Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

People v. Simon, Docket No. 6,779 (Michigan Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1970)

Factual and Procedural Background

Albert E. Simon, Jr. was tried by a jury on October 1, 1968, and convicted of receiving stolen property of a value over $100 (CLS 1961, § 750.535). The conviction arose from the theft of an Apache camping trailer on April 4, 1968. On the same day, defendant was apprehended hauling the trailer behind his automobile and admitted he had stolen it. At the preliminary examination, held after the theft, a qualified appraiser testified (May 21, 1968) that the trailer was worth $200 and that he observed no new conditions or additions when he appraised it. A police officer testified the trailer had been in police custody from April 4, 1968, to May 21, 1968. Defendant moved to quash the information on the theory that the preliminary examination transcript contained no evidence of the value of the trailer at the time of the offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash, the defendant was convicted and sentenced, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on March 30, 1970; rehearing was denied May 4, 1970.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to quash the information on the ground that the preliminary examination transcript did not contain evidence of the value of the stolen property at the time of the offense.
  2. Whether references at trial to the defendant's admission that he stole the trailer constituted improper proof of a distinct offense and were reversible error.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The motion to quash should have been granted because the preliminary examination transcript allegedly contained no evidence establishing the value of the trailer at the time of the offense.
  • References in the prosecuting attorney's opening statement, closing argument, and during testimony to the defendant's admission that he stole the trailer were improper proof of a distinct offense and so prejudicial as to require reversal.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the People's (prosecutor's) trial or appellate arguments beyond what is described in the court's analysis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People v. Medley (1954), 339 Mich. 486 Standard on a motion to quash an information: the trial court must find on the record that the magistrate abused his discretion in binding over the defendant for trial. The court applied this standard and concluded that, on the record before it (including the appraiser's testimony and police custody evidence), the trial court could not properly find that the magistrate abused his discretion in binding the defendant over; therefore the denial of the motion to quash was not reversible error.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the motion to quash first. It identified the applicable standard from People v. Medley: on a motion to quash the information a trial court must find on the record that the magistrate abused his discretion in binding the defendant over for trial. The court reviewed the preliminary examination record and the related factual testimony: the trailer was stolen April 4, 1968; the defendant was caught hauling it and admitted theft; an appraiser testified on May 21, 1968 that the trailer was worth $200 and that no new conditions or additions were observed since the theft; and a police officer testified the trailer had been in police custody from April 4 to May 21. Given that evidence, the court concluded the trial court could not find an abuse of discretion by the magistrate in binding the defendant over. Thus the denial of the motion to quash was affirmed.

As to the references at trial to the defendant's admission that he stole the trailer, the court noted that an element of the charged offense is that the defendant knew the property received was stolen. The court referenced CL 1948, § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050) and held that the proof and argument referring to defendant's admission were proper to prove that element. The court therefore rejected the claim that such references constituted improper proof of a distinct offense requiring reversal.

The opinion also notes briefly that the defendant abandoned the other two issues raised on appeal, and so the court did not address them.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the information, and references at trial to the defendant's admission that he stole the trailer were permissible to show the requisite knowledge that the property was stolen under CL 1948, § 768.27.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant's conviction and sentence were upheld. The opinion does not announce or rely upon any new legal doctrine beyond application of existing standards (People v. Medley and the cited statute) and does not discuss broader legal implications beyond the outcome in this case.

PEOPLE v. SIMON

PER CURIAM.

October 1, 1968, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted of receiving stolen property of the value of over $100. CLS 1961, § 750.535 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 28.803). He was sentenced and he appeals.

Defendant first contends it was reversible error to deny his motion to quash the information. The motion to quash was based on defendant's theory that the preliminary examination transcript contained no evidence of value at the time of the offense.

April 4, 1968, an Apache camping trailer was stolen. That same day defendant was caught hauling the trailer behind his automobile. He admitted he had stolen it. A qualified appraiser viewed the trailer May 21, 1968. His testimony at preliminary examination was that the trailer was worth $200 and that he had observed no new conditions or additions to the trailer when he appraised it. A police officer testified that the trailer was in police custody from April 4, 1968 to May 21, 1968.

On a motion to quash an information, a trial court must find that on the record, it was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to have bound the defendant over for trial. People v. Medley (1954), 339 Mich. 486. The trial court was unable to make such a finding on the record before him, nor can we.

In the prosecuting attorney's opening statement, closing argument and also during some testimony, reference was made to the fact that defendant admitted stealing the trailer. Defendant now claims this was improper proof of a distinct offense and was reversibly erroneous.

An element of the offense charged is that defendant knew that the property received was stolen. Under CL 1948, § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050), the proof and argument were proper.

Defendant has abandoned the other two issues raised on appeal.

Affirmed.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

PEOPLE v. SIMON
(Mar 30, 1970)