STATE v. PETERSEN, Or., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

R. Ryan Lawrence of Susak and Lawrence, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Thomas H. Denney, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Attorney General, and W. Michael Gillette, Solicitor General, Salem.

Judges

O'CONNELL, C.J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Toby Edward Petersen was charged with recklessly causing the death of another human being (manslaughter) under ORS 163.125, and with leaving the scene of an accident without providing his name and address or rendering assistance, under ORS 483.602 and 483.991(12). The incident arose from a drag race between defendant and Richard Wille in Portland. Defendant had Mike Barlow as a passenger, and Wille had Daniel Warren as a passenger. During the race, Wille’s vehicle was struck by a truck at an intersection, resulting in Warren's death. Petersen was convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Petersen then petitioned for review, which was granted by the Oregon Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether defendant’s reckless conduct constituted both the factual and legal cause of Warren’s death under ORS 163.125 (manslaughter statute).
Whether the manslaughter statute applies when the victim is a knowing and voluntary participant in reckless conduct.
Validity of the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident under ORS 483.602.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals had held that defendant's reckless conduct was both the factual and legal cause of the victim’s death and that it fell within the scope of the manslaughter statute, ORS 163.125. Chief Judge Schwab dissented in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the statute should not apply when the victim knowingly and voluntarily participates in the reckless conduct. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting opinion from the Court of Appeals and adopted its reasoning as the opinion of the court. Based on this reasoning, the court found that the manslaughter statute did not apply under the circumstances of this case.

Holding and Implications

The judgment was reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The court reversed the conviction for manslaughter, holding that the statute does not extend to cases where the victim is a knowing and voluntary participant in reckless conduct. The conviction for leaving the scene of an accident was affirmed. This decision directly affects the parties by overturning the manslaughter conviction but upholding the other conviction. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond adopting the dissenting reasoning from the Court of Appeals regarding the interpretation of ORS 163.125.

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STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. TOBY EDWARD PETERSEN, Petitioner.

O'CONNELL, C.J.

Defendant was charged with recklessly causing the death of another human being (manslaughter), ORS 163.125, and with leaving the scene of an accident in which his car was involved without giving his name and address and rendering assistance to the survivor, ORS 483.602, 483.991 (12). He appealed to the Court of Appeals from a judgment of conviction. The judgment was affirmed (State v. Petersen, 17 Or. App. 478, 522 P.2d 912 (1974)), whereupon defendant filed a petition for review, which we granted.

The facts, which are fully set out in the Court of Appeals opinion, may be summarized as follows. Defendant and Richard Wille agreed to engage in a "drag race" on a street in Portland. Defendant had as his passenger Mike Barlow and Wille had as his passenger Daniel Warren. In the course of the race, Wille's vehicle was struck by a truck at an intersection and Warren was killed.

The Court of Appeals held that defendant's reckless conduct was both the factual and legal cause of Warren's death and fell within the purpose of the proscription in ORS 163.125. Chief Judge SCHWAB dissented, expressing the opinion that ORS 163.125 should not be interpreted to extend to those cases in which the victim is a knowing and voluntary participant in the course of reckless conduct. We agree with the reasoning in the dissenting opinion and adopt it as the opinion of this court.

The judgment is reversed as to the conviction for the crime of manslaughter, and affirmed as to the violation of ORS 483.602.

Reversed in part; affirmed in part.

STATE v. PETERSEN