GEORGE v. JORDAN MARSH Co, Mass. App. Ct., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Attorney(S)

Joseph Stashio for the plaintiff. Raymond J. Kenney, Jr., for the defendant.

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves an action of tort for the intentional infliction of mental distress brought by the plaintiff, Irenee George, Jr., against the defendant, Jordan Marsh Co. The Supreme Judicial Court previously recognized the plaintiff's cause of action, reversing an order that had sustained a demurrer to her declaration. Following that, a trial was held which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, contesting the exclusion of certain evidence by the trial judge.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in excluding a letter sent by the plaintiff's attorney to the defendant, which was offered to show that the defendant had reason to believe the plaintiff's health was deteriorating due to alleged harassment, thereby establishing that the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous."
Whether the plaintiff properly limited the offer of the letter to its relevant purpose, as required by evidentiary rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The letter from the plaintiff's attorney was relevant and competent evidence to show the defendant had reason to believe the plaintiff's health was failing as a result of its alleged harassment.
The letter was admissible not for the truth of its contents but to establish the defendant's knowledge, supporting the claim of "extreme and outrageous" conduct.

Defendant's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244 (1971)	Recognition of the plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress.	Referenced to establish the background and prior rulings relevant to the current appeal.
H.H. Hawkins Sons Co. v. Robie, 338 Mass. 61, 66 (1958)	Duty of counsel to clearly state the grounds for admission of evidence.	Applied to determine that the plaintiff failed to limit the offer of the letter, justifying its exclusion.
Hathaway v. Tinkham, 148 Mass. 85, 87 (1888)	Requirement that counsel clearly articulate the purpose for admitting evidence.	Supported the principle that the trial court properly excluded the letter due to lack of limitation on its use.
Tobin v. Brimfield, 182 Mass. 117, 120 (1902)	Clarification of counsel's duty regarding evidentiary offers.	Reinforced the court's view that the plaintiff's offer was insufficiently restricted.
Palm v. Kulesza, 333 Mass. 461, 463 (1956)	Proper exclusion of evidence when offer is not limited to a permissible purpose.	Used as precedent to uphold the exclusion of the letter by the trial court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that the letter from the plaintiff's attorney might have been admissible if offered solely to show the defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff's health was being affected by the alleged harassment, thus supporting the claim of "extreme and outrageous" conduct. However, the plaintiff failed to restrict the offer of the letter to this limited purpose. The bill of exceptions indicated the letter was offered without any limitation or explanation. The court emphasized the settled legal principle that counsel must clearly specify the grounds for admitting evidence. Because the plaintiff did not fulfill this duty, the trial court was correct in excluding the letter. The court relied on established precedents to affirm that evidence improperly offered without limitation may be excluded to prevent unfair prejudice or confusion.

Holding and Implications

Exceptions overruled.

The court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the letter evidence, affirming the jury verdict for the defendant. This decision directly affects the parties by sustaining the judgment against the plaintiff. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming existing evidentiary principles regarding the clear specification of the purpose for admitting evidence.

Show full summary ...

IRENEE GEORGE, JR. v. JORDAN MARSH Co

This is an action of tort for the intentional infliction of mental distress. By a prior decision of the Supreme Judicial Court the plaintiff's cause of action was recognized and an order sustaining a demurrer to her declaration reversed. See George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971). A subsequent trial of the case resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. The sole exception argued to this court concerns the judge's exclusion of certain evidence, to wit, a letter sent to the defendant by the plaintiff's attorney which read in relevant part as follows: "May I advise you [Jordan Marsh Co.] that your alleged claim is absolutely groundless, as you well know; that your persistent dunning tactics are obviously designed to harass and intimidate . . . Mrs. George Jr.; that same are having the intended effect of injuring her health and well being;. . . ." The plaintiff concedes that the letter was not admissible for the truth of the statements contained therein but argues that it was nevertheless relevant and competent to show that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff's health was failing as a result of its alleged harassment and consequently that its subsequent conduct was "extreme and outrageous." See George v. Jordan Marsh Co., supra, at 254-255. Although the letter may have been admissible for that limited purpose, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff restricted her offer to that purpose. To the contrary, it appears from the bill of exceptions that the letter was offered without limitation or explanation. It is settled that it is "the duty of counsel to bring to the judge's attention with sufficient clarity the grounds upon which the admission of the evidence . . . [is] sought." H.H. Hawkins Sons Co. v. Robie, 338 Mass. 61, 66 (1958). See also Hathaway v. Tinkham, 148 Mass. 85, 87 (1888); Tobin v. Brimfield, 182 Mass. 117, 120 (1902). In the absence of any limitation on the offer by the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that it was proper for the court to exclude it. See Palm v. Kulesza, 333 Mass. 461, 463 (1956).

Exceptions overruled.

GEORGE v. JORDAN MARSH Co