JEFFERSON NATL. BANK v. CT. OF MIAMI

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Docket Number

No. 72-164.

Attorney(S)

Katz Salmon, Miami Beach, for appellant. Joseph A. Wanick, City Atty., for appellee.

Judges

BARKDULL, Chief Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (plaintiff below), Jefferson National Bank of Miami Beach, owns a lot at the northwest corner of Pine Tree Drive and Forty-Second Street in the City of Miami Beach, immediately north of the appellant's bank (separated by Forty-Second Street) and adjacent to property referenced as the "Manilow Property." The appellant sought a permit to use the lot as a parking lot in conjunction with its bank. The lot was zoned "RC" (an estate district) under the City's zoning ordinance, which allows "Parks, playgrounds, automobile parking areas, or municipal buildings, owned and operated by the City of Miami Beach" subject to certain distance limitations.

The City refused the permit. The appellant filed suit in the trial court seeking to have the City's comprehensive zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional in its entirety and, as applied, to obtain permission to use the lot for parking. The trial court denied relief; the appellant appealed. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of relief.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the City's comprehensive zoning ordinance is unconstitutional in its entirety because it no longer represents a comprehensive zoning scheme (i.e., whether the entire ordinance should be invalidated).
Whether the zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by permitting a municipal (public) parking lot on the parcel while denying the property owner the right to operate a private parking lot (an alleged discriminatory distinction between public and private parking uses).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The entire zoning ordinance is unconstitutional because it purportedly no longer functions as a comprehensive zoning ordinance and therefore should be declared invalid in its entirety.
The ordinance denies the appellant equal protection by allowing the City to operate a public parking lot on the parcel (within the distance limits in the ordinance) while refusing the appellant the right to operate a private parking lot on the same parcel; the appellant relied heavily on City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear to support the argument that private and public uses should be treated equivalently.

Appellee's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
City of Miami Beach v. Ocean Inland Company, 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364	Cited for the proposition concerning the validity or comprehensiveness of the City's zoning ordinance.	Used as authority in rejecting appellant's contention that the entire zoning ordinance is unconstitutional because the record does not show the ordinance fails to comprehensively zone the municipality.
City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, Fla. 1956, 86 So.2d 442	Cited in connection with the general proposition that the zoning ordinance remained a comprehensive scheme.	Relied on to support the court's conclusion that the ordinance was not shown to be noncomprehensive and thus not invalid in toto.
Oka v. Cole, Fla. 1962, 145 So.2d 233	Cited on the topic of comprehensive zoning and related validity principles.	Cited as part of the authorities supporting rejection of the appellant's attack on the ordinance as a whole.
Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281	Cited regarding the ordinance's comprehensiveness or the standards for evaluating zoning validity.	Included among cases showing the record did not demonstrate the ordinance failed to comprehensively zone the municipality.
County of Brevard v. Woodham, Fla.App. 1969, 223 So.2d 344	Cited in support of the court's view on comprehensive zoning validity.	Used as part of the court's authority for refusing to invalidate the ordinance in its entirety.
Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 589	Referenced in the opinion identifying the "Manilow Property" located across Pine Tree Drive.	Referenced as background/context for the location of nearby property; not used as a central legal principle in the court's analysis.
City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, Fla. 1969, 226 So.2d 805	Referenced alongside the Manilow property identification.	Used as a citation to identify the adjacent "Manilow Property"; not relied on for the court's principal legal reasoning in this opinion.
City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537	Held that it would be discriminatory to deprive a property owner in a multifamily use district of the right to operate a private school when the ordinance permitted the operation of a public school.	The appellant relied heavily on Lear for its equal protection argument; the court distinguished Lear and declined to extend it to require equal treatment between municipal parking and private parking.
Township of Scotch Plains v. Town of Westfield, 83 N.J. Super. 323, 199 A.2d 673	Cited for the proposition that a zoning authority may exempt itself from regulations applicable to private interests and that municipal construction of parking garages can be a governmental function.	Relied upon to support the court's conclusion that the City could reserve for itself a use (municipal parking) within a zoning district that private owners do not enjoy.
City of Cincinnati v. Wegehoft, 119 Ohio St. 136, 162 N.E. 389	Cited as authority that a zoning authority may exempt itself from regulations applicable to private parties.	Used to bolster the court's view that municipalities may reserve uses for themselves within zoning districts.
City of Treasure Island v. Decker, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 756	Referred to (cf.) in the context of municipal exemptions within zoning districts.	Referenced as authority consistent with permitting municipal exceptions to zoning restrictions.
Nichols Engineering Research Corp. v. State ex rel. Knight, Fla., 59 So.2d 874	Cited as an example of instances where municipalities are accorded uses in a zoned use district not enjoyed by all citizens (e.g., public facilities).	Invoked to illustrate that municipal functions and facilities constitute recognized exceptions to private use limitations.
AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, Fla.App. 1971, 246 So.2d 126	Cited regarding municipal exceptions to zoning limitations and governmental-function principles.	Used to support the court's statement that governmental functions are usually exceptions to general use limitations in zoning districts.
Stott v. City of Manchester, 109 N.H. 59, 242 A.2d 58	Cited for the proposition that the erection of a parking garage has been held to be a governmental function.	Relied upon as authority supporting the classification of municipal parking facilities as governmental functions, which are exceptions to zoning restrictions on private uses.
State v. City of Miami Beach, Fla. 1950, 47 So.2d 865	Cited among authorities on municipal governmental functions and related zoning exceptions.	Utilized to support the court's view that municipal parking construction can be a governmental function and thus excepted from private-use limitations.
Riviere v. Orlando Parking Commission, Fla. 1954, 74 So.2d 694	Cited in connection with municipal parking and governmental-function principles.	Used to support the court's characterization of municipal parking operations as governmental functions analogous to other municipal facilities exempted from private-use rules.
Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 140 N.E.2d 241	Cited as authority that governmental functions are usually exceptions to general use limitations permitted in a zoned use district.	Employed to reinforce the court's conclusion that municipal parking may be treated differently from privately operated parking for zoning purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytical steps corresponding to the appellant's preserved points:

On the facial attack to the entire zoning ordinance, the court found that although the ordinance had been amended over time, the record did not demonstrate that it failed to comprehensively zone the municipality with generally compatible use districts. Citing several authorities (e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Ocean Inland Company; City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen; Oka v. Cole; Smith v. City of Miami Beach; County of Brevard v. Woodham), the court rejected the contention that the ordinance must be declared unconstitutional in its entirety.
On the equal protection claim, the court examined the appellant's reliance on City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear (which had held it discriminatory to permit a public school but deny a private school). The court distinguished Lear by focusing on who would operate the use: schools (private or public) are operated by entities other than the municipality, whereas the parking lot at issue would be owned and operated by the City itself. The court reasoned that a zoning authority may, upon adopting a comprehensive zoning ordinance, exempt itself from regulations applicable to private interests. It cited authorities (e.g., Township of Scotch Plains v. Town of Westfield; City of Cincinnati v. Wegehoft; and other cases and treatises) to support the proposition that municipalities may be accorded uses or perform governmental functions (such as parking facilities) that are exceptions to general use limitations in a zoning district. The court also observed that municipal parking is constructed for the public benefit, whereas private parking facilities typically serve the patrons of the private owner. On this basis the court concluded there was no denial of equal protection.

The court therefore found the appellant's distinctions between private and municipal parking insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutional discrimination and affirmed the trial court's denial of relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the appellant relief; Affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the appellant's challenge to the zoning ordinance — both as a facial attack on its comprehensiveness and as an equal protection claim based on the ordinance permitting municipal parking but not private parking — was rejected and the appellant's request for a permit and declaratory relief was denied. The court did not find the comprehensive zoning ordinance unconstitutional and upheld the principle that a municipality may reserve or exercise certain uses (including municipal parking) within zoned districts that private citizens do not enjoy. The opinion does not announce a novel broader precedent beyond applying established authorities to distinguish Lear and to reaffirm that municipal governmental functions can constitute exceptions to private-use limitations in zoning districts.

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JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI BEACH, A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BANKING CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE.

BARKDULL, Chief Judge.

The appellant, as plaintiff in the trial court, filed an action seeking to have the comprehensive zoning of the City of Miami Beach declared unconstitutional in its entirety and as applied to a lot it owns in a residential use district of the City. The trial court denied the relief sought and this appeal ensued.

The record reveals the following: The plaintiff owns a lot on the northwest corner of Pine Tree Drive and Forty-Second Street in the City of Miami Beach. The lot is located immediately north of plaintiff's Bank, separated only by Forty-Second Street. The plaintiff desires to use the property as a parking lot in conjunction with the Bank. The zoning classification applicable to the lot under the defendant's ordinance is RC. This permits:

"In the * * * `RC' Estate Districts no building or land shall be used * * * other than a single family residence, * * * excepting for one or more of the following uses:

"Parks, playgrounds, automobile parking areas, or municipal buildings, owned and operated by the City of Miami Beach, provided that no automobile parking area so owned and operated by said City shall be located at a distance greater than 250 feet from a public park owned and operated by said City, or at a distance greater than 350 feet from a Business District."

The property immediately to the north of the lot in question is zoned single-family residence. The plaintiff's Bank is across Forty-Second Street to the south. Across Pine Tree Drive to the east is the "Manilow Property". See: Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 589; City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, Fla. 1969, 226 So.2d 805. The plaintiff applied for a permit to use its lot for parking purposes, but was refused. It then filed its action in the trial court and suffered an adverse final judgment.

The plaintiff, as appellant, has preserved two points for review: (1) That the trial court erred in entering the final judgment under review, because the entire zoning ordinance is unconstitutional since it no longer represents a comprehensive zoning ordinance. We reject this contention. Although the zoning ordinance may have been altered or amended many times over the years since it was initially adopted, the record fails to disclose that it does not comprehensively zone the entire municipality with use districts which are generally compatible with today's times. See: City of Miami Beach v. Ocean Inland Company, 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364; City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, Fla. 1956, 86 So.2d 442; Oka v. Cole, Fla. 1962, 145 So.2d 233; Smith v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 281; County of Brevard v. Woodham, Fla.App. 1969, 223 So.2d 344.

Secondly, and more importantly, the plaintiff urges that the trial court in effect, by its judgment, denied it the equal protection of the law and discriminated against this property owner when it is apparent from the zoning ordinance of the City that if the City of Miami Beach desired to operate a public parking lot on this parcel it would be permitted to do so, said lot admittedly being within 350 feet of a business district, the plaintiff-appellant relying heavily on City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537. The cited case held that it would be discriminatory to deprive a property owner in a multifamily use district of a right to operate a private school on its property, when the applicable zoning ordinance permitted the operation of a public school. The appellant contends that if there is no difference between a private and a public school there should be no difference between a private and a public parking lot. We believe there is a distinction between the operation of a school and the operation of a parking lot. If not, this opinion will be in conflict with City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, supra.

As to the schools referred to in City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, supra, whether they be private or public they would be operated by an entity other than a municipality; whereas the parking lot in the instant case would be operated by the zoning authority itself, the City of Miami Beach. A zoning authority has the right, upon the adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, to exempt itself from the regulations applicable to private interests. See: Township of Scotch Plains v. Town of Westfield, 83 N.J. Super. 323, 199 A.2d 673; City of Cincinnati v. Wegehoft, 119 Ohio St. 136, 162 N.E. 389; Vol. 2, American Law of Zoning, Anderson, § 9.04, cf. City of Treasure Island v. Decker, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 756. No contention having been made that the comprehensive zoning ordinance was not validly adopted after public hearing [and we haven't found any reason to hold that it is not a comprehensive zoning ordinance], we do not find it is unconstitutional because it permits the zoning power itself a reservation of use within a particular zoning district different from that enjoyed by private citizens. There are many instances where municipalities are accorded uses in a zoned use district which are not enjoyed by all its citizens, e.g., operation of a fire, police, electric, water, sewerage, and similar facilities therein. Nichols Engineering Research Corp. v. State ex rel. Knight, Fla., 59 So.2d 874; AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, Fla.App. 1971, 246 So.2d 126; Vol. 2, American Law of Zoning, Anderson, § 9.03. The erection of a parking garage has been held to be a governmental function [Stott] v. City of Manchester, 109 N.H. 59, 242 A.2d 58; Township of Scotch Plains v. Town of Westfield, supra; See also: State v. City of Miami Beach, Fla. 1950, 47 So.2d 865; Riviere v. Orlando Parking Commission etc., Fla. 1954, 74 So.2d 694], and governmental functions are usually considered exceptions to general use limitations permitted in a zoned use district. AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County, supra; Township of Scotch Plains v. Town of Westfield, supra; Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 140 N.E.2d 241; Vol. 2, American Law of Zoning, Anderson, § 9.03. Further, when parking garages are built by a municipality they are constructed for the benefit of the public at large; when they are built by private interests, the patronage of a parking facility is generally limited by the ownership of the property involved.

Therefore, we find no denial of equal protection of the law and affirm the action of the trial judge in denying the relief sought.

Affirmed.