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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Donald Hansen was tried by jury and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery. Facts at trial established that Hansen, after heavy drinking over about 12 hours, entered a tavern armed with an automatic pistol, said "Don't move," was wrestled to the floor by a bartender who disarmed him, and a clip filled with live bullets fitting the pistol was later found at the scene. The gun had nothing in the chamber, and testimony indicated the clip could be attached to the gun with ease. Hansen testified he did not remember what happened. On appeal, he challenged (1) the trial court's exclusion of proffered evidence of a fall about 10 years earlier causing concussion and subsequent abnormal reactions to alcohol, and (2) the court's refusal to give a requested instruction (No. 4) and its giving of Instruction No. 13.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a prior accident (a fall about ten years earlier) and related medical/behavioral consequences.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing the appellant's requested Instruction No. 4 (stating an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon and the State must prove the gun was loaded beyond a reasonable doubt) and in giving Instruction No. 13 (defining a deadly weapon to include a gun that is loaded or can be immediately loaded).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Trial counsel proffered that Hansen's fall ten years earlier caused a concussion and blood clot requiring surgery and produced abnormal reactions to liquor (blackouts, irrational conduct); counsel assigned error to the sustained objection and exclusion of that evidence as remote and immaterial.
  • Appellant contended an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon and sought Instruction No. 4, arguing the State must prove the gun was loaded beyond a reasonable doubt; counsel cited authority (74 A.L.R. 1206) supporting the general rule that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's (State's) separate arguments beyond the court's discussion and resolution of the points raised by appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1962) Supports appellate deference to trial court discretion in evidentiary rulings. Cited to justify affirming the trial court's exercise of discretion in excluding the proffered remote evidence about a prior accident and its effects.
74 A.L.R. 1206 (1931) Annotation reflecting the general rule that an unloaded gun, used only as a firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a deadly weapon in many assault cases. Noted by the court as authority cited by appellant for the proposition that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon; court observed such authorities are older and that the rule is not absolute, especially in robbery cases.
79 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1961) Annotation reflecting a tendency to treat unloaded guns as deadly weapons in robbery contexts because of fear and attendant circumstances. Invoked by the court to show the evolving tendency to consider unloaded guns as deadly in robberies; used to distinguish the general rule cited by appellant and support the court's instruction choice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed exclusion of the proffered evidence of a ten-year-old accident. It concluded the trial judge properly exercised sound discretion in excluding the evidence as remote, and that such discretion was rightly exercised in this record, citing Evans v. Gaisford for deference to trial-court evidentiary rulings.

On the instruction issue, the court examined the contested legal question whether an unloaded gun is a "deadly weapon." The court acknowledged authority for the general rule that unloaded firearms may not be deadly weapons (74 A.L.R. 1206) but noted contrasting authority and a trend, particularly in robbery cases, to treat unloaded guns as deadly because of the fear and circumstances involved (79 A.L.R.2d 1412). The court found the facts here dispositive: the pistol could have a clip attached or detached almost instantaneously, meaning the gun could "then and there be immediately loaded within a matter of moments." Given the realities of automatic weapons and the ease of converting the gun to a loaded, firing condition, the court found Instruction No. 13 (defining a deadly weapon to include a gun capable of being immediately loaded) realistic and correct, and that Requested Instruction No. 4 did not fit the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The judgment of conviction was AFFIRMED.

Implications: The trial court's exclusion of the proffered ten-year-old accident evidence was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion. The court approved Instruction No. 13's definition of "deadly weapon" to include a gun that is loaded or can be immediately loaded, and rejected the requested Instruction No. 4 as inapplicable to the facts. The decision affirms the conviction and does not announce any broader change in law beyond applying existing principles to the facts; no new precedent beyond the court's application to these facts is stated.

STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, v. DONALD HANSEN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery. Affirmed.

Hansen entered a tavern, after having consumed a considerable amount of intoxicants at other taverns over a period of some 12 hours. He wielded an automatic pistol and was heard to say, "Don't move." The tavern operator dropped behind the bar. A bartender wrestled Hansen to the floor, and took the pistol away from him. Later, the proprietor found a clip at the scene filled with live bullets, which fit the pistol. The gun had nothing in the chamber. Testimony indicated the ease with which the clip could be attached to the gun. Hansen said he did not remember what happened.

At trial, his counsel asked him if he had an accident about 10 years before, to which question an objection was made on the grounds of immateriality and remoteness, and sustained. Thereafter a proffer of proof was made by counsel to the effect that Hansen had fallen downstairs 10 years before, suffered a concussion and a blood clot, requiring surgery resulting in abnormal reactions to liquor, including blackouts and irrational conduct. Counsel assigns the sustaining of the objection as error.

We believe and hold that under the circumstances of this case as reflected in the record, the trial court exercised a sound discretion in keeping such evidence from the jury. Such discretion he may exercise, which we believe he exercised with good reason and judgment.

See Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1962).

Only other point urged on appeal was that the court erred in 1) refusing to give appellant's requested Instruction No. 4, and 2) in giving Instruction No. 13. Counsel urges that the general rule is that an unloaded gun, used only as a firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a deadly weapon under statutes having to do with aggravated assaults and assaults with a deadly weapon. He cites respectable authority for this proposition, found in 74 A.L.R. 1206 (1931), which of course were cases decided 35 years or more ago. The same annotation, however, also reflects a difference between unloaded guns being deadly weapons in some assault cases and those involving robbery. The majority of cases seem to hold that in the latter category, an unloaded gun may be a lethal weapon because of fear and attendant circumstances involved in robbery. The tendency increasingly to look at the matter thus is reflected more strongly in 79 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1961). The arguments pro and con with respect to unloaded weapons are somewhat academic. They would appear to make some kind of difference with respect to guilt or innocence depending on whether the assailant, thinking he had an unloaded gun, actually had a loaded one, and the assailant who thought he had a loaded gun, but didn't.

To the effect that: "You are further instructed that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun held by Don Hansen in this case was loaded at the time. If it is reasonable to believe that the gun was not loaded, you should acquit the defendant."

To the effect that: "A deadly weapon, as that term is used in these instructions, means a weapon which in the particular manner used is then and there capable of producing death or great bodily harm. A loaded gun capable of being fired, or a gun capable of being fired and which can then and there be immediately loaded within a matter of moments is a deadly weapon."

We think we do not have to indulge in such niceties under the facts of the instant case since we have a situation where the clip respectively could have been inserted or ejected from the gun by the almost instantaneous push of a palm or the flick of a finger, and we do not think a judge or jury should have to guess how many bullets Black Bart had in his six-gun, which movie-wise invariably are 50 instead of six, and where the good sheriff has 60 instead of six, and thus survives. We think that in this age of automatic weapons, Instruction No. 13, given by the trial judge is most realistic and correct. Otherwise a switch-blade or gun artist, when wrestled, with deftness and perhaps sleight of hand, could unload an erstwhile lethal weapon and convert it into a harmless, but vicious-appearing toy. Requested Instruction No. 4, on the other hand, is highly debatable as reflected in the authorities, and as a matter of fact does not fit the circumstances of the instant case.

CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

ELLETT, J., concurs in the result.

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STATE v. HANSEN
(Jan 18, 1968)