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Citation Codes
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Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, James K. Miller, Prosecuting Attorney and Robert J. Stephan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Fred D. Falkinburg, for defendant on appeal.
Judges
  • V.J. BRENNAN, J.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, James K. Miller, Prosecuting Attorney and Robert J. Stephan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Fred D. Falkinburg, for defendant on appeal.
Judges
  • V.J. BRENNAN, J.
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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: People v. Edwards, Docket No. 5,660 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31, 1969)

Factual and Procedural Background

Eddie Edwards was charged with felonious assault and tried before a Kent County circuit judge sitting without a jury. Shortly before trial Edwards requested the appointment of different counsel, expressing dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney's preparation. The trial judge inquired into the complaint, found no meritorious cause, and informed Edwards that he could either dismiss his attorney and represent himself or continue with the appointed counsel. Counsel remained and defended Edwards without objection. The judge found Edwards guilty and sentenced him to a term of 2-1/2 to 4 years. At sentencing an associate of the appointed attorney represented Edwards because the appointed attorney became seriously ill; Edwards did not object to that substitution. Edwards appealed his conviction and sentence; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court refused to permit the defendant to choose between continuing with appointed counsel and representing himself.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request for different appointed counsel when the defendant did not assert incompetence of his appointed attorney.
  3. Whether the defendant was denied due process at sentencing because his original appointed counsel was absent and an associate handled the sentencing proceeding.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The trial court allegedly refused to permit him to choose between continuing with his appointed attorney and defending himself.
  • The trial court erred in denying his request for different appointed counsel.
  • He was denied due process at sentencing because his trial counsel was absent and a substitute attorney represented him.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People v. LaMarr (1965), 1 Mich. App. 389 The right to assigned counsel does not extend to counsel of the indigent defendant's own choosing. The court applied this principle to hold that denial of Edwards' request for a different appointed attorney, absent a claim of incompetence, was not error.
People v. Dye (1967), 6 Mich. App. 217 An indigent defendant is entitled to the benefit of effective appointed counsel at the sentencing proceeding. The court relied on this rule to acknowledge the entitlement but held that substitution of counsel at sentencing does not automatically constitute denial of the right to counsel.
People v. Theodorou (1968), 10 Mich. App. 409 An indigent defendant is entitled to the benefit of effective appointed counsel at the sentencing proceeding. The court cited this decision alongside Dye to support the proposition that effectiveness at sentencing is required, but that substitution alone is not ipso facto denial; here no claim of substitute's incompetence was made.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the record for any indication that the trial judge refused to allow Edwards to choose self-representation or to dismiss appointed counsel. The record showed the judge had inquired into Edwards' dissatisfaction, found no meritorious cause for substitution, and explicitly informed Edwards of his alternatives (dismiss counsel and proceed pro se or continue with the appointed attorney). The court noted there was no expression by Edwards of a desire to represent himself and that he had sufficient opportunity to make his choice known before trial.

Regarding the request for different counsel, the court relied on People v. LaMarr to state the legal principle that an indigent's right to appointed counsel does not include a right to counsel of his own choosing. Because Edwards did not claim his appointed counsel was incompetent, denial of the request for different counsel was not erroneous.

On the sentencing contention, the court acknowledged the established rule that an indigent defendant is entitled to effective appointed counsel at sentencing (citing People v. Dye and People v. Theodorou). The court then explained that the effectiveness of counsel at sentencing is not determined by counsel's participation at trial and that substitution of an associate does not automatically amount to a denial of the right to counsel. The court observed that Edwards did not contend the substitute was incompetent or unprepared and that the trial judge inquired into mitigating circumstances, with Edwards responding. Hence, no basis for resentencing was shown.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The trial court did not refuse to permit self-representation, did not err in denying a request for different appointed counsel absent a claim of incompetence, and did not deny Edwards due process by permitting substitution of counsel at sentencing where no claim of incompetence or unpreparedness by the substitute was made.

Implications: The direct effect is that Edwards' conviction and sentence remain intact. The opinion applies existing Michigan precedent regarding appointed counsel and effectiveness at sentencing but does not announce new legal doctrine beyond applying those precedents to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

PEOPLE v. EDWARDS

V.J. BRENNAN, J.

Defendant, Eddie Edwards, was charged with felonious assault and tried before a Kent county circuit judge sitting without a jury. Shortly before the trial began, defendant requested the court to appoint different counsel as he was dissatisfied with his court-appointed attorney's preparation for trial. The trial court inquired into the possible causes of his discontent, found none of merit, and told defendant that his attorney was capable of conducting an adequate defense. The trial court also informed defendant that he could either dismiss his attorney and defend himself, or he could continue with said counsel.

Counsel remained and defended Edwards without his objection. The judge found Edwards guilty and subsequently sentenced him to a term of 2-1/2 to 4 years. An associate of the court-appointed attorney represented Edwards during the sentencing proceeding, as the court-appointed attorney had fallen seriously ill. Edwards did not object to the substitution.

On appeal Edwards assigns as error an alleged refusal by the trial court to permit him to choose between continuing with the appointed attorney and defending himself. This allegation is unfounded. The record does not disclose an unwillingness on the trial court's part to permit a defense in propria persona, nor does it contain an expression by defendant of a desire to represent himself. Aware of the alternatives open to him, defendant had sufficient opportunity, before the trial began to make his decision known, or, if he was undecided, to communicate his indecision to the court.

Defendant also contends the trial court erred by denying his request for a different attorney, although he does not maintain that his trial counsel was incompetent. The right to assigned counsel does not extend to counsel of the indigent defendant's own choosing. People v. LaMarr (1965), 1 Mich. App. 389. Therefore the denial of appellant's request does not constitute error.

Defendant seeks to be resentenced, claiming he was denied due process of law by reason of his trial counsel's absence during the sentencing proceeding.

The indigent defendant is entitled to the benefit of effective appointed counsel at the sentencing proceeding. People v. Dye (1967), 6 Mich. App. 217; People v. Theodorou (1968), 10 Mich. App. 409. The effectiveness of counsel's assistance at the sentencing proceeding is not determined, however, by his participation at the trial. Thus the substitution of the associate does not ipso facto constitute a denial of the right to counsel.

A need for resentencing is not apparent here. Defendant does not contend that the substitute was incompetent or unprepared. Moreover, the trial court inquired into the existence of mitigating circumstances, and defendant was responsive to the questioning.

Affirmed.

All concurred.

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PEOPLE v. EDWARDS
(Jul 31, 1969)