QUILLIAN, Judge.
The appellee filed a claim against the appellant on an unconditional promissory note. The appellant filed an answer in which he alleged: (1) that there was a failure of consideration; (2) that the payment of the note was conditional. Held:
1. "It is true, of course, that the maker of a note when sued, has the right to show by parol, if he can, a want or failure of consideration, but he will not be allowed to prove that his obligation to pay was dependent or conditional upon the promisee's compliance with a prior or contemporaneous agreement not expressed in the note, unless the execution of the note was induced by fraud, accident, or mistake." Lee v. Garland, 208 Ga. 251 (1) ( 66 S.E.2d 223), and cases therein cited.
Therefore, it was not error to exclude parol evidence which would have changed the unconditional promissory note into a conditional obligation.
2. While the appellant argues that he was not allowed to introduce evidence as to a failure of consideration, the evidence excluded was in regard to the extrinsic condition precedent and not to a failure of consideration.
Judgment affirmed. Jordan, P. J., and Evans, J., concur.
ARGUED OCTOBER 6, 1971 — DECIDED DECEMBER 1, 1971.