CANEY HUNTING CLUB, INC. v. TOLBERT

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Docket Number

No. 12289.

Attorney(S)

Shotwell, Brown Sperry by Burt W. Sperry and L. Michael Ashbrook, Monroe, for plaintiff-appellant. Holloway, Baker, Culpepper Brunson by William H. Baker and Bobby L. Culpepper, Jonesboro, for defendants-appellees.

Judges

BOLIN, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 14, 1973, Olinkraft, Inc. leased several thousand acres of land in Winn and Jackson parishes to plaintiff Caney Hunting Club, Inc., granting the plaintiff exclusive rights to hunt, fish, and take game on the property. On November 29, 1973, plaintiff filed suit against defendants seeking a temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent defendants from trespassing on the leased land to hunt or take game. The trial court initially granted a temporary restraining order but later denied the preliminary injunction. Plaintiff then sought writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus from the appellate court, which were granted, and perfected a devolutive appeal. The hearing on the writs was consolidated with the appeal argument.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff-lessee is entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from trespassing on lands leased for hunting and fishing purposes.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

Defendants contended that because some were in automobiles parked on roads, they were not trespassing on the leased property.

Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff asserted exclusive rights under the lease to use the land for hunting and that defendants’ presence and hunting constituted trespass and irreparable injury.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Indian Bayou Hunting Club, Inc. v. Taylor, 261 So.2d 669 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1972)	Injunctions enjoining trespass and unauthorized taking of game on leased hunting lands.	The court found the concurring opinion's reasoning persuasive that continuous trespass and game taking justifies injunctive relief under CCP Article 3601.
West v. Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So.2d 665	Equitable remedy of injunction available when no adequate remedy at law exists.	The court applied the principle that injunctions issue when legal remedies are not as complete, speedy, or efficient as equitable relief, supporting the issuance of a preliminary injunction here.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3601	Conditions under which injunctions and temporary restraining orders may be issued.	The court relied on this statute as the primary legal authority authorizing injunctive relief to prevent irreparable injury or damage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found that defendants were trespassing on the leased property, as the roads they used were owned by the lessor, not public roads, and the evidence showed hunting and killing of game by defendants. The lease granted the plaintiff exclusive rights and an obligation to protect against trespassers. Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3601, injunctive relief is appropriate where irreparable injury may result and no adequate legal remedy exists. The court determined that monetary damages would be insufficient to compensate for the loss caused by trespass and hunting. The court cited prior case law, including Indian Bayou Hunting Club, Inc. v. Taylor and West v. Winnsboro, to reinforce that injunctions are proper to prevent continuous trespass and protect exclusive hunting rights. The court concluded that plaintiff demonstrated entitlement to a preliminary injunction to prevent further irreparable harm.

Holding and Implications

The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and granted a preliminary injunction.

The injunction prohibits the defendants from entering or trespassing on the leased property for hunting or taking game. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s views. The direct effect is to protect the plaintiff’s exclusive hunting rights under the lease. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing equitable principles and statutory authority.

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CANEY HUNTING CLUB, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. A. J. TOLBERT ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

BOLIN, Judge.

On September 14, 1973, Olinkraft, Inc., leased to plaintiff several thousand acres of land located in Winn and Jackson parishes. The lease granted plaintiff the exclusive right "to hunt, fish, pursue, capture, shoot, kill and take away all legal types and species of game fish, game birds and game animals" on the described land.

On November 29, 1973, plaintiff instituted the present action against defendants seeking a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting any of defendants from trespassing on the leased premises in order to hunt, kill, or take any game animals therefrom. The lower court granted a temporary restraining order and in due course the rule to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue was called and tried. Following trial, the lower court rendered judgment rejecting plaintiff's demands for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff applied to this court for writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus, which were granted. Plaintiff further perfected a devolutive appeal to this court. The hearing on the writs previously issued by this court was consolidated with the argument on the appeal.

The primary issue is whether plaintiff-lessee is entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from trespassing on lands which plaintiff has leased for hunting and fishing purposes.

We make the following factual findings: all of the defendants were within the area covered by the lease for the purpose of hunting deer; at least one of the defendants admitted he was on the property for the purpose of hunting deer but that he did not desire to join plaintiff's hunting club; that he intended to continue hunting deer without paying any money for the privilege. An agent of the State Wildlife and Fisheries Department testified he saw a freshly-killed deer on the premises and that one of the defendants freely admitted he had killed the deer.

Counsel for defendants argue that, because the evidence reflects one or more of defendants were in automobiles which were parked on roads, they were not trespassing on any property covered by plaintiff's lease. This contention does not impress us, principally because the roads were owned by Olinkraft and not the public. We are further convinced the evidence abundantly shows defendants were trespassing on the land itself.

The lease from Olinkraft to plaintiff contains several provisions granting lessee the exclusive right to use the premises for hunting and recreational purposes. The lease further provides the lessee "shall protect the leased premises against trespassers".

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3601 provides:

"An injunction shall issue in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law.

* * * * * *

"During the pendency of an action for an injunction the court may issue a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or both, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

"Except as otherwise provided by law, an application for injunctive relief shall be by petition." (Emphasis ours)

Contrary to the finding of the trial judge, we are convinced plaintiff has shown that it will suffer "irreparable injury, loss, or damage" unless a preliminary injunction is granted in this case. This appears to be the very type of case for which injunctive relief would be the only effective remedy. Indeed, plaintiff's only reason for obtaining a lease on the property was to have the exclusive right to use it for recreation and hunting. After defendants have trespassed on plaintiff's leased premises and killed and taken game therefrom, no monetary award would adequately compensate for this loss.

We have been cited to Indian Bayou Hunting Club, Inc. v. Taylor, 261 So.2d 669 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1972) by counsel for both appellant and appellees. In that case, strikingly similar to the instant case in that it involved a hunting lease, the court on rehearing affirmed a judgment of the trial court permanently enjoining defendants from trespassing on the leased premises. However, there was a concurring opinion by Judge Domengeaux following both the original opinion and the rehearing opinion which we find contains the better statement of the law:

"It is my belief now, that the continuous acts of trespass on plaintiff's leased lands by defendant, and the taking of game thereon, all of which is supported by the record, are such acts as can be enjoined under CCP Article 3601 because these acts constitute injuries for which an equally adequate remedy is not available on the law side of the court."

From the facts of the case before us, we see no reason to look any further in our law for authority to grant an injunction than Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3601. In West v. Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So.2d 665, our Supreme Court, on rehearing, stated an injunction is an equitable remedy under Code of Civil Procedure Article 3601, which is available to a plaintiff who is without an adequate remedy at law. The court defined "adequate remedy at law" in the following terms:

"By adequate remedy at law is meant one which is as speedy, efficient, and complete as the remedy in equity. See Banjavich v. Louisiana Licens. Bd. f Marine Divers, supra [ 237 La. 467, 111 So.2d 505]; de Funiak, Handbook of Modern Equity § 5, pp. 9-10 (2d ed. 1956); McClintock on Equity § 43, p. 103 (2d ed. 1948); 27 Am.Jur.2d. Equity, § 94, pp. 616-617; and 28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 39, pp. 534-535."

The test is correctly stated in 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, § 39, page 534, as follows:

"It is not enough that there is a remedy at law. The remedy, to preclude injunction, must be certain and reasonably prompt, and as practicable and efficient to the ends of justice and its administration, both in respect of the final relief and the mode of obtaining it, as an injunction would be."

For the reasons assigned the alternative writs previously issued by this court are made absolute and the judgment appealed from is reversed. It is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that a preliminary injunction issue herein enjoining defendants, A. J. Tolbert, Joe Thompson, Leon Temple, Howard Temple, and Alfred E. Antley, from entering and trespassing upon any of the property leased from Olinkraft, Inc., to Caney Hunting Club, Inc., in Winn and Jackson parishes, in order to hunt, fish, pursue, capture, shoot, kill, and take away legal types of game, fish, game birds, and game animals, said leased property being more particularly described in that certain lease filed in the public records of Winn Parish, Louisiana, on September 18, 1973, under Clerk's Registry No. 88, 468, and recorded in Conveyance Book 121, page 368; and also filed in the public records of Jackson Parish, Louisiana, on September 20, 1973, under Clerk's Registry No. 216, 326 and recorded in Conveyance Book 146, page 476.

It is further ordered that the case be remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein, assessment of costs to await the final outcome of the case.