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Docket Number

No. 1, CA-CR 607.

Attorney(S)

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Frank T. Galati, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by Richard L. Thompson, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: The State of Arizona v. Edward V. Renteria, No. 1, CA-CR 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1974)

Factual and Procedural Background

Edward V. Renteria (the appellant-defendant) was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of Maricopa County (Cause No. CR-72543, Rufus C. Coulter, Jr., J.) of illegal possession of heroin and sentenced to a term of 2 to 5 years in the Arizona State Prison. He appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeals, Division One.

At trial, the evidence showed that Renteria was standing in front of a house in the company of Manuel Rascon and Hector Rascon when three Phoenix Police Department officers observed the group and approached, thinking the men might be intoxicated. As the police car approached, Renteria was observed to throw an object as he hurried through a gate; an officer retrieved the object, which was later determined to be two baggies containing usable amounts of heroin.

Renteria's trial strategy was to show that Manuel and Hector Rascon were the actual possessors of the heroin. To support that theory he sought to have the court take judicial notice of the Rascons' criminal records and, when that was denied, requested that the sheriff bring the Rascons to testify so he could lay foundation for admitting their records. The trial court denied those requests and did not admit the Rascons' criminal records. On appeal, Renteria also argued that various rulings by the trial judge cumulatively deprived him of due process.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of or admit the criminal records of Manuel and Hector Rascon and in denying the defendant's request to have the Rascons brought to court to lay foundation for admission of those records.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence intended to cast suspicion on the Rascons where the defendant sought to show that they, not the defendant, possessed the heroin.
Whether the cumulative effect of the trial court's evidentiary rulings deprived the defendant of due process of law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The defendant sought to show that Manuel and Hector Rascon, and not the defendant, were the persons in possession of the heroin found by police.
To bolster that theory, the defendant attempted to introduce the criminal records of the Rascons and requested that the sheriff bring the Rascons to testify so he could lay a foundation for admission of those records; both requests were denied.
Counsel for the defendant argued that, although individual rulings might not constitute reversible error, the cumulative effect of the trial judge's rulings prevented the defendant from properly presenting his defense and thus denied him due process of law.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the appellee (the State) beyond representation by counsel.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Delvecchio, 110 Ariz. 396, 519 P.2d 1137 (filed March 15, 1974)	Supports the proposition that a trial court has reasonable discretion in determining relevance and admissibility of offered evidence.	Used to show that excluding the Rascons' records and evidence that merely cast possible suspicion was within the trial court's discretion.
State v. Chambers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P.2d 27 (1969)	Illustrates the principle that trial courts exercise discretion over relevance and admissibility.	Relied upon to justify the trial court's exclusion of the defendant's proffered evidence.
State v. Turner, 92 Ariz. 214, 375 P.2d 567 (1962)	Addresses trial court discretion in evidentiary rulings (relevance/admissibility).	Applied as authority for affirming the trial court's exercise of discretion.
State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962)	Supports the general rule of judicial discretion over admissibility of evidence.	Invoked to support the trial court's exclusion of unsupported inferences.
McCormick, Law of Evidence, §152 (1954)	Treatise authority on relevance and admissibility; supports the proposition that trial courts have discretion.	Cited as doctrinal support for the discretion afforded trial courts in admitting or excluding evidence.
People v. Hayden, 30 Cal.App.3d 446, 106 Cal.Rptr. 348 (1973)	Supports the proposition that evidence whose sole effect is to create mere suspicion against another may be excluded.	Used to show that exclusion of evidence offering only a possible ground of suspicion is within trial court discretion.
People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924)	Authority for excluding evidence that only furnishes a possible cause of suspicion against another.	Applied to support the trial court's refusal to admit the Rascons' records when those records only supplied possible suspicion.
State v. Umfrees, 433 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1968)	Recognizes trial court discretion to refuse evidence that merely suggests possible suspicion of others.	Cited to reinforce that exclusion of such evidence is permissible.
State v. Shinn, 238 N.C. 535, 78 S.E.2d 388 (1953)	Also supports the rule that evidence creating only possible suspicion of another person may be excluded.	Relied upon to affirm the propriety of excluding the defendant's proffered evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals reviewed the factual record and the trial court's evidentiary rulings and articulated its analysis as follows:

Factual finding: The testimony of the three police officers was characterized as unequivocal that the defendant, Renteria, was the person who possessed the heroin. Specifically, an officer observed Renteria throw an object and immediately retrieved it; the object contained two baggies with usable heroin.
Insufficiency of proffered support: The defendant offered no evidentiary support for his theory that the Rascons possessed the heroin. He did not subpoena the Rascons, nor did he testify that they were the possessors.
Relevance and admissibility: The court concluded that the defendant's attempts to introduce the Rascons' criminal records and to present evidence casting mere suspicion on the Rascons amounted to unsupported inferences. The trial judge properly ruled such inferences irrelevant and therefore inadmissible.
Standard of review and authority: The opinion stated that it is "well settled" that a trial court is allowed reasonable discretion in determining relevance and admissibility, citing several Arizona cases and an evidence treatise. The court also cited cases from other jurisdictions establishing that a trial court may refuse to admit evidence which only affords a possible ground of suspicion against another person.
Application of the standard: Applying that standard and the cited authorities, the appellate court determined the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the proffered evidence. The court further reviewed the transcript and found that the defendant was afforded a fair trial and that the evidentiary rulings were proper.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The core ruling is stated as: Affirmed.

Implications:

The direct effect is that Edward V. Renteria's conviction for illegal possession of heroin and his sentence (2 to 5 years' imprisonment) were upheld by the appellate court.
The court relied on established principles that a trial court has reasonable discretion to exclude evidence that is irrelevant or that only creates mere suspicion of another person; the opinion did not announce a new rule of law.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not include information beyond what appears in that opinion.

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The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Edward V. RENTERIA, Appellant.

OPINION

OGG, Judge.

The appellant-defendant Edward V. Renteria was convicted by a jury of the illegal possession of a narcotic drug (heroin) and was sentenced to a term of 2 to 5 years in the Arizona State Prison. The defendant appeals this conviction.

The facts presented at the trial show the defendant was in the company of Manuel Rascon and Hector Rascon; all were standing in front of a house when they were observed by three members of the Phoenix Police Department. The officers decided to investigate when it appeared the men might be intoxicated. As the police car approached the defendant he was observed to throw an object as he hurried through a gate on his way to the house. One of the officers immediately retrieved the object which was later determined to be two baggies containing usable amounts of heroin.

Defendant's trial strategy was to show Manuel and Hector Rascon were the ones who possessed the heroin found by the police. To bolster this position he attempted to introduce the criminal records of the Rascons into evidence.

The defendant asked the court to take judicial notice of their criminal records; when that was denied he requested that the sheriff bring the Rascons to testify on his motion so he could lay further foundation for the admission of the Rascons' criminal records. The court refused defendant's motion and the criminal records of the Rascons were not admitted into evidence. Defendant further complains that he was prevented by various rulings of the trial judge from properly presenting his defense. Counsel for defendant states that although the single rulings of the trial judge were not necessarily reversible error, it was the cumulative effect of these rulings that denied the defendant due process of law.

In our opinion the trial judge was correct in denying defendant's attempts to cast suspicion on the Rascons and to put their criminal records into evidence.

The evidence shows by the unequivocal testimony of the police officers that the defendant was the one person in possession of the heroin. The defendant offered no support for his theory that the Rascons were in possession of the heroin, he never attempted to subpoena them nor did he testify that they were in possession of the heroin.

We believe the trial judge was correct in ruling that these unsupported inferences were not relevant and therefore not admissible in evidence. Although we have found no Arizona cases directly in point, it is well settled that a trial court is allowed reasonable discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of offered evidence. State v. Delvecchio, 110 Ariz. 396, 519 P.2d 1137 (filed March 15, 1974); State v. Chambers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P.2d 27 (1969); State v. Turner, 92 Ariz. 214, 375 P.2d 567 (1962); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); McCormick, Law of Evidence, § 152 (1954).

The defendant can always show that some other person and not the defendant committed the crime; however, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to refuse to admit such evidence when it simply affords a possible ground of possible suspicion against another person. People v. Hayden, 30 Cal.App.3d 446, 106 Cal.Rptr. 348 (1973); People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924); State v. Umfrees, 433 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1968); State v. Shinn, 238 N.C. 535, 78 S.E.2d 388 (1953).

We have examined the transcript and it appears the defendant was afforded a fair trial and that the trial judge's rulings on the evidence were proper.

The conviction of the defendant is affirmed.

DONOFRIO, P.J., and STEVENS, J., concur.

STATE v. RENTERIA