MELKUN v. STATE

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Docket Number

No. 70-545.

Attorney(S)

Walter R. Talley, Public Defender, and W. Daniel Kearney, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Warren H. Petersen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lakeland, for appellee.

Judges

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Edward C. Melkun was charged on February 19, 1970, with unlawfully receiving and concealing a motorcycle known to be recently stolen. He pled not guilty and was tried by a jury in the Pinellas County Circuit Court. On May 18, 1970, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Melkun was adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the State Prison. Melkun appeals the judgment and sentence entered against him.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty for unlawfully receiving and concealing stolen property.
Whether the appellate court may review the sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of an order ruling on the defendant’s motion for new trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Melkun contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
He further argues that filing a motion for new trial, without an order ruling on it, should suffice as a prerequisite to appellate review of sufficiency of evidence.

Appellee's Arguments

The State argues that the evidence was overwhelmingly sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.
The State maintains that an order ruling on the motion for new trial is essential before appellate review of sufficiency of evidence can occur.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Owens, Fla. 1970, 233 So.2d 389	Requirement that a motion for new trial be filed and ruled upon before appellate review of sufficiency of evidence.	Used to support the court’s holding that without an order on the motion for new trial, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is improper.
State v. Contreras, Fla. 1969, 227 So.2d 306	Same as above—necessity of a ruling on the motion for new trial for appellate sufficiency review.	Reinforced the principle that the trial court must rule on the motion for new trial to allow appellate consideration of sufficiency of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court thoroughly reviewed the record and found the evidence overwhelmingly sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. The stolen motorcycle was traced to Melkun’s garage, and his statements to the investigating officer indicated knowledge that the motorcycle might have been stolen. Melkun’s own testimony corroborated these facts. However, the court emphasized that appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence requires not only the filing of a motion for new trial but also an order ruling on that motion. This procedural prerequisite ensures that the trial court has the opportunity to reconsider the evidence calmly after the verdict and potentially set it aside if deficient. Since no order denying the motion for new trial was entered, the court declined to review sufficiency of evidence on appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to AFFIRM the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

The direct effect of this decision is that Melkun’s conviction and sentence stand. The court did not set new precedent but reaffirmed the procedural requirement that an order ruling on a motion for new trial is essential before appellate courts may review the sufficiency of evidence to convict.

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EDWARD C. MELKUN, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.

PIERCE, Chief Judge.

Appellant Edward C. Melkun appeals to this Court from a judgment of conviction entered against him by the Pinellas County Circuit Court.

On February 19, 1970, Melkun was informed against for the offense of unlawfully receiving and concealing a described motorcycle, belonging to another person, knowing the same to have been recently stolen. Upon plea of not guilty, he was tried by jury which, on May 18, 1970, returned a verdict of guilty. In due course he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment in the State Prison. It is from this judgment and sentence that Melkun appeals to this Court.

The only point urged here for reversal is the insufficiency of the evidence to convict. But we have examined the record thoroughly and find the evidence to be overwhelmingly sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. The tracks of the stolen motorcycle were traced to Melkun's garage where it was found. Melkun told the investigating officer the motorcycle was brought to his garage by "two guys" and that "he thought it was strange that they brought it there, and he thought it might have been stolen" or, to use his exact words at the time he "thought it might have been hot." Melkun testified in his own behalf and in many important respects reiterated what he told the officer originally. The evidence was ample to convict.

In addition, the record here reflects no order denying Melkun's motion for new trial filed after verdict. Such motion for new trial has been held to be essential for an appellate Court to review the issue of sufficiency of evidence to convict. State v. Owens, Fla. 1970, 233 So.2d 389; State v. Contreras, Fla. 1969, 227 So.2d 306.

Melkun makes the anomalous contention here that the cited cases require only, as a condition prerequisite to consideration of sufficiency of the evidence upon appeal, the filing of the motion for new trial and not necessarily the entry of any order upon the motion. Melkun contends that because he filed such motion for new trial the sufficiency of evidence to convict is available for consideration by this Court even though no order apparently was entered on the motion. Such contention is clearly untenable. The obvious reason for requiring filing of such motion for new trial as an essential prerequisite to consideration of the sufficiency of evidence on appeal is to enable the trial Court to consider and weigh the evidence in the calmness of the after-verdict and if found in any material respect deficient to set it aside and have further proceedings in the case if necessary. This could not be done if the trial Court never ruled on the motion.

The judgment appealed is therefore —

Affirmed.

HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.