AMADOR v. NEW MEXICO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION

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Docket Number

No. 8754.

Attorney(S)

E. P. Ripley, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant. Bigbee Byrd, Richard N. Carpenter, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Albert Amador, Jr., a certified and qualified school teacher, was elected a member of the New Mexico State Board of Education on November 8, 1966. The State Board had previously adopted a 1962 resolution requiring suspension of the teaching certificate of any teacher elected to the Board. After being served with an order to show cause why his teaching certificate should not be suspended pursuant to this resolution, Amador sought and obtained an injunction restraining the Board from enforcing the resolution or suspending his certificate. The State Board appealed the injunction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the New Mexico State Board of Education has statutory authority to suspend a teacher's certificate solely on the basis that the teacher holds office as a member of the State Board of Education.
Whether the suspension of Amador's teaching certificate for alleged incompatibility with Board membership constitutes "good and just cause" under § 77-8-19(A), N.M.S.A. 1953.
Whether the statute's language granting authority to suspend or revoke teaching certificates should be interpreted broadly to include incompatibility of offices or strictly limited to reasons related to teaching competence, morality, or other causes related to the purpose of the licensing statute.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments

The office of member of the State Board of Education and that of a public school teacher are incompatible positions, citing Haymaker v. State ex rel. McCain.
The statute authorizing suspension or revocation of teaching certificates for "good and just cause" grants the Board broad discretionary authority to suspend Amador's certificate based on this incompatibility.
The suspension is justified to ensure that active teachers can effectively and fairly serve as Board members without conflicts arising from holding both roles.

Plaintiff-Appellee's Arguments

The right to practice teaching is a property right that is protected and can only be revoked or suspended for specifically enumerated causes under the statute.
The phrase "good and just cause" must be strictly construed and limited to causes reasonably related to the statute's purpose of protecting the public against incompetent or unfit teachers.
The incompatibility argument does not relate to teaching performance or competence and therefore does not justify suspension under the statute.
The position of school teacher is not an "office" within the meaning of the statute governing incompatible offices, so the cited incompatibility statute does not apply.
It is common for licensing agencies to include members of the profession they regulate, and a teacher serving on the Board can simply recuse themselves in cases of conflict.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bourne v. Board of Education of City of Roswell, 46 N.M. 310, 128 P.2d 733	Limits on Board's power to promulgate rules must be found in statute.	Confirmed that the Board’s authority to suspend certificates is limited by statute, not merely constitutional provisions.
State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 37 N.M. 423, 24 P.2d 274	Similar to Bourne, regarding Board's statutory authority.	Supported the principle that the Board’s regulatory power must be statutorily grounded.
Haymaker v. State ex rel. McCain, 22 N.M. 400, 163 P. 248	Incompatibility of holding two offices.	The Board relied on this case to argue incompatibility of offices, but the Court found it inapplicable because a teacher is not an "office" under the statute.
State v. Collins, 61 N.M. 184, 297 P.2d 325	Right to practice a profession is a property right.	Supported the strict construction of statutes authorizing revocation or suspension of licenses.
Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers Funeral Directors, 78 N.M. 536, 434 P.2d 61	Statutes authorizing license revocation are penal and strictly construed; reasons must be specified.	Applied to limit suspension authority to causes related to competence, morality, or other justified causes directly connected to the profession.
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13	Administrative discretion must be guided by reasonable standards.	Used to reject the Board’s argument that "good and just cause" grants broad discretion without clear standards.
State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 367 P.2d 918	Legislative acts are presumed constitutional if reasonably possible.	Applied to interpret the statute narrowly to avoid unconstitutional overreach.
Fowler v. Corlett, 56 N.M. 430, 244 P.2d 1122	Similar principle of constitutional avoidance in statutory interpretation.	Supported narrow interpretation of "good and just cause."
Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 677, 179 A. 195, 98 A.L.R. 897	Legislature unlikely intended to vest overly broad power beyond statute's purpose.	Quoted to emphasize that broad interpretation of "good and just cause" would be unconstitutional and unreasonable.
In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503	Related to statutory interpretation of licensing provisions.	Supported the Court’s interpretation regarding the purpose of licensing statutes.
Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School Dist., 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289	Purpose of teacher licensing is to protect public by ensuring qualifications and fitness.	Used to define the scope and purpose of the teacher licensing statute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by recognizing the constitutional creation and statutory authority of the State Board of Education, emphasizing that the Board's power to suspend teaching certificates must be grounded in statute. The Board relied on § 77-8-19(A), which authorizes suspension or revocation for incompetency, immorality, or "any other good and just cause."

The Court acknowledged that the right to practice teaching is a property right and that statutes authorizing suspension of such a right must be strictly construed and limited to specified causes. The phrase "good and just cause" was analyzed, with the Court concluding that it cannot be interpreted so broadly as to allow suspension for reasons unrelated to the statute’s purpose—namely, protecting the public from unqualified or unfit teachers.

The Board's argument that holding the office of Board member is incompatible with being a teacher was rejected because the statute concerning incompatible offices does not apply to teachers, who are not statutory officers. The Court noted that the Board’s concern relates to the ability of teachers to serve as Board members, not to teaching competence or fitness.

Furthermore, the Court observed that licensing bodies commonly include members of the regulated profession, and any conflicts can be managed by recusal rather than suspension of licenses. Thus, suspending Amador’s certificate for incompatibility with Board membership does not align with the statutory purpose of ensuring teaching quality.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the injunction preventing enforcement of the Board’s resolution and suspension of Amador’s teaching certificate.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the District Court granting an injunction against the suspension of Amador’s teaching certificate is AFFIRMED.

The immediate effect is that the State Board of Education may not suspend a teacher’s certificate solely on the basis that the teacher holds office as a member of the Board. The decision clarifies that statutory authority to suspend teaching certificates is strictly limited to causes reasonably related to teaching competence, morality, or other professional qualifications. No new precedent expanding the Board’s discretionary authority was established; rather, the ruling reinforces the strict construction of licensing statutes to protect property rights in professional licenses.

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Albert A. AMADOR, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW MEXICO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

NOBLE, Chief Justice.

On November 8, 1966, Albert Amador, Jr., a certified and qualified school teacher, was elected a member of the State Board of Education. The State Board, in 1962, adopted a resolution requiring the suspension of the teaching certificate of a teacher elected to the State Board. Upon being served with an order to show cause why his teacher's certificate should not be suspended, Amador sought and was granted an injunction restraining and enjoining the State Board of Education from enforcing its resolution or suspending Amador's teaching certificate. The Board has appealed.

The State Board of Education was created by art. XII, § 6 (Supp. 1967) of the State Constitution, one member to be elected from each judicial district for terms of six years. The Constitution requires the Board to determine public school policy and to have control, management and direction of all public schools, pursuant to authority and powers provided by law. The constitutional provision respecting rules or regulations is not self-executing but the Board's power to promulgate the rule now under consideration must be found in and is limited by statute. See Bourne v. Board of Education of City of Roswell, 46 N.M. 310, 128 P.2d 733; State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 37 N.M. 423, 24 P.2d 274. The Board relies upon § 77-8-19(A), N.M.S.A. 1953, for its authority to suspend Amador's teaching certificate. The provision reads:

"The state board may suspend or revoke a certificate held by a certified school instructor or administrator for incompetency, immorality or for any other good and just cause."

Relying on Haymaker v. State ex rel. McCain, 22 N.M. 400, 163 P. 248, L.R.A. 1917D, 210, the Board argues that the office of member of the State Board of Education and that of a public school teacher are incompatible, and then reasons that since the statute grants authority to revoke a teacher's license for "good and just cause," the suspension of Amador's license was for "good and just cause" and is authorized by the statute.

The law requires teachers to be licensed, but it is well settled that the right to practice a profession or vocation is a property right. State v. Collins, 61 N.M. 184, 297 P.2d 325. Legislation concerning revocation of this right is highly penal in its nature and is to be strictly construed. Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers Funeral Directors, 78 N.M. 536, 434 P.2d 61. It is equally well established that when a statute authorizes revocation or suspension of a license entitling one to practice a profession or vocation for certain specified reasons, revocation or suspension is strictly limited to those specified. Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers Funeral Directors, supra. It is argued that the words "for good and just cause" grant to the Board broad discretionary authority. However, it is firmly established that statutes delegating powers to administrative agencies must clearly provide reasonable standards as a guide in the exercise of the discretionary powers. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13.

It is likewise a fundamental principle that courts will not declare a legislative act unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which it can be upheld. State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 367 P.2d 918; Fowler v. Corlett, 56 N.M. 430, 244 P.2d 1122. In authorizing revocation or suspension of a license by reason of "incompetency or immorality" the legislature employed words having a reasonably certain meaning in the law, but then added "or for other good and just cause." These words in themselves have no reasonably defined meaning in law, and, if they are to be given the broad interpretation contended for by the Board, would seem to permit the revocation of a teacher's license for matters having no reasonable relation to the underlying purpose of the statute. See Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 677, 179 A. 195, 98 A.L.R. 897, where the Connecticut court said:

"* * * But if we did give to these words so broad a meaning, we would be attributing to the Legislature an intent to vest the board with power going beyond the scope of its purposes and to enact a law of at least doubtful constitutionality. We cannot assume that the Legislature intended to give expression to such an intent and must, if it is reasonably possible to do so, so construe the words it has used as to make the provision a valid and reasonable one. * * *"

See also In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503. An examination of the Act requiring the licensing of school teachers convinces us that its purpose is to protect the public against incompetent teachers, and to insure proper educational qualifications, personal fitness and a high standard of teaching performance. See Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School Dist., 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289.

The "other good and just cause" for suspension of teachers, then, must be related to this purpose of the statutory provision. In our view, the suspension of a teacher for incompatibility with membership on the State Board of Education does not fall within the purpose of insuring a high quality of public instruction. Indeed, appellant does not argue that the supposed incompatibility detrimentally affects teaching performance.

Rather, appellant's argument goes to the ability of active teachers to effectively and fairly carry out their duties as Board members. However, the statute providing that an office becomes vacant when an officer accepts or undertakes the discharge of the duties of another incompatible office, upon which Haymaker v. State, supra, rested, has no application here. The position of school teacher is not an office within the meaning of the statute (§ 5-3-42, N.M.S.A. 1953). The State Board only has jurisdiction over a school teacher in the instance where the teacher appeals to that Board from an adverse ruling by the local board of education. The fact that a teacher who is also a member of the State Board might appeal from the action of the local board presents no serious problem. The teacher would simply refrain from acting as a member of the Board in his case just as would a member of any other trade or profession who appealed to the board of which he was a member. In fact, in looking at other legislation requiring the licensing of trades or professions, in every instance to which our attention has been called, the licensing agency includes members of the trade or profession. For examples, see dentistry (§ 67-4-1 et seq.), optometry (§ 67-7-1 et seq.), pharmacy (§ 67-9-1 et seq.), architecture (§ 67-12-1 et seq.), engineering and surveying (§ 67-21-29 et seq.), public accountancy (§ 67-23-1 et seq.), and real estate brokers (§ 67-24-1 et seq.).

It follows that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

COMPTON and TACKETT, JJ., concur.