PEOPLE v. HAWKINS

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Docket Number

Docket No. 8203.

Attorney(S)

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney; Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Arthur J. Tarnow, State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Lucious Hawkins was charged with armed robbery under MCLA § 750.529 and was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery under MCLA § 750.530. An attorney was appointed to represent the indigent defendant on September 26, 1968. The trial commenced on August 6, 1969. At the outset of the trial, before the jury was drawn, the defendant stated that he did not have an attorney; the trial judge responded that he did have one and instructed him to sit down. The record shows that the defendant never, during the intervening period or at trial, complained about the adequacy of his court-appointed counsel, requested that counsel be discharged, requested substitute counsel, or asked to proceed in propria persona.

During trial, the complaining witness testified that the defendant spoke incoherently, did not walk steadily, and smelled of alcohol. Defense counsel did not argue at trial that the defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the offense that he lacked the specific intent required for robbery; instead counsel argued that the encounter was misinterpreted by the witness. No request for jury instructions on an intoxication defense was submitted, and no objection was made to the instructions given. The conviction was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, and leave to appeal was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court (385 Mich. 780).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial judge's response to the defendant's statement that he did not have an attorney violated the defendant's constitutional right to proceed in propria persona (Const 1963, art 1, § 13).
Whether the court's failure to give jury instructions regarding intoxication as negating specific intent required reversal where the defendant's counsel did not rely upon intoxication as a defense.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant (appellant) contended on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself in propria persona when the trial judge responded to his statement that he did not have an attorney by telling him he did and instructing him to sit down.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the people's (prosecution's) trial or appellate arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
People v. Payne (1970), 27 Mich. App. 133	The Michigan constitutional right to represent oneself must be unequivocally claimed by the defendant.	The court relied on this rule to conclude the judge should not have been expected to interpret the defendant's inartful statement as an unequivocal request to proceed in propria persona.
People v. Henderson (1971), 30 Mich. App. 675	Support for the proposition that a trial judge does not necessarily err in failing to ask a defendant whether he wishes to proceed in propria persona under certain circumstances.	The court cited Henderson to support the conclusion that the trial judge did not err in failing to ask Hawkins whether he wished to discharge counsel and proceed pro se.
People v. Guillett (1955), 342 Mich. 1	When a defendant injects intoxication and inability to form specific intent into the case, failure to properly instruct on intoxication can warrant reversal.	Guillett was distinguished: in Guillett the intoxication issue was injected and erroneous instructions required reversal; here, because counsel did not rely on intoxication, reversal for instructional error was not indicated.
People v. Kelley (1970), 21 Mich. App. 612	Similar principle to Guillett regarding intoxication defenses and instructional error.	The court cited Kelley as another instance where convictions were reversed for misleading and incorrect charges on the intoxication defense, and distinguished the present case on the basis that intoxication was not relied upon by defense counsel.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statement at the start of trial that he did not have an attorney. It noted that counsel had been appointed almost a year earlier and that the defendant never during the pretrial period or trial complained about his representation, sought discharge of appointed counsel, requested substitute counsel, or asked to proceed in propria persona. Applying the general rule from People v. Payne that the right to self-representation must be unequivocally claimed, the court concluded that the judge was not required to treat the defendant's inartful remark as an unequivocal request to proceed pro se and did not err in failing to ask whether the defendant wished to proceed without counsel. The court also cited People v. Henderson to support that conclusion.

On the intoxication issue, the court noted the complaining witness' testimony suggesting the defendant may have been under the influence of alcohol. However, defense counsel did not argue at trial that the defendant's intoxication negated the specific intent necessary for robbery, did not request instructions on an intoxication defense, and did not object to the instructions given. The court distinguished precedents (People v. Guillett and People v. Kelley) in which convictions were reversed because the intoxication issue had been injected into the case and the jury received misleading or incorrect instructions. Because intoxication was not relied upon as a defense here, the court determined there was no need to instruct on that non-issue and reversal for instructional error was not warranted.

Holding and Implications

Affirmed.

Consequences: The defendant's conviction for unarmed robbery was affirmed and his claim that he was denied the right to proceed in propria persona was rejected. The court found no basis for reversal on the theory that an intoxication instruction was required because defense counsel did not rely on intoxication. The opinion does not announce or establish a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities; its direct effect is to leave the jury's verdict and conviction intact.

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PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Lucious Hawkins, was charged with committing the offense of armed robbery, MCLA § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 28.797), and was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery, MCLA § 750.530 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.798).

At the outset of the trial, before the jury was drawn, the following colloquy took place:

"Defendant: Your Honor, could I say I don't have an attorney.

"The Court: You have one. Sit down.

"Defendant: I don't have one.

"The Court: Sit down. You had one since September of last year. Don't tell me that. All right. You may proceed, Mr. Clerk."

An attorney appointed by the court to represent Hawkins, an indigent, entered an appearance on September 26, 1968, almost a year before the commencement of trial on August 6, 1969. At no time during the intervening period nor at any time during the trial did the defendant lodge any complaint regarding the adequacy of his representation by his court-appointed attorney. Nor did he at any time ask that his attorney be discharged or that substitute assigned counsel be appointed or that he be permitted to proceed in propria persona.

Now on appeal he claims that he was denied his constitutional right to proceed in propria persona (Const 1963, art 1, § 13) when the judge responded as he did to the defendant's statement regarding his attorney.

The general rule is that the Michigan constitutional right to represent one's self must be unequivocably claimed by the defendant. People v. Payne (1970), 27 Mich. App. 133. We do not think that the judge should have understood the defendant's statement to be an inartful request that he be permitted to discharge his attorney and proceed in propria persona, or that the judge erred in failing to ask the defendant whether he wished to do so. See People v. Henderson (1971), 30 Mich. App. 675.

During the trial the complaining witness testified that the defendant spoke incoherently, was not walking very steadily, and that she smelled alcohol on his breath. The defendant's attorney did not, based on this testimony, contend or argue to the jury that the defendant was at the time the offense was committed so deeply intoxicated that he could not entertain the requisite specific intent to commit the offense of robbery. He argued, rather, that when Hawkins accosted the complaining witness on the street he was not attempting to rob her and she misinterpreted his conduct. No request for instructions on an intoxication defense was submitted, nor did the defendant's attorney object to the instructions that were given.

In People v. Guillett (1955), 342 Mich. 1, on which the defendant relies, Guillett injected the issue of inability, by reason of intoxication, to entertain the requisite specific intent. Similarly, see People v. Kelley (1970), 21 Mich. App. 612. In both cited cases the defendants' convictions were reversed because of misleading and incorrect charges on the intoxication defense. In this case, reversal for instructional error is not indicated. Hawkins' counsel did not rely on intoxication as a defense and, therefore, there was no need properly to charge on that non-issue.

Affirmed.

PEOPLE v. HAWKINS

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

PEOPLE v. HAWKINS

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