Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and facts, without costs, and the complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Judgment has been entered in an action for personal injuries sustained by a seven-year-old boy while attending class in a public school when he returned to his desk and sat on the point of a pencil placed in his seat by another student. Appeal is taken from the judgment based on a verdict in the personal injury action for $3,000 and a verdict in the derivative action for $2,343, the exact amount of the medical expenses. Unquestionably the incident occurred during the absence of the teacher who had been called upon by a fellow-teacher to locate some books in the book room. She remained away for but a very short time, during which she was 10 1/2 feet away from her room and the doors to both rooms were open. There is no support in the record for any claim that the defendant board failed to select and employ competent personnel, or that defective equipment was a proximate producing cause of the accident. In effect, respondents would impose upon the board a duty to require a teacher to call for outside assistance during her short absence from the classroom. Upon the facts of this case, we cannot so hold. A contrary holding in the circumstances of this case would effectively impose on both a school board and teacher a standard of care akin to an insurer rather than the standard of a reasonable and prudent parent. Nor can respondents prevail on their claim of inadequate supervision by the teacher in leaving the classroom unattended for the short space of time she was required to be absent. As in Ohman v. Board of Educ. of City of New York ( 300 N.Y. 306) the injury resulted from "the act of an intervening third party which under the circumstances could hardly have been anticipated in the reasonable exercise of the teacher's legal duty toward the plaintiff" (p. 309) and which act was "one of those events which could occur equally as well in the presence of the teacher as during her absence" (p. 310). We are, of course, mindful of the proposition that a school board is not the insurer of the safety of students ( Ohman v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., supra; Cambareri v. Board of Educ. of City of Albany, 246 App. Div. 127, affd. 283 N.Y. 741) and that a school or teacher may be charged only with reasonable care such as a parent of ordinary prudence would exercise under comparable circumstances ( Lawes v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 305). The verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence and the law. By reason of our determination it is unnecessary to reach appellant's contentions regarding the court's charge.