O'CONNELL, C.J., dissenting.
I would grant the petition for review in this case. I am of the opinion that neither this court nor the legislature has the constitutional power to require an attorney to defend an indigent unless the attorney is reasonably compensated for his service. I shall not at this time set out the reasons which support this conclusion. See, however, the following references which lend support to my point of view. Johnson and Douglas v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 407, 409 P.2d 566 (1966), (but see State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 466, 409 P.2d 750 (1966)); Hill v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 169, 293 P.2d 10, 14 (1956) (dissenting opinion); People v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966), noted 16 DePaul L Rev 499 (1967); Knox County Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 217 Ind 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940); Ferguson v. Pottawattamie County, 224 Iowa 516, 278 NW 223 (1938); State v. Rush, 46 NJ 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); Dane County v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861); Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts — A Suggested Solution, 74 Case Comment 3 (1969); Allison Hasset, Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 41 Am Jud Soc'y 100 (1957); Comment, Attorney and Client — Compensation of Indigent's Counsel in Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings, 46 N Car L Rev 379 (1968); Note, 49 Cal L Rev 954 (1961); Note, 107 U Pa L Rev 812 (1959); see also Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 213-216 (1955), and Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 136-138 (1951).