Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Johnson v. United States — Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner Johnson was tried on a charge of rape. At trial, the District Judge instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty with the death penalty. The case reached this Court on a writ of certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (cited in the opinion as 138 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 426 F.2d 651). The writ of certiorari was ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted by a per curiam opinion. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Counsel of record noted in the opinion: William J. Lippman, by appointment of the Court, argued and filed briefs for petitioner; Samuel Huntington argued for the United States, with Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and Roger A. Pauley on the brief.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the jury instruction permitting a verdict of guilty with the death penalty was constitutionally permissible in light of this Court's decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 Establishes that a verdict permitting the death penalty may be constitutionally impermissible under the circumstances addressed in Jackson. Justice Stewart (dissenting) relied on Jackson to contend that the jury instruction allowing a death-penalty verdict was constitutionally impermissible and thus erroneous.
Bailey v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 86 and n. 3, 405 F.2d 1352, 1356 and n. 3 Referenced as supporting authority regarding the application of Jackson to similar jury instructions or sentencing consequences. Justice Stewart cited Bailey to support his view that the instruction here was impermissible under Jackson.
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331-332 Used by analogy for the proposition that extreme prejudice from an erroneous instruction can require reversal and remand for a new trial. Justice Stewart cited Price by way of comparison (cf.) to support his conclusion that the prejudice here warranted reversal and remand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Per curiam, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The per curiam opinion contains no extended legal analysis explaining that disposition.

In dissent, Justice Stewart (joined by Justice Douglas) explained the substantive reasoning underlying his disagreement with the dismissal: he observed that the District Judge's instruction allowed the jury to return a verdict of guilty carrying the death penalty, which, in his view, was constitutionally impermissible under United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570. He referenced Bailey v. United States as further support for applying Jackson to this instructional context. Based on that premise, Justice Stewart concluded that the erroneous instruction caused extreme prejudice and therefore required reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial, citing Price v. Georgia by way of analogy to the remedial principle.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

Implications: - The Court did not reach the merits of the constitutional claim addressed in the dissent; consequently no Supreme Court precedent resolving that issue was established in this opinion. - The direct effect is that the Supreme Court declined to decide the substantive constitutional question presented; the judgment of the court below thus stands by virtue of the dismissal of certiorari. - Justice Stewart's dissent indicates a view that, had the Court reached the merits, the instruction permitting a death-penalty verdict was constitutionally infirm and that the appropriate remedy would have been reversal and remand for a new trial. The majority did not adopt that position.

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

138 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 426 F.2d 651, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.

PER CURIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.

In the petitioner's trial on a charge of rape, the District Judge instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty with the death penalty. Yet that verdict was constitutionally impermissible in light of this Court's decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570. See Bailey v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 82, 86 and n. 3, 405 F.2d 1352, 1356 and n. 3. I think the extreme prejudice arising from this erroneous instruction requires reversal of the judgment of conviction and a remand of this case for a new trial. Cf. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331-332.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
(Apr 5, 1971)