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Docket Number

Crim. A. Nos. 17725-17727.

Motions

Motion for suppression : Denied

Attorney(S)

John L. Bowers, Jr., U.S. Atty., Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff. Ray Jenkins, Jenkins Jenkins, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant.

Judges

Robert Love Taylor

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Smart Summary

United States of America v. George Finis Garner (Crim. A. Nos. 17725-17727) — District Court, E.D. Tenn., N.D. (Sept. 11, 1970)

Factual and Procedural Background

George Finis Garner was indicted on a two-count indictment alleging willful and knowing obtaining of United States Postal Money Orders with intent to convert them to his own use and knowing they were stolen; Count Two charged possession with intent to defraud of falsely made, forged, or counterfeited United States Postal Money Orders. Separately, in an earlier indictment, Garner was charged with possession of a firearm after a felony conviction and with transporting firearms and ammunition in interstate commerce on or about February 5, 1970.

The defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from him as a result of a search and seizure of his property and his subsequent arrest by Tennessee Highway Patrol troopers, Blount County and Maryville officers, and post office inspectors, asserting violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The parties stipulated the controlling facts of the arrest and seizure.

Stipulated facts (brief): Garner was driving at a reckless, dangerous, excessive rate of speed on Highway 411 in Monroe and Blount Counties; officers established one or more roadblocks which Garner ran through until he was finally stopped. When stopped, officers observed an Army .45 caliber automatic pistol loaded, with a bullet in the chamber and cocked, in the defendant's hand or lying between his knees or on the floor of the car. Officers seized that gun and also searched the trunk, discovering additional guns, ammunition, tools and other items. The defendant sought suppression of evidence found in the trunk as well as other items.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the warrantless search of the trunk of the defendant's automobile was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and therefore admissible.
Whether the evidence seized (including firearms, ammunition, tools, and cash) incident to the stop and search should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful search and seizure.
Whether the Government may retain $3,800 in cash found on the defendant until trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The officers violated defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by searching his car without probable cause; the searches were unreasonable.
The officers had no ground to arrest or search the defendant and acted without the defendant's permission.
The search of the trunk was unreasonable because there was no relation between the offense(s) for which defendant was arrested and the items found in the trunk.
Defense counsel cited Chimel v. California and Shipley v. California (addressing searches of a home) and United States v. Adams (5th Cir.) to support suppression.

Government's Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

The officers observed a loaded, cocked Army .45 automatic pistol in the car's front area, which gave them the right to seize that weapon.
The nature of automobiles—being movable—permits a more liberal approach to searches than for homes; waiting for a warrant might result in loss of the vehicle or evidence.
After observing the loaded pistol, officers had the right to search the trunk to secure evidence comparable to that indicating a violation of the firearms statute.
Relevant authority (including state and federal decisions) supports a warrantless search of the automobile under the circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685	Authority concerning searches incident to arrest in the context of a person's home.	The Court noted Chimel deals with a man's home and distinguished those principles from searches involving automobiles, which are treated more liberally because of mobility concerns.
Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 89 S.Ct. 2053, 23 L.Ed.2d 732	Authority concerning searches incident to arrest in the home context (cited alongside Chimel).	Used similarly to Chimel as a home-search authority that the Court distinguished from automobile searches.
United States v. Adams, 424 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.)	Example of an automobile search found by that court to have exceeded necessary scope and thus to render evidence inadmissible.	The Court quoted Adams, then distinguished that decision on its facts, finding Adams did not control because here officers observed a loaded pistol and other circumstances supported a trunk search.
United States v. Williams, 230 F. Supp. 47	District-court decision addressing whether officers may search the trunk following an arrest for a misdemeanor.	The Court stated it had considered Williams, in which it had previously held officers did not have the right to search the trunk after a misdemeanor arrest; noted the decision in its analysis of similar issues.
United States v. Cole, 243 F. Supp. 421	District-court decision addressing trunk searches following arrest for misdemeanor.	The Court referenced Cole alongside Williams as prior decisions of the Court on the trunk-search question.
Liming v. State of Tennessee, 220 Tenn. 371, 417 S.W.2d 769	Tennessee Supreme Court ruling that officers had a right to search the trunk of a car for an arrest on a misdemeanor only.	The Court found Liming directly applicable and stated the reasons given in that opinion were applicable to the present case.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419	Holds that officers may search an entire car without a search warrant under circumstances presented in that case.	The Court cited Chambers as recent authority supporting the right to search the entire automobile without a warrant.
Welch v. United States, 361 F.2d 214 (C.A. 10)	Authority cited in connection with automobile searches (supporting the proposition cited).	Used as additional authority consistent with Chambers for permitting warrantless automobile searches under certain circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first accepted the stipulated facts: the defendant was driving recklessly and ran through roadblocks; when stopped officers observed a loaded, cocked Army .45 automatic pistol in the front area of the car. The Court concluded that observation of the firearm in view gave officers the right to seize the gun.

The central legal question the Court addressed was whether, having lawfully observed and seized the pistol, the officers also had the right to search the trunk where they discovered additional firearms, ammunition, tools and other items. The defendant argued the trunk search was unreasonable and unrelated to the offense.

In analyzing the issue the Court distinguished cases dealing with home searches (Chimel, Shipley), noting that an automobile's mobility justifies a more liberal rule for warrantless searches. The Court considered and quoted United States v. Adams (5th Cir.), which condemned an overly broad vehicle search; however, the Court found Adams distinguishable on the facts of this case because the officers here saw a loaded pistol in the front seat area and thus had cause to search for additional evidence indicative of a firearms violation.

The Court acknowledged prior district-court decisions (United States v. Williams and United States v. Cole) in which it had held officers did not have the right to search the trunk following an arrest for a misdemeanor only. It then cited the Tennessee Supreme Court decision in Liming, which upheld a trunk search incident to a misdemeanor arrest, and found the reasoning in Liming applicable. The Court also relied on Chambers v. Maroney (and Welch) as recent authority permitting warrantless searches of an entire automobile under appropriate circumstances.

Weighing these authorities and the stipulated facts (notably the visible loaded pistol and the defendant's dangerous conduct—running roadblocks and reckless driving), the Court found as a fact and concluded as a matter of law that the search of the trunk was legal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress; it held the search was legal and the evidence obtained need not be suppressed.

Disposition and direct implications: The seized items and evidence from the search of the automobile were ruled admissible for trial. The Court also held that the Government officers may retain the $3,800 in cash found on the defendant's person and hold it until trial on the merits.

No broader change in legal precedent was announced by the Court beyond its application of existing authorities; the immediate effect is that suppression was denied and the Government may use the seized evidence and retain the cash pending trial.

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UNITED STATES of America v. George Finis GARNER (3 cases).

OPINION

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

George Finis Garner was indicted by the Grand Jury on a two-count indictment for willfully and knowingly obtaining a number of U.S. Postal Money Orders with intent to convert the same to his own use and that he knew the money orders to have been stolen.

Count Two charges that he willfully and knowingly possessed with intent to defraud, falsely made, forged, counterfeited or altered obligations or securities of the United States, that is, United States Postal Money Orders which are described in the indictment, in that he knew the money orders to have been falsely made, forged or counterfeited.

Defendant has moved to suppress all evidence obtained from him by reason of a search and seizure of the property and subsequent arrest by the Tennessee Highway Patrol Troopers and officers of Blount County and Maryville, Tennessee and post office inspectors on the following grounds:

The officers violated defendant's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States in searching petitioner's car without probable cause; the searches were unreasonable; the officers had no ground upon which to arrest or search the defendant; the searching and seizure were without permission of the defendant.

Defendant has been charged in another indictment, which appears to have been returned on March 19, 1970 or prior to the indictment just referred to. In the first count of that indictment defendant was charged with willfully and knowingly having in his possession a firearm, that is, a U.S. Army type Colt .45 caliber automatic pistol, said George F. Garner at that time having been previously convicted by a court of the United States or a state court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding a year; second, that on or about the 5th day of February, 1970, the defendant willfully and knowingly transported and shipped in interstate commerce from the State of Florida to Blount County, Tennessee, firearms and ammunition, a detailed description of which is set forth in Count No. 2 of the indictment.

A like motion to suppress all the evidence was filed by the defendant based upon the contention that the officers violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

The parties stipulated the controlling facts in the arrest and seizure of the property which is the subject of the motion to suppress.

Briefly stated, defendant was driving his automobile on Highway 411 in the Monroe and Blount County areas at a reckless, dangerous, excessive rate of speed; that the officers formed one or more roadblocks to stop him and he ran through all of the roadblocks before he was finally stopped; when the officers stopped the car they saw in the hand of defendant an Army .45 caliber automatic pistol, loaded, with a bullet in the chamber, and cocked, lying between defendant's knees or on the floor of the car. This gave the officers the right to seize the gun.

The crucial question in the case is whether the officers, who admittedly had the right to seize the gun that was on the front seat and was observed by them, had a further right to search the trunk of the car which was done by them and where they found other guns, ammunition and various items of tools, etc.

It is contended by the defendant that the search of the trunk of the car was unreasonable, therefore, in violation of the rights of the defendant contained in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States because there was no relation between the offense, or offenses, for which defendant was arrested and the items found in the trunk of the car.

In support of his contention, his counsel cites the cases of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 and Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 89 S.Ct. 2053, 23 L.Ed.2d 732.

Those cases deal with a man's home, which is entirely different from dealing with an automobile. An automobile is movable and the courts are much more liberal in sustaining a search when an automobile is involved than when a home is involved. If the officers wait to get a search warrant for an automobile they may never seize the automobile, in many instances, or the driver.

Defendant's counsel also cites the case of United States v. Adams, 424 F.2d 175, by the Fifth Circuit in an opinion written by Judge Bell. The Court in that case said, among other things:

"* * * The search far exceeded what would have been necessary for identification purposes only. Indeed, from aught that appears, the serial number of the vehicle was not obtained. The search was not necessary to protect the officers, no emergency existed, nor was there danger that evidence might be lost, or that the vehicle might be removed. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence obtained through and as a result of the search including the statements which were the fruits thereof, was not admissible * * *"

The Adams case may be differentiated on the facts from the case under consideration. In the opinion of the Court, after the officers observed the loaded pistol on the front seat of the car they had a right to search the trunk of the car and secure evidence comparable to the evidence that they found in the front seat of the car which indicated a violation of the Firearms Statute. The defendant, when arrested, or immediately prior to his arrest, showed a total disregard for the law in that he was driving his car in an exceedingly reckless manner, having driven it through, according to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, three roadblocks, all of which indicated that he was a deliberate and intentional law violator.

As indicated to counsel during this trial, this Court has considered the question at issue in the cases of United States v. Williams, 230 F. Supp. 47 and United States v. Cole, 243 F. Supp. 421.

In those cases this Court held that the officers did not have the right to search the trunk of the car following the arrest for a misdemeanor only. Since those decisions, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has dealt directly with the question in the case of Liming v. State of Tennessee, 220 Tenn. 371, 417 S.W.2d 769, in an opinion written by Justice Humphreys. It was held in that case that the officers had a right to search the trunk of the car for an arrest on a misdemeanor only and the reasons given by Justice Humphreys in that case are applicable to our case.

The most recent case that has been cited to us is Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419. In that case it was held that the officers had the right to search the entire car without a search warrant. See also Welch v. United States, 361 F.2d 214 (C.A. 10).

In the opinion of the Court, and the Court finds as a fact, and concludes as a matter of law, that the search was legal and the motion to suppress is, therefore, denied.

Defendant has also filed a petition to have returned to him the sum of $3,800.00 cash which was found on his person at the time the search was made. The Court holds that the Government officers have a right to hold this money until the trial is had on the merits.

UNITED STATES v. GARNER, (E.D.Tenn. 1970)