Opinion by JUDGE SMITH.
Plaintiff-appellant Ownbey commenced this action as subrogee on a group credit life insurance policy issued by defendant-appellee insurance company to First National Bank of Fleming, Colorado, covering the life of plaintiff's husband, a debtor of First National. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant based upon the finding that decedent was not covered by the policy because he had committed suicide within one year from the date of issue of the insurance coverage. We reverse.
Under the group credit life insurance policy, lives of debtors of the insured bank were insured for the balance of the debtor's indebtedness not in excess of $10,000, with certain express limitations placed upon the term of indebtedness. In December of 1968, the insured bank loaned decedent $8,750, payable within 90 days, and decedent was enlisted as an insured debtor under the policy. Between December of 1968 and decedent's death, the original note was renewed and other notes were variously extended or renewed for 60 to 90 day periods. In addition, loans were made to decedent for $1,000 in October, 1969; $1,500 in January, 1970; and $2,000 in April, 1970.
On July 3, 1970, decedent died of a gunshot would to his head. The insured bank filed a claim with defendant insurance company, which claim was denied on the basis of a suicide provision in the policy. Plaintiff, decedent's widow, then paid the amount of decedent's indebtedness and a subrogation agreement was executed with the bank whereby plaintiff was assigned the bank's rights under the insurance policy.
With regard to renewals and extensions, the policy, in its "Maximum age and term" provision, states:
"If said indebtedness is renewed or otherwise extended, any insurance issued in connection with such renewal or extension shall constitute new insurance and the effective date thereof shall be the date of said renewal or extension."
As to the effect of suicide, the policy states:
"In the event that the insured dies by suicide within one year from the date of issue of the insurance coverage, and while this policy be in force, the death benefits payable hereunder shall be limited to the amount of the premium paid." (emphasis added)
Defendant contends that each renewal of the 60 or 90 day notes creates a new policy under the "Maximum age and term" provision, and that the one year period specified in the suicide clause begins to run anew with each new policy created. Because all instruments of indebtedness in the present case were extended, renewed, or initially made within one year of decedent's suicide, defendant argues that decedent is not covered.
The assertion of suicide as a defense against payment of a life insurance policy is controlled by C.R.S. 1963, 72-3-23, which provides:
"The suicide of the policy holder after the first policy year of any life insurance policy issued by any life insurance company doing business in this state, shall not be a defense against payment of a life insurance policy . . . . "
Our principal consideration, then, is whether decedent died within the period prescribed by C.R.S. 1963, 72-3-23.
Although we have found no Colorado case law construing the statutory phrase "first policy year of any life insurance policy," we are persuaded by the analysis employed by the Utah Supreme Court in Carter v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, where a Utah statute similar to C.R.S. 1963, 72-3-23 was construed. In Carter, the accident insurance policy ran for a term of one year with the option to renew. In that case, plaintiff's deceased took out a policy in 1915, and renewed it each year for eight years. The insured died in 1923, allegedly from suicide. The court rejected the insurance company's argument that because the accident policy was renewed each year, the one year statutory limitation began running anew each year, and that the insured committed suicide within the first policy year of the policy. The court observed that the policy was substantially the same in its terms and form during the eight years it was renewed, and that there was in fact but one policy in form issued to the insured.
With regard to the Utah statute, the court stated:
"Its purpose, clearly, was to protect the insurance company against fraud on the part of the insured. The Legislature evidently assumed that after one whole year had elapsed from the time the insured made application for the policy it should be conclusively presumed that he did not contemplate suicide when he made the application, and consequently that he did not contemplate defrauding the company by taking his own life. In this class of cases, where the insured renews his policy every year for two or more years by payment of the annual premium in advance, which premium is accepted by the company, the case certainly comes within the plain purpose and intention of the Legislature."
[1] In the present case, the debtor's coverage on certain instruments of indebtedness began in December 1968, more than one year prior to his death. Upon renewal of these instruments of indebtedness, the same coverage was extended automatically, without new application, and without any physical issuance of "new" insurance. As with the Utah statute, our statute provides that after one full year has elapsed from the time the insured has been issued coverage, it is conclusively presumed that he did not contemplate defrauding the insurance company by taking his own life. By the terms of the statute, then, the one year period begins as of the date of the initial coverage of the instrument of indebtedness, and not as of the date of extension or renewal of such indebtedness.
The suicide provision of the policy under consideration can be construed to comport with the controlling statutory requirement. Under the policy, the one year period begins from the "date of issue of the insurance coverage." The policy does not provide a definition of "date of issue." Further, "date of issue" is used in contradistinction with "effective date of coverage" which is defined by the policy as being the later of the date of the indebtedness, its renewal or extension. We therefore construe date of issue as referring to the date of initial coverage of the instrument of indebtedness, and the question of whether decedent's death was by suicide is therefore moot. Because the trial court used the wrong dates in determining the applicability of the suicide provision, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE RULAND concur.