The trial court did not err in permanently enjoining DeKalb County from imposing the charges or "rentals" against the appellees for any of the reasons assigned.
GRICE, Presiding Justice.
This is the second appearance of this case before this court. In DeKalb County v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 228 Ga. 512 ( 186 S.E.2d 732), and related cases, we affirmed an order of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, which declared an ordinance enacted by that county attempting to impose a license tax or charge against the appellees to be null and void, and granted an interlocutory injunction against its enforcement.
Upon return to the trial court, with the same facts before it, an order was entered on July 31, 1972, granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment, dismissing a counterclaim of the county, and permanently enjoining the county from enforcing the ordinance in question.
In the previous appearance of this case we held that "The County of DeKalb has no constitutional or statutory authority to impose the taxes and charges contained in the ordinance under attack in these cases, either as a tax or as a `rental' of its streets and rights of way..." DeKalb County v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 228 Ga. 512, 514, supra.
Nevertheless, the county in the present appeal insists that it is entitled to recover such charges on a quantum merit basis. This argument is without merit.
DeKalb County has no statutory authority to impose such charges and there is no express contract between the parties providing for such payment. Therefore, there is no legal obligation on the part of the appellees to pay under a quantum merit or quasi contract theory. See City of Hogansville v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 12 (1) ( 182 S.E. 78).
All the other issues raised by the county in this appeal were resolved adversely to it in its previous appearance before this court.
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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