HARRIS v. THOMPSON

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Docket Number

No. 1 CA-CIV 1678.

Attorney(S)

Hughes, Hughes Conlan, by John C. Hughes, Phoenix, for appellants. Malcolm P. Strohson, Phoenix, for appellee.

Judges

DONOFRIO, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Joe B. and Dortha Harris, landlords, sued defendant Henry A. Thompson, tenant, for waste and unreasonable wear and tear to leased barroom premises. Thompson filed a $10,000 counterclaim for value of possessions and damages to his furnishings and equipment that plaintiffs refused to permit him to remove after plaintiffs obtained a prior judgment resulting in eviction. Motions to dismiss the counterclaim were denied before trial, with leave to reurge at trial. During trial plaintiffs objected to evidence regarding the counterclaim, particularly testimony as to the value of improvements made by defendant. A jury returned a $200 verdict for defendant on the counterclaim. After trial the court struck the counterclaim as barred by collateral estoppel under Thompson v. Harris, amended the judgment to delete the $200 verdict, and entered judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial after the post-trial dismissal of the counterclaim.

Legal Issues Presented

Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiffs' motion for new trial following the post-trial dismissal of defendant's counterclaim?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Valley Transp. System v. Reinartz, 67 Ariz. 380, 197 P.2d 269 (1948)	Standard for determining prejudicial error when improper evidence was admitted upon which the jury "might" act.	The court applied this standard to assess whether admission of evidence regarding the counterclaim was prejudicial to plaintiffs.
Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Morris, 78 Ariz. 24, 275 P.2d 389 (1954)	Where an appellate court cannot say the jury would have reached the same verdict had the improper testimony been excluded, reversal is required.	The court relied on this principle to hold that because it could not determine what the jury would have done without the improper evidence, reversal was compelled.
Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969)	Cited as the prior judgment forming the basis for collateral estoppel barring the counterclaim.	The trial court's post-trial striking of the counterclaim was predicated on this decision; the appellate court declined to review that ruling because no cross-appeal was filed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recited the procedural posture: counterclaim denial before trial (with right to reurge), admission at trial of evidence regarding defendant's improvements, a jury verdict for $200 on the counterclaim, and a post-trial ruling striking the counterclaim as barred by collateral estoppel. The court identified Arizona law on prejudicial error: if improper evidence was admitted that the jury might act upon, an appellate court must reverse unless it can say the jury would have reached the same result without that evidence (citing Valley Transp. System v. Reinartz and Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Morris). Applying those principles, the court concluded that the $200 verdict for defendant would not have been returned had the judge ruled before submission that the counterclaim was barred, and the appellate court could not determine with certainty that the jury would have reached the same disposition on plaintiffs' complaint absent the evidence of improvements. Because resolving that uncertainty would require speculation, the court found the admission of the evidence prejudicial and reversed the judgment. The court also noted it would not address the correctness of the post-trial collateral estoppel ruling since no cross-appeal was filed.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED

Direct effect: The judgment of the trial court was reversed due to prejudicial admission of evidence related to the defendant's counterclaim. The opinion does not announce a new precedent; it applies established Arizona standards for prejudicial error and notes no broader implications beyond the reversal and the court's choice not to review the post-trial collateral estoppel ruling in the absence of a cross-appeal.

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Joe B. HARRIS and Dortha Harris, his wife, Appellants, v. Henry A. THOMPSON, Appellee.

DONOFRIO, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment entered in favor of defendant-appellee-tenant Henry A. Thompson after jury trial on a complaint by plaintiff-appellant-landlord Joe B. Harris and his wife alleging damages of $1087.70 to the demised premises as a direct result of defendant's removal of property at the time defendant was compelled to vacate. The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court.

The facts deemed necessary for disposition of this appeal are as follows: Plaintiffs proceeded to trial on a complaint alleging waste and unreasonable wear and tear on the leasehold premises owned by them and leased to defendant to operate as a barroom at 1337 E. Indian School Road in Phoenix. Defendant filed a counterclaim for $10,000 which represented the value of possessions which plaintiffs refused to permit defendant to take with him at the time plaintiffs obtained a judgment of forcible entry and detainer, and also included damages to his furnishings and equipment. Motions to dismiss the counterclaim were made before trial and denied, with the right to re-urge the motion at trial. The record reflects several objections by plaintiffs during the course of trial as to the introduction of any evidence regarding the counterclaim; in particular, any testimony of the value of improvements put into the premises by the defendant. The jury reached a verdict of $200 for defendant on his counterclaim.

Subsequently a motion for new trial was made and denied while the judge simultaneously granted plaintiffs motion to strike the counterclaim as being barred by collateral estoppel as a subsequent attack on a former Maricopa County Superior Court judgment which this Court affirmed in Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969), even though it was held to be a judgment of eviction rather than of forcible entry and detainer. The judgment in the instant case was then amended to delete the verdict of $200 so that judgment was finally had for defendant on plaintiffs' complaint.

On appeal the plaintiffs have raised the following question: Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiffs' motion for new trial following the post-trial dismissal of defendant's counterclaim?

In Arizona the standard accepted for determining whether prejudicial error has been committed is where improper evidence was admitted upon which the jury might act. Valley Transp. System v. Reinartz, 67 Ariz. 380, 197 P.2d 269 (1948). Where an appellate court would be unable to say that the jury would have reached the same verdict had the testimony that was improper been excluded, the reviewing court must hold that reversible error was committed. Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Morris, 78 Ariz. 24, 275 P.2d 389 (1954). Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is eminently clear that a verdict of $200 for the defendant would not have been returned had the judge ruled before the case was given to the jury that the counterclaim was barred as a matter of law. Furthermore, we are unable to state with any certainty that the jury would have returned a verdict for defendant on plaintiff's complaint, which is precisely what the amended judgment from which the appeal was taken specifies. It is entirely possible that absent any evidence of the defendant's improvements the plaintiffs may have been successful on their complaint. Since we are unable to determine what the verdict would have been without resorting to speculation, we are compelled to reverse.

Since no cross-appeal was filed, we need not question the propriety of the court's post-trial ruling that Thompson v. Harris, supra, barred any counterclaim in the instant case.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

STEVENS, P.J., and CASE, J., concur.