reverse and to dismiss the complaint upon the dissenting opinion at the Appellate Division; Judge BREITEL taking no part.

Order affirmed.

MITCHELL v. THE SHOALS, INC