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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Donald Collinsworth and Donald Ray Patrick were convicted in the Magoffin Circuit Court of grand larceny and arson. The jury sentenced them to three years' imprisonment for arson and two years for grand larceny, to be served consecutively. The arson conviction arose from the burning of Calvin Cain's barn on the evening of August 18, 1970. Mrs. Cain testified that the appellants were seen across the road from the barn between approximately 9 p.m. and after 10 p.m., while the barn burned between 10:30 p.m. and 11 p.m. Additional evidence included testimony that Collinsworth sold two saddles that were in the barn prior to the fire, and that the appellants sought to procure a false alibi from a witness. Evidence of a prior vague threat by the appellants against Mr. Cain was introduced to show a possible motive. On appeal, the appellants challenged only the arson conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the appellants' conviction for arson.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 675 (1969) Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, but not if evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt. Applied to determine that suspicion alone was insufficient to uphold the arson conviction.
Hodges v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 811 Suspicion alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Reinforced the standard that circumstantial evidence must exclude reasonable innocence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that circumstantial evidence can support a conviction, but emphasized the principle that such evidence must not be equally consistent with innocence. The evidence was sufficient to prove that the appellants stole saddles from the barn, but was insufficient to establish that they intentionally set the barn on fire. The timing of the appellants' presence near the barn and the subsequent fire, the sale of stolen property, and the attempt to fabricate an alibi were not enough to prove arson beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict on the arson charge.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the appellants' conviction for arson and directed that if the evidence remains the same on retrial, a verdict of acquittal should be entered. The conviction for grand larceny was not appealed and thus remains intact. This decision does not establish new precedent but clarifies the evidentiary threshold required for sustaining an arson conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

Donald COLLINSWORTH and Donald Ray Patrick, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

NEIKIRK, Judge.

Donald Collinsworth and Donald Ray Patrick were convicted in the Magoffin Circuit Court of grand larceny and arson. Their punishment was fixed by a jury at three years' imprisonment on the charge of arson and two years on the charge of grand larceny, the terms to be served consecutively.

The appellants seek reversal of the conviction of arson, contending that the lower court erred in overruling their motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. They do not appeal the conviction of grand larceny.

On the evening of August 18, 1970, Calvin Cain's barn and its contents burned. Mr. Cain's wife testified that she saw the appellants across the road from the barn at approximately 9 p. m., and that they remained there until after 10 p. m. The barn allegedly burned between 10:30 p. m. and 11 p. m. A witness testified that appellant Collinsworth sold him two saddles. According to Mrs. Cain, those saddles were in the barn on the evening the barn was destroyed. Another witness testified that the appellants came to him on the night after the incident and asked him to say that they had been with him on the night of the fire. Evidence that appellants had made a rather indirect and vague threat against Mr. Cain a year prior to the incident was introduced to show that the appellants bore a grudge against Mr. Cain.

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a conviction may be obtained on circumstantial evidence. However, no defendant may be convicted on such evidence if it is as consistent with innocence as with guilt. Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 675 (1969). Suspicion alone is not enough. Hodges v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 811.

The evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the appellants had entered the barn and stolen the saddles, but in our opinion it was not sufficient to show an intentional setting fire to the barn, which was required to sustain a conviction of arson. The trial court should have sustained the appellants' motion for a directed verdict on the arson charge.

The judgment convicting the appellants of arson is reversed, with directions that if on another trial the evidence is the same, a verdict of acquittal should be directed.

All concur.

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COLLINSWORTH v. COMMONWEALTH
(Feb 4, 1972)