COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v. SUPERIOR COURT

Factual and Procedural Background

David P. Sorben, a licensed chiropractor, has been voluntarily treated for alcoholism since October 1973 at the Crisis and Referral Center in Riverside, California. The Center maintains confidential records regarding Sorben’s treatment pursuant to the confidentiality provisions of section 5328 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The State Board of Chiropractic Examiners initiated an accusation seeking suspension or revocation of Sorben’s chiropractic license on grounds of habitual intemperance impairing his professional duties. The State Board petitioned the Riverside Superior Court for an order directing the Custodian of Patient Records at the Center to submit Sorben’s treatment records to the court to determine whether they should be disclosed to the State Board for its administrative proceeding. The Superior Court granted the order ex parte on June 21, 1974. The County of Riverside then filed a petition for an extraordinary writ challenging the validity of this order, resulting in a stay and alternative writ of mandate issued by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal ultimately concluded the Superior Court’s order was invalid.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the confidentiality provisions of section 5328 of the Welfare and Institutions Code permit disclosure of patient records to an administrative agency such as the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners through a court order.

Whether the exception in subdivision (f) of section 5328, allowing disclosure "to the courts, as necessary to the administration of justice," authorizes the Superior Court to order disclosure of confidential treatment records for use in an administrative proceeding.

Arguments of the Parties

State Board of Chiropractic Examiners' Arguments

While conceding no specific statutory exception permits disclosure to administrative agencies, the State Board argued that subdivision (f) of section 5328 allows disclosure of confidential records to the courts "as necessary to the administration of justice."

The State Board contended that the court’s involvement would permit indirect access to the records for use in the pending administrative proceeding against Sorben.

County of Riverside's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Collins v. City Co. of S.F., 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 731	Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: when a statute enumerates exceptions, other exceptions are excluded.	Used to interpret the confidentiality statute as excluding exceptions beyond those specifically enumerated, thus denying disclosure to administrative agencies.
Shelby v. Southern Pacific Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 594, 599	Reinforces the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius in statutory interpretation.	Supported the court’s conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to permit disclosure to administrative agencies not specifically mentioned.
Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 666, 668	Legislative purpose to encourage voluntary treatment for mental or alcoholic problems by ensuring confidentiality.	Used to emphasize the importance of protecting confidentiality to promote voluntary treatment, opposing broad disclosure exceptions.
54 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 24	Interpretation of confidentiality provisions and exceptions under section 5328.	Referenced to show that no exception permits disclosure to administrative agencies and that subdivision (f) applies only to courts in judicial proceedings.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Collins v. City Co. of S.F., 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 731

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: when a statute enumerates exceptions, other exceptions are excluded.

Used to interpret the confidentiality statute as excluding exceptions beyond those specifically enumerated, thus denying disclosure to administrative agencies.

Shelby v. Southern Pacific Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 594, 599

Reinforces the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius in statutory interpretation.

Supported the court’s conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to permit disclosure to administrative agencies not specifically mentioned.

Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 666, 668

Legislative purpose to encourage voluntary treatment for mental or alcoholic problems by ensuring confidentiality.

Used to emphasize the importance of protecting confidentiality to promote voluntary treatment, opposing broad disclosure exceptions.

54 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 24

Interpretation of confidentiality provisions and exceptions under section 5328.

Referenced to show that no exception permits disclosure to administrative agencies and that subdivision (f) applies only to courts in judicial proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory confidentiality scheme under section 5328 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which broadly protects treatment records of voluntary recipients. It recognized that while the statute includes several specific exceptions to confidentiality, none expressly authorize disclosure to administrative agencies such as the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners. The court rejected the State Board’s argument that subdivision (f) of section 5328, permitting disclosure "to the courts, as necessary to the administration of justice," could be used to indirectly disclose records to the State Board through the court. The court emphasized that the plain language confines disclosure under subdivision (f) to judicial proceedings, and no judicial action was pending that justified disclosure. Furthermore, the court applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, concluding that the Legislature’s omission of administrative agencies from the exceptions was intentional. Finally, the court underscored the legislative purpose of encouraging voluntary treatment by maintaining confidentiality, warning that a broad interpretation of the exception would undermine this purpose. Consequently, the court held the Superior Court’s order to disclose the records was invalid.

Holding and Implications

The Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court’s ex parte order directing disclosure of confidential treatment records to the court for use by the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners was invalid and must be vacated.

The direct effect of this decision is to preserve the confidentiality of the patient records at the Crisis and Referral Center and to prevent their disclosure to the State Board in the absence of a judicial proceeding justifying such disclosure. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond the interpretation of the confidentiality statute in this context and reinforces the legislative intent to protect voluntary treatment records from administrative agency access.

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; STATE BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS, Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

KAUFMAN, J.

David P. Sorben is a licensed chiropractor. Since October 1973, Sorben has been treated on a voluntary basis for alcoholism at the Crisis and Referral Center, Riverside, California (hereinafter "Center"). Personnel of the Center made and maintain records relating to Sorben, including dates of visits, diagnosis, evaluation and treatment. These records are subject to the confidentiality provisions of section 5328 et seq., of the Welfare and Institutions Code (part of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act).

Hereafter all section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

There is pending before the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners (hereinafter "State Board") an accusation seeking the suspension or revocation of Sorben's chiropractic license alleging violation of section 10 subdivision (b) of the Chiropractic Act of California (3 West's Ann. Bus. Prof. Code (1974 ed.) p. 147; 4 Deering's Ann. Bus. Prof. Code (1961-1973 Cum. Supp., following § 25763 at p. 277), habitual intemperance in the use of ardent spirits to such an extent as to incapacitate him for the performance of his professional duties.

(1) State Board petitioned the Riverside Superior Court for an order directing the Custodian of Patient Records of the Center to submit all of its records pertaining to Sorben to the court for a determination by it whether the records should be disclosed to State Board for use in the pending administrative proceeding against Sorben.

On June 21, 1974, the Riverside Superior Court rendered an ex parte order pursuant to State Board's petition, ordering Center's custodian of patient records to deliver to the court Center's records relating to Sorben.

This petition for an extraordinary writ followed, and we issued a stay order and alternative writ of mandate to inquire into the validity of the superior court's order of June 21, 1974. We have concluded that the order is invalid.

The petition sought prohibition or certiorari. We have treated the petition as a petition for a writ of mandate.

The statutory scheme is as follows: section 5328 broadly provides for confidentiality: "All information and records obtained in the course of providing services under Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000), Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000), or Division 7 (commencing with Section 7000), to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services shall be confidential." There then follows in various subdivisions of section 5328 and in the sections following 5328 a number of specified exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality.

State Board concedes, as it must, that there is no specifically enumerated exception permitting disclosure to it or other administrative agencies. (Cf. 54 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 24, at pp. 24, 29-30.) State Board contends, however, that disclosure to it may be achieved indirectly under subdivision (f) of section 5328: "Information and records may be disclosed only: . . . (f) To the courts, as necessary to the administration of justice." (See 54 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 30-31.) This contention cannot be sustained.

In the first place, the plain language of the exception to confidentiality contained in subdivision (f) of section 5328 says that information and records may be disclosed to the courts, not to an administrative agency through the courts. In our view, the subdivision contemplates use of the information or records "as necessary to the administration of justice" in some pending judicial action or proceeding. In the case at bench there is no judicial action or proceeding pending in which the use of information or records is "necessary to the administration of justice."

Secondly, in section 5328 and succeeding sections the Legislature has specifically provided for disclosure to certain persons or agencies under certain circumstances. Had the Legislature intended to permit disclosure to administrative agencies such as State Board it would doubtless have included a specific authorization for such disclosure. (See, e.g., § 5328.2 added by Stats. 1970, ch. 1627, p. 3447, § 22.5, amended by Stats. 1972, ch. 1377, p. 2857, § 121.) "Under the familiar maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius it is well settled that, when a statute expresses certain exceptions to a general rule, other exceptions are necessarily excluded." ( Collins v. City Co. of S.F., 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 731 [ 247 P.2d 362]; Shelby v. Southern Pacific Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 594, 599 [ 157 P.2d 442].)

Last, one of the legislative purposes in providing for confidentiality was undoubtedly to encourage persons with mental or alcoholic problems to seek treatment on a voluntary basis. (See § 5001, subds. (a), (b) and (f); Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 666, 668 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 600, 464 P.2d 56].) To construe the limited exception contained in subdivision (f) of section 5328 as permitting disclosure to any person or agency whenever a court determined it was "necessary to the administration of justice" would tend to nullify the broad legislative provision for confidentiality and would tend to stultify the legislative purpose.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue to the Riverside County Superior Court commanding the court to vacate its order of June 21, 1974, in proceeding numbered 109283 and to dismiss the petition therein. The stay order heretofore made is vacated and the alternative writ heretofore issued is discharged.

Gardner, P.J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied October 29, 1974, and the petition of the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 5, 1974.