Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: People v. Reed, Docket No. 6,058 (Mich. Ct. App. June 24, 1969)

Factual and Procedural Background

George Reed, also known as George Cumbus, was convicted in a nonjury circuit court of second-degree murder. He appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The information charging Reed alleged he "murdered Jessie Lee Hatten" and cited both § 750.316 and § 750.317 of the Compiled Laws of 1948 (M.S.A. cited). Reed raised several grounds on appeal: that the information was defective because it charged two crimes in the disjunctive; that the trial court erred in refusing to require indorsement of the name of an alleged res gestae witness who had been seen at the scene three hours before the shooting; and that the conviction was against the great weight of the evidence. Reed did not object to the form of the information until after the people had concluded their proofs. The trial court denied his motion to require indorsement of the witness and entered a conviction for second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Leave to appeal was later denied (see 383 Mich. 769).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the information was defective and duplicitous because it charged two crimes in the disjunctive ("or"), thereby denying the defendant notice and a fair trial.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to require indorsement of the name of an alleged res gestae witness.
  3. Whether the conviction of second-degree murder was against the great weight of the evidence (insufficient evidence).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The information was defective and duplicitous because it charged the defendant under § 750.316 or § 750.317, placing him in a perilous position of not knowing the specific crime charged and preventing a proper defense.
  • The trial court erred in refusing to require indorsement of an individual alleged to have been at the scene three hours prior to the shooting; the individual should have been treated as a res gestae witness.
  • The conviction for second-degree murder was against the great weight of the evidence and unsupported by the proof presented.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People v. Amos (1968), 10 Mich. App. 533 Standard for appellate reversal: court will not reverse unless error deprived defendant of substantial rights or resulted in a miscarriage of justice (citing MCLA § 769.26). The court invoked this standard to conclude that no reversible error occurred with respect to the information or other claimed errors.
People v. Keys (1968), 9 Mich. App. 482 Principle concerning the trial court's discretion to determine whether a person is a res gestae witness and whether to require indorsement. The court held the trial judge's refusal to indorse the alleged witness was within judicial discretion and not an abuse of that discretion.
People v. Schwartz (1921), 215 Mich. 197 Authority regarding whether failure to indorse a witness constitutes prejudicial error. The court cited Schwartz to support the conclusion that the failure to require indorsement in this case did not constitute prejudicial error.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each asserted error in turn:

  1. Information alleged to be duplicitous. The court noted the information charged homicide while citing both § 750.316 and § 750.317. However, because the defendant did not object to the form of the information until after the people had concluded their proofs, the court found the objection was waived under MCLA § 767.76. Applying the appellate reversal standard (MCLA § 769.26 and People v. Amos), the court determined no error occurred that deprived the defendant of substantial rights or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
  2. Failure to indorse alleged res gestae witness. The court examined the factual basis for treating the individual as a res gestae witness and found there was no affidavit showing the witness was present at the time of the shooting or remained after being seen three hours earlier. The court concluded there was no interrelated chain of events connecting that individual's presence to the shooting such that the person qualified as a res gestae witness. The record did not establish that the prosecutor knew the identity of the alleged witness prior to trial. The trial court had determined the individual was not a res gestae witness and refused to require indorsement; the Court of Appeals held this refusal was within the trial judge's discretion (citing MCLA § 767.40 and People v. Keys) and that the failure to indorse was not prejudicial error (citing People v. Schwartz).
  3. Sufficiency of the evidence. The court found there was sufficient evidence, as reflected in the trial court's specific findings of fact, such that, if believed, the evidence supported a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of second-degree murder.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

Direct effect: The judgment of conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The court held that (1) the defendant waived any objection to the form of the information by waiting until after the people's proofs; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to indorse the alleged res gestae witness and that the failure to indorse was not prejudicial; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree murder. The opinion does not announce any new legal principle or broader precedent beyond its application of existing statutes and cited cases.

PEOPLE v. REED

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals his nonjury circuit court conviction of second-degree murder under CL 1948, § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549), claiming the information failed to charge him with any crime, the court erred in failing to require indorsement of an alleged res gestae witness and the conviction of murder in the second degree was against the great weight of the evidence. The first question raised involves an examination of the requirements of an information charging an accused with murder. Defendant alleges the information was defective on the grounds that it charged him with two crimes in the disjunctive ("or") and was therefore duplicitous. Furthermore, defendant alleges that he was denied a fair trial on the ground that he was placed in a perilous position of not knowing the specific crime under which he was charged thereby preventing him from raising a proper defense. The information, where pertinent, reads as follows:

"George Reed a/k/a George Cumbus * * * murdered Jessie Lee Hatten, Contrary to Section 750.316 of the Compiled Laws of 1948: M.S.A. Section 28.548 or Contrary to Section 750.317 of the Compiled Laws of 1948: M.S.A. Section 28.549. ( Maximum penalty — Life)."

Defendant did not object to the form of the information until after the people had concluded their proofs. Thus, he waived any alleged error and the trial court correctly denied the motion. MCLA § 767.76 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1016).

Also on appeal this Court will not reverse unless we are satisfied that there was error committed that deprived the defendant of substantial rights or resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCLA § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1096), People v. Amos (1968), 10 Mich. App. 533. We do not find such error here.

Second, defendant's allegation that the court erred in failing to require indorsement of the name of an individual who allegedly was present at the scene of the fatal shooting some three hours prior to the shooting lacks merit. There is no affidavit suggesting that this witness was present at the time of the shooting or even remained after having been seen there three hours prior to the shooting. At the time he was present there did not exist any interrelated chain of events leading up to the shooting making the individual a res gestae witness. The record fails to establish that the prosecutor had knowledge of the identity of the alleged witness prior to trial. Additionally, the trial court determined that the witness was not a res gestae witness and refused defendant's motion to have him indorsed on the information. This was within the discretion of the trial judge, and his refusal does not constitute an abuse of judicial discretion. MCLA § 767.40 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.980), People v. Keys (1968), 9 Mich. App. 482. The failure to require indorsement did not constitute prejudicial error. See People v. Schwartz (1921), 215 Mich. 197.

The allegation that the evidence introduced did not support the conviction of defendant for second-degree murder lacks merit. There was sufficient evidence introduced as noted in the specific finding of facts, if believed, to support the conclusion that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Affirmed.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

PEOPLE v. REED
(Jun 24, 1969)