Case Summary: Commonwealth vs. Melvin Brown

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the defendant's exceptions to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict as to the portion of an indictment charging unarmed robbery, to portions of the court's charge, and to the court's refusal to give his requested instructions. The facts admitted at trial were that the defendant and another youth approached the victim from behind while she was walking on the street. The victim held a small purse in her left hand; one of the youths snatched the purse out of her hand without touching her hand or body. The two youths then fled. The victim testified that she was not aware of their presence until the purse had been snatched. The central contested question presented by the exceptions was whether such a bare snatching, without prior awareness by the victim, supplied the element of "force" necessary for unarmed robbery under the statutory definition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the bare act of snatching a purse from a victim's hand, when the victim had no prior awareness of the impending act, constitutes the "force and violence" element required for unarmed robbery under G.L. c. 277, § 39.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 88 (1972)	Statement (by way of dictum) that Massachusetts will follow the minority or Kentucky rule on purse snatching; that "snatching, without more, involves the requisite element of force to permit a jury verdict on a charge of robbery."	The court relied on this authority to support its conclusion that pulling a purse from a victim's hand constitutes sufficient force under the "by force and violence" alternative of the statutory definition of robbery.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 112 Ky. 689, 692-695 (1902)	Articulation of the minority/Kentucky rule that purse snatching without more satisfies the force element for robbery.	Cited as the originating authority for the rule adopted (by dictum) in Commonwealth v. Jones, and thereby used to justify treating purse snatching as the requisite "force and violence."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the indictment's statutory language: a charge of "rob" under G.L. c. 277, § 39, which defines robbery as "taking and carrying away of personal property of another from his person and against his will, by force and violence, or by assault and putting in fear, with intent to steal." The court observed that there was no evidence that the purse was taken by placing the victim in fear, so the relevant inquiry concerned whether the physical act of pulling the purse from the victim's hand satisfied the "by force and violence" alternative.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that pulling a purse from a victim's hand constituted sufficient force to meet that statutory alternative. The defendant had requested an instruction that guilt for unarmed robbery required that the victim be placed in fear at the time of the taking; the court denied that requested instruction. In affirming the trial court's rulings, the Appeals Court relied on the Supreme Judicial Court's observation (by dictum) in Commonwealth v. Jones that Massachusetts follows the minority (Kentucky) rule that "snatching, without more, involves the requisite element of force to permit a jury verdict on a charge of robbery." The court therefore concluded that the bare snatching in the present case satisfied the statutory force requirement.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Exceptions overruled.

The court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the motion for a directed verdict as to unarmed robbery, approved the jury instruction that pulling a purse from a victim's hand supplies the "force and violence" element of robbery, and upheld the denial of the defendant's requested instruction that would have required proof the victim was placed in fear at the time of the taking.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant's exceptions were denied and the conviction-related rulings below stand. The opinion rests on the application of an existing dictum in Commonwealth v. Jones adopting the minority/Kentucky rule; the opinion does not purport to establish a new, broader precedent beyond that reliance.

Show full summary ...

COMMONWEALTH v. MELVIN BROWN

This case is here on the defendant's exceptions to the denial of his motion for a directed verdict with respect to so much of an indictment as charged unarmed robbery, to portions of the court's charge, and to the court's failure to give his requested instructions. The facts of the case were as follows: The defendant and another youth approached the victim from behind while she was walking on the street. The victim was holding a small purse in her left hand, and one of the youths snatched the purse out of her hand, touching neither her hand nor her body. The two youths fled. The victim testified she was not really aware of their presence until her purse had been snatched. The issue presented by each of the exceptions is whether the bare act of snatching a purse from the hand of a victim, in the absence of any prior awareness by the victim of the impending act, is sufficient to constitute the element of force required for unarmed robbery. We answer this question in the affirmative. By its use of the word "rob" the indictment effectively charged a "taking and carrying away of personal property of another from his person and against his will, by force and violence, or by assault and putting in fear, with intent to steal." G.L.c. 277, § 39 (emphasis supplied). The trial judge correctly instructed the jury that while there was no evidence that the purse was taken by placing the victim in fear, the pulling of a purse from a victim's hand constituted sufficient force to satisfy the "by force and violence" alternative of the statutory definition. The defendant's requested instruction which asserted that the defendant could be found guilty of unarmed robbery only if the victim was placed in fear at the time of taking the property was properly denied. The Supreme Judicial Court has explicitly stated, although by way of dictum, that Massachusetts will follow the minority or Kentucky rule on purse snatching. "[S]natching, without more, involves the requisite element of force to permit a jury verdict on a charge of robbery." Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 88 (1972). See Jones v. Commonwealth, 112 Ky. 689, 692-695 (1902).

Exceptions overruled.

COMMONWEALTH v. BROWN