STATE v. LAITINEN

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 40167.

Attorney(S)

Ernest W. Laitinen, pro se. Charles O. Carroll and David W. Hotchkin, for respondent. Chas. H.W. Talbot (of Talbot, Smith Stone), Jack Zektzer, Arnold J. Barer, and Michael H. Rosen, amici curiae.

Judges

HILL, J. (dissenting).

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Ernest Laitinen was prosecuted for violating a 1967 Washington statute requiring motorcycle riders on public highways to wear protective helmets approved by the state commission on equipment. On September 17, 1967, Laitinen rode a motorcycle in King County without wearing any helmet, let alone an approved one. He was arrested, charged, and convicted in justice court, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal by the King County Superior Court. Laitinen appealed the judgment and sentence, which involved a suspended fine of $10. The appeal was prosecuted pro se by Laitinen, with amici curiae including the Washington Motorcycle Defense League and the American Civil Liberties Union supporting his position. The primary legal challenge concerned whether the helmet statute was a constitutional exercise of the state's police power. The legality of the commission's resolution approving helmets was not contested.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the statute requiring motorcycle riders to wear state-approved protective helmets on public highways is a constitutional exercise of the state's police power.
Whether the statute violates constitutional rights by intruding on personal freedom when the protective helmet protects only the wearer and not other persons on the highway.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The helmet statute constitutes an unwarranted and unconstitutional intrusion on personal freedom because it requires self-protection that does not benefit others on the highway.
The statute lacks a real, substantial, or rational connection to public peace, health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
The statute serves primarily to harass motorcycle riders and compel them to spend money on helmets they would not otherwise purchase.

Respondent's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Amici Curiae Arguments

Joined in supporting the appellant's position challenging the constitutionality of the helmet statute on grounds of personal freedom and lack of public benefit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Shea v. Olson, 185 Wn. 143, 53 P.2d 615, 111 A.L.R. 998 (1936)	Legislative police power upheld if a justifying state of facts can reasonably be conceived to exist; courts presume such facts existed.	Supported the presumption that the legislature acted on a reasonable basis when enacting the helmet statute.
State v. Dexter, 32 Wn.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, 13 A.L.R.2d 1081 (1949)	Same principle regarding judicial deference to legislative police power.	Reinforced the concept that courts do not weigh wisdom or efficacy but only constitutional power.
Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 932	Judicial deference to legislature's police power decisions.	Applied to affirm constitutionality of statute under police power.
Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 408 P.2d 269 (1965), appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 10	Legislative police power and presumption of constitutionality.	Used to support the court's deferential standard.
Ace Fireworks Co. v. Tacoma, 76 Wn.2d 207, 455 P.2d 935 (1969)	Presumption that a justifying state of facts exists for police power classifications.	Confirmed the presumption that facts justifying helmet law exist.
State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963)	Same as above.	Supported presumption of legislative fact-finding.
Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim. 1969)	Upheld constitutionality of motorcycle helmet laws.	Referenced as part of near-universal support from other jurisdictions.
State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1968)	Constitutional validity of helmet statutes.	Supported the court's conclusion on constitutionality.
Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 999	Helmet law constitutionality.	Reinforced the court’s position.
People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc.2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1967)	Support for helmet law validity.	Part of cited consensus among jurisdictions.
People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc.2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1967), appeal dismissed 23 N.Y.2d 686	Helmet statute upheld.	Referenced as supportive precedent.
People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc.2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1968)	Helmet law constitutionality.	Added to the weight of authority.
People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc.2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968)	Same as above.	Supported the court’s conclusion.
State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968)	Helmet statute upheld.	Referenced as persuasive authority.
Everhardt v. New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 So.2d 400 (1968)	Helmet law constitutionality.	Part of near-universal support cited.
State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App. 124, 164 S.E.2d 48 (1968)	Helmet statute upheld.	Supported the court’s reasoning.
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968)	Constitutionality of helmet laws (cited as a comparison).	Referenced for contrast or additional context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court emphasized the distinct roles of the judiciary and legislature, noting that the legislature is not bound by strict evidentiary standards but may enact laws based on any reasonably conceivable state of facts justifying the legislation. The judiciary must presume such facts existed and focus solely on whether the legislature acted within its constitutional police power. Applying this principle, the court reasoned that motorcycles present inherently greater hazards to riders than other vehicles due to their instability, lack of protective frames, and susceptibility to injury from accidents at various speeds. The legislature could reasonably conceive that requiring protective helmets would reduce head and neck injuries among motorcycle riders.

Further, the court found a rational connection between helmet use and the public welfare because motorcycle accidents impose burdens on publicly funded emergency medical, hospital, and law enforcement services. By reducing injuries, helmet laws serve the public health, safety, and welfare. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that helmet laws only protect the wearer and thus do not justify state regulation, holding that the public’s interest in reducing the costs and consequences of injuries supports the statute. The court also noted nearly universal judicial support for helmet laws in other jurisdictions.

Holding and Implications

The judgment and sentence of conviction for violating the motorcycle helmet statute are affirmed.

The court's ruling confirms that state laws mandating the use of protective helmets by motorcycle riders constitute a valid exercise of the police power. This decision directly upholds the statute's constitutionality and enforces compliance by motorcycle riders. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond affirming existing legal principles regarding legislative deference and public welfare considerations in police power cases.

Show full summary ...

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ERNEST LAITINEN, Appellant. Reported in 459 P.2d 789.

[1] Constitutional Law — Statutes — Police Power — Validity — Determination. A legislative exercise of the police power will be upheld as constitutionally valid if a state of facts which would justify it can reasonably be conceived to exist. If any such justifying state of facts can be conceived to exist, the court will presume that such state of facts actually did exist and that the statute in question was enacted in reference to it; the courts will not consider the wisdom, efficacy, or desirability of the legislation.

[2] Automobiles — Motorcycles — Compulsory Helmet Law — Validity. RCW 46.37.530(3), which requires those riding motorcycles upon public highways to wear state-approved protective helmets, is a legitimate, reasonable, and constitutionally valid exercise of the police power, there being a reasonable connection between such use of protective helmets and the public health, welfare, and safety.

See 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 173.

HILL and ROSELLINI, JJ., dissent.

HALE, J.

A statute enacted in 1967 requires all persons riding motorcycles on the public highways to wear protective helmets of a type approved by the state's commission on equipment. It states:

It shall be unlawful:

. . .

For any person to operate or ride upon a motorcycle unless he wears a protective helmet of a type approved by the commission on equipment. Such a helmet must be equipped with either a neck or chin strap which shall be fastened securely while the motorcycle is in motion. The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to adopt and amend regulations covering the types of helmet and the special specifications therefor and to establish, maintain, and distribute to law enforcement agencies throughout the state a list of approved helmets which meet the specifications to be established by the commission on equipment.

Laws of 1967, ch. 232, § 4(3), p. 1117; RCW 46.37.530(3).

The commission on equipment, established in 1961 by RCW 46.37.005, consisting of the Chief of the Washington State Patrol, the Director of Highways and the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, by resolution approved several types and kinds of protective helmets and prescribed minimum standards. September 17, 1967, while both the statute and the resolution were in effect, Ernest Laitinen rode a motorcycle on a public highway in King County wearing neither a protective helmet approved by the commission on equipment nor any protective helmet whatever.

Arrested, charged and convicted of violating RCW 46.37.530(3) in justice court and convicted on appeal by the superior court sitting without a jury, defendant now appeals the judgment and sentence of a suspended fine of $10. He prosecutes the appeal pro se, but the Washington Motorcycle Defense League and the American Civil Liberties Union, appearing amici curiae, filed briefs, joined in arguing the appeal, and support his position. Legality of the commission's resolution is unchallenged; the only issue is whether the statute requiring anyone who rides a motorcycle upon the public highways to wear an administratively prescribed protective helmet is a constitutional exercise of the state's police power.

Neither defendant nor amici curiae contend that the state may not constitutionally enact laws requiring one to have and use safety appliances or devices which protect others on the public highways or which tend to reduce the hazards of highway travel. They do urge, however, that the protective helmet reduces the hazards to the motorcycle rider only and has no beneficial effect upon other persons on the highway, and that requiring one to protect himself when the protection will not serve to protect others is an unwarranted and unconstitutional intrusion upon personal freedom and violates defendant's rights under Const. art. 1 §§ 3, 7, and U.S. Const. amends. 9 and 14. Although conceding that the state has a broad police power, defendant and amici curiae contend that, since the helmet affords protection to the wearer only, it does not protect the public, and, therefore, requiring that it be worn has no real, substantial or rational connection with the public peace, health, safety, morals or general welfare. Stated another way, defendant contends that the statute accomplishes no more for the public good than to provide a means of harassing cycle riders and requiring them to spend money for something they would not otherwise buy and, therefore, is not a reasonable exercise of the police power.

[1] Highlighting the issue here is the marked difference between the decision making processes of the judiciary and those of the legislative branch of the government under our constitutions. Whereas the judges must determine the facts from the evidence, avoiding personal predilections and opinions, come to a conclusion of ultimate fact from the proof presented, and apply the law thereto regardless of personal animus, bias or feelings, the legislative branch of government under our constitution is free of such strictures. Legislators may well have been selected by the people not in spite of but because of openly declared opinions, prejudices and predilections. Unlike the judges, legislators need not base their decisions upon the weight of evidence, but may vote against the preponderance of it or vote upon a proposition without hearing any evidence whatever. In prescribing the police power, all that is constitutionally required of the legislature is that a state of facts can reasonably be conceived to exist which would justify the legislation. If the courts can reasonably conceive of such a state of facts, they must presume that such facts actually did exist and that the statute being tested was passed with reference to them. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wn. 143, 53 P.2d 615, 111 A.L.R. 998 (1936); State v. Dexter, 32 Wn.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, 13 A.L.R.2d 1081 (1949); Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 932, 5 L.Ed.2d 365, 81 S.Ct. 379 (1961); Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 408 P.2d 269 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 10, 17 L.Ed.2d 10, 87 S.Ct. 70 (1966).

Accordingly, if a state of facts can reasonably be conceived that will sustain a classification under the police power, there is a presumption that such facts exist. Ace Fireworks Co. v. Tacoma, 76 Wn.2d 207, 455 P.2d 935 (1969); State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963); Shea v. Olson, supra. It is not the court's function to decide whether the statute is sound or unsound, wise or unwise, effectual or ineffectual — but only whether it is within the legislature's constitutional powers to enact it. This comports with the general democratic principle that powers of self-government have been largely reserved by the people to be exercised through their legislatures and not their courts.

Applying these general principles to the motorcycle helmet statutes, we think that a state of facts can reasonably be conceived to exist that motorcycles capable of operating at very high speeds are far more hazardous to their riders than automobiles and other kinds of vehicles. Motorcycles not only appear to have less stability than other kinds of vehicles, but they seem more hazardous too because their riders have no protective frame or structure surrounding them. Even at slow and moderate speeds, motorcycle riders are subject to greater danger of injuries from skids, slips, slides and spills than are riders in other kinds of motor vehicles, and at high speeds these dangers increase enormously. The legislature could reasonably assume that the increased hazards in riding motorcycles, when combined with the dangers arising from the want of a protective frame or shield, add to the probabilities of injury to the upper neck and head. One way of reducing these hazards and their attendant injuries, it can reasonably be conceived, is to require all motorcycle riders to wear sturdy protective helmets.

[2] The legislature could also reasonably assume — and legislate on such assumption — that the public welfare and safety is substantially affected by the dangers arising from motorcycle riding. The public has already assumed many burdens and responsibilities in helping ameliorate the effects of accidents. It has at public expense substantially provided emergency ambulance, medical and hospital care for persons injured on the public highways and supplied medical, surgical and hospital services for indigent persons so injured. The public has undertaken the basic responsibility of policing the public highways and regulating traffic thereon both in the interests of safety and efficiency, and has utilized the state and its political subdivisions to carry these burdens. The greater the number of serious injuries to the head and upper spine suffered by motorcycle riders, the greater the burdens it can reasonably be said are imposed on the publicly supplied or regulated medical, hospital, ambulance and police services. There thus exists a reasonably manifest connection between the use of protective helmets by motorcycle riders and the public health, welfare and safety. Accordingly, requiring motorcycle riders to wear protective helmets of a type approved by the state commission on equipment when riding upon the public highways is a legitimate and reasonable exercise of the police power, and RCW 46.37.530 (3) is a constitutional declaration thereof.

Our views upholding the constitutionality of the protective helmet statutes pertaining to riders of motorcycles appear to have nearly universal support in other jurisdictions. Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim. 1969); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, ___ R.I. ___, 241 A.2d 625 (1968); Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999, 21 L.Ed.2d 464, 89 S.Ct. 485 (1968); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc.2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1967); People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc.2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1967), appeal dismissed, 23 N.Y.2d 686, 295 N.Y.S.2d 936, 243 N.E.2d 153 (1968); People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc.2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1968); People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc.2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968); Everhardt v. New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 So.2d 400 (1968); State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App. 124, 164 S.E.2d 48 (1968). See, also, Constitutional Law — Validity of Safety Helmet Requirements, 71 W. Va. L. Rev. 191 (1969); Constitutional Law — Police Power — Motorcycle Crash Helmet Laws' Relation to Public Welfare, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 320 (1969); Constitutionality of Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet Legislation, 73 Dick. L. Rev. 100 (1968). Cf., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968).

The judgment and sentence, are, therefore, affirmed.

HUNTER, C.J., FINLEY, HAMILTON, NEILL, and McGOVERN, JJ., and DONWORTH, J. Pro Tem., concur.

HILL, J. (dissenting).

I dissent. The majority have been most ingenuous and ingenious in their efforts to find some nexus between the legislation here in question and the public health, safety ajd welfare. The reasoning adopted by the majority would with equal force support legislation requiring a pedestrian to don such a helmet and other protective apparatus when crossing a street or road; or even prohibit a pedestrian from crossing a street or road save at controlled intersections.

ROSELLINI, J., concurs with HILL, J.