HALL v. POWERS and COMMONWEALTH

Sovereign immunity — Trespass actions — Equal protection — Due process — Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amendment.

1. The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the Commonwealth from actions in trespass, and such doctrine does not deny equal protection or due process under the Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amendment, to those claimants whose actions are so barred. [545-6]

Judge CRUMLISH, JR., filed a concurring opinion reiterating his previous position which was substantially as follows:

1. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania should provide the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania with the benefit of its reasoning on the facts and on the question of sovereign immunity.

OPINION BY JUDGE BLATT, November 6, 1972:

This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court, being a complaint in trespass filed against the Commonwealth and Thomas J. Powers, a Commonwealth employee. The plaintiff claims that she was injured when a generator, pulled by a Commonwealth owned truck, which was driven by Powers, broke free and struck the vehicle which she was driving. The Commonwealth has filed Preliminary Objections, claiming the protection of sovereign immunity from actions in trespass.

This Court has consistently and repeatedly refused to overturn the doctrine of sovereign immunity as laid down by many decisions of our Supreme Court. Our position has most recently been stated in Duquesne Light Company v. Department of Transportation, 6 Pa. Commw. 364, 295 A.2d 351 (1972), and previously in Lovrinoff v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 3 Pa. Commw. 161, 281 A.2d 176 (1971). See Sweigard v. Commonwealth, 5 Pa. Commw. 637 (1972); Brown v. National Guard, 3 Pa. Commw. 457 (1971); Kremin v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1 Pa. Commw. 642 (1971).

The plaintiff, however, has raised the issue here that Pennsylvania's doctrine of sovereign immunity constitutes a denial of equal protection and due process under the United States Constitution by creating two classes of litigants; those who have a cause of action because injured by a private tortfeasor, and those whose cause of action is barred by sovereign immunity. In Duquesne, supra, however, this Court specifically rejected that contention.

We, therefore, sustain the Commonwealth's preliminary objections, and the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed.

CONCURRING OPINION BY JUDGE CRUMLISH:

I reaffirm my position as stated in Duquesne Light Company v. Department of Transportation, 6 Pa. Commw. 364, 295 A.2d 351 (1972), and in the other cases cited by the majority.