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Docket Number

No. 5658.

Attorney(S)

William C. McArthur, for appellant. Ray Thornton, Attorney General; John D. Bridgforth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Judges

JOHN A. FOGLEMAN, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Lester Earl Rimes v. State of Arkansas

Citation elements from the opinion: No. 5658; Supreme Court of Arkansas; Opinion delivered December 20, 1971.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division; Judge John S. Mosby; judgment affirmed. Counsel of record: William C. McArthur for appellant; Ray Thornton, Attorney General, and John D. Bridgforth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Lester Earl Rimes, appealed the imposition of a sentence under the habitual criminal statute following a conviction. The appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Arkansas from the Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division (Judge John S. Mosby). The Supreme Court's opinion, delivered by Justice John A. Fogleman, affirms the circuit court's judgment. The record and opinion focus on two contentions raised by appellant: (1) the procedural method used to determine guilt and then sentencing under the habitual criminal act, and (2) the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions where an authentication certificate used a different middle name.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the procedure of having the jury first determine the defendant's guilt or innocence of the charged crime and then, after a guilty finding, determine the sentence following presentation of evidence of prior convictions is proper under the relevant statute (Act 639 of 1967; Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2330.1 (Supp. 1969)).
Whether admission of evidence of prior convictions was erroneous where an authentication certificate identified the convicted person with a different middle name ("Lester Ease Rimes") than the name used in the present charge ("Lester Earl Rimes").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant contended that the circuit court employed an improper procedure by permitting the jury to decide guilt first and only after a guilty verdict to hear evidence of prior convictions and determine sentencing under the habitual offender statute. He relied on Miller v. State (239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601), which had prescribed a different procedure.
Appellant also contended that the court erred in admitting evidence of prior convictions because the authentication certificate for those convictions identified the person convicted as "Lester Ease Rimes," whereas in the present prosecution he was identified as "Lester Earl Rimes," alleging a discrepancy in identity proof.

Appellee's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's (State's) specific trial- or appellate-level arguments beyond the court's summary disposition and legal citations supporting the challenged procedure and admission of prior-conviction evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601	Previously prescribed a different procedure for handling guilt and sentencing when prior convictions were at issue.	The appellant relied on Miller to challenge the procedure used; the court noted Miller but explained that the Legislature changed the procedure by Act 639 of 1967.
Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108	Authority holding that the procedure of first determining guilt and afterward determining sentence with evidence of prior convictions is proper under the statute enacted by the General Assembly.	The court cited Ridgeway to support that the procedure used in this case was proper and in accord with Act 639 of 1967 (Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2330.1).
State v. Smith, 12 Ark. 622, 56 Am. Dec. 287	Rule that insertion or omission of a middle initial is generally immaterial; a wrong letter may be stricken or disregarded because the law recognizes but one Christian (first) name.	The court relied on this rule to reject appellant's challenge to the admissibility of prior-conviction records that used a slightly different middle name.
Garner v. Cluck, 209 Ark. 912, 193 S.W.2d 661	Support for the general principle that middle-name discrepancies are not controlling where identity is otherwise clear.	The court cited Garner as consistent authority affirming the immateriality of a middle-name discrepancy in identity disputes of this type.
Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499	Principle that identity of name is prima facie evidence of identity of person and that a defendant may introduce evidence to show he is not the person referred to in the record.	The court invoked Higgins to explain that since appellant did not offer evidence that he was not the person in the prior-conviction records, the records' identification sufficed.
Henson v. State, 248 Ark. 992, 455 S.W.2d 101	Authority supporting the sufficiency of evidence of prior convictions in similar contexts.	The court cited Henson to conclude that the evidence of the convictions was sufficient to support the jury's finding when the appellant did not rebut identity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the two contentions raised by appellant and analyzed them against statutory change and established identity principles:

Procedure for guilty-then-sentencing sequence: The appellant's challenge rested on Miller v. State, which had required a different approach. The court explained that the General Assembly amended the statutory procedure by Act 639 of 1967 (Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2330.1 (Supp. 1969)), and that subsequent Arkansas decisions (specifically Ridgeway v. State (1971)) had upheld the procedure followed in this case. Accordingly, the court found that the circuit court's practice of having the jury decide guilt first and only after a guilty verdict hear evidence of prior convictions to determine sentence was proper under the current statute.
Admission of prior-conviction evidence with name discrepancy: The court addressed the contention that an authentication certificate described the convicted person as "Lester Ease Rimes" while the defendant in the present case was "Lester Earl Rimes." The circuit judge had noted that accompanying records showed judgments against "Lester Earl Rimes." The Supreme Court observed controlling principles: historically the insertion or omission of a middle initial/name is immaterial; the law recognizes but one Christian (first) name (State v. Smith). The court noted that the rule has been treated as inapplicable only where an initial is used instead of the first name and where multiple persons with similar names exist locally. The court reiterated the ordinary principle that a name's identity is prima facie evidence of identity of person and that the defendant bears the opportunity to introduce evidence if he is not the person referred to in the record (Higgins). Because appellant did not offer evidence to negate that he was the person in the records and because the circuit judge observed records indicating convictions against "Lester Earl Rimes," the Supreme Court concluded that admission of the prior-conviction evidence was not reversible error and was sufficient to support the jury's finding.

Holding and Implications

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Direct effect: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court, leaving appellant's conviction and sentence under the habitual criminal statute intact.

Broader implications: The opinion follows statutory change (Act 639 of 1967; Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2330.1) and existing Arkansas authority (e.g., Ridgeway) endorsing the procedure of first determining guilt and then, post-verdict, considering evidence of prior convictions to fix sentence. The court also reaffirmed settled Arkansas principles regarding name identity and the limited circumstances in which a discrepancy in middle name or initial can defeat the use of prior-conviction records. The opinion does not announce a new legal rule beyond applying these established authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary is a faithful synthesis of the contents of the opinion provided and does not add information not present in the original text.

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LESTER EARL RIMES v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

1. CRIMINAL LAW — PROSECUTION FOR SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES — STATUTORY PROCEDURE. — Procedure of permitting the jury to first consider only the question of accused's guilt or innocence of the crime for which he is on trial and after finding him guilty to then determine his sentence after hearing evidence of previous convictions held proper and in accord with Act 639 of 1967 [Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2330.1 (Supp. 1969).] 2. NAMES — IDENTITY — REQUISITES SUFFICIENCY. — Ordinarily, insertion or omission of the middle initial in a name is immaterial, unless a material issue of identity is raised, and a wrong letter may be stricken or disregarded because the law knows but one Christian name. 3. NAMES — IDENTITY — BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR. — Admission of evidence of previous convictions with the authentication certificate identifying the person convicted with a different middle name than the one used in the charge against him held proper where no evidence was offered that the individual was not the person referred to in the record introduced.

JOHN A. FOGLEMAN, Justice.

Appellant argues two points for reversal of his sentence under the habitual criminal act. We affirm because we find no merit in either contention.

Appellant's initial contention is that the circuit court followed an erroneous procedure in permitting the jury to first consider only the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime for which he was on trial, and, after finding him guilty, to determine his sentence only after hearing evidence of previous convictions. He relies upon Miller v. State, 239 Ark. 836, 394 S.W.2d 601, decided October 18, 1965, which prescribed a different procedure. The General Assembly promptly changed that procedure by Act 639 of 1967 [see Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2330.1 (Supp. 1969)]. We have held that the procedure followed in this case was proper and in accord with this statute. Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157 (1971), 472 S.W.2d 108.

Appellant then urges that the circuit court erroneously admitted evidence of previous convictions because the authentication certificate relating to records of alleged previous convictions identified the person convicted as Lester Ease Rimes while he was charged in this case as Lester Earl Rimes. The circuit judge stated that the records accompanying the questioned authentication certificates showed that the judgments of conviction were against Lester Earl Rimes.

We find no reversible error in the admission of this evidence, under these circumstances. This court has held that insertion or omission of a middle initial is immaterial and that a wrong letter may be stricken or disregarded, because the law knows but one Christian name. State v. Smith, 12 Ark. 622, 56 Am. Dec. 287. While this rule has been held inapplicable where an initial only is used in lieu of the first or Christian name, particularly where there are other persons in the area who have similar names, its efficacy has not otherwise been questioned. See Garner v. Cluck, 209 Ark. 912, 193 S.W.2d 661.

Courts ordinarily apply the principle that a middle name or initial is immaterial unless a material issue of identity is raised. See Annot., IS A.L.R.3d 968, 974 (1967). Identity of name is prima facie evidence of identity of person, but if appellant was not the person referred to in the record introduced, he was free to offer evidence to that effect. Higgins v. State, 235 Ark. 153, 357 S.W.2d 499. Since he did not do so, we cannot say that the evidence of these convictions was not sufficient to support the jury's finding. Henson v. State, 248 Ark. 992, 455 S.W.2d 101.

The judgment is affirmed.

RIMES v. STATE