Opinion by JUDGE RULAND.
Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, appeals from a judgment in the amount of $2,875 entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Dennis Langford. We affirm.
Langford and plaintiff Ingrid Garrett filed the present action to recover the value of various items of their personal property destroyed by a fire which demolished a log cabin owned by Marvin Moriarty near Aspen, Colorado. They alleged that Allstate was obligated to pay the value thereof pursuant to a homeowner's policy issued to Moriarty. Allstate answered denying liability on the basis that the items in question were not covered by its policy.
Following presentation of evidence by plaintiffs in a jury trial, Allstate elected not to present evidence and moved for a directed verdict as to both claims. The trial court granted the motion as to the claim of Garrett, and no appeal has been taken from that ruling. The trial court granted the motion as to some of the items included in Langford's claim, and he does not contest that ruling. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Langford on the remaining items. Allstate then perfected this appeal.
Viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the successful party, as we must, see J K Construction Co. v. Molton, 154 Colo. 214, 390 P.2d 68, the record discloses the following: Moriarty had business interests in Vermont which required him to travel there on frequent occasions, and thus he was unable to occupy his cabin continuously. Moriarty therefore engaged Langford as a "caretaker" to live in the cabin, and Langford agreed to use some barnwood which he owned for the purpose of paneling the interior of the cabin for Moriarty.
One bedroom was kept vacant for Moriarty's use, and Moriarty spent time at the cabin approximately two and one-half weeks before the fire. Among the items of personal property in the cabin which were owned by Langford at this time were 250 record albums, various components of a stereo system, and a handwoven Navaho rug. Moriarty used the stereo equipment and the rug while at the cabin, and by inference therefrom the jury found that Moriarty also used the record albums at the time of his last stay. The barnwood, stereo equipment, records, and rug were all destroyed in the fire, and the jury's award represents the amount claimed therefor.
Langford based his claim for the value of the stereo equipment, the record albums, and the rug upon the following provision of the Allstate policy:
"This policy covers unscheduled personal property usual or incidental to the occupancy of the premises as a dwelling, owned, worn or used by an Insured, while on the premises . . . . " (emphasis supplied)
In support of its motion for directed verdict and in this appeal, Allstate's sole contention is that the above-quoted provision does not afford coverage because the insured, Moriarty, was not occupying the premises on the date of the fire. We find no merit in this contention.
[1] We have been unable to discover and Allstate cites no authority which supports this interpretation of the policy. In our view, the meaning of this provision of the policy is clear. Unscheduled items of personal property on the premises and incidental to the occupancy thereof as a dwelling are covered irrespective of whether the insured is occupying the premises on the date of the fire so long as the insured uses the items when he is occupying the premises. Hence, the trial court was correct in denying Allstate's motion for directed verdict on this issue.
Langford relied upon the following policy provision in support of his claim for the value of the barnwood:
"This policy covers: (a) the building described, including additions in contact therewith, occupied principally for dwelling purposes; (b) if the property of the Insured and when not otherwise covered, building equipment fixtures and outdoor equipment, all pertaining to the service of the premises and while located thereon or temporarily elsewhere; and (c) materials and supplies located on the premises or adjacent thereto, intended for use in construction, alteration or repair of such Dwelling." (emphasis supplied)
Allstate's sole argument relative to this provision is that no coverage is afforded because the barnwood was not owned by its insured, Moriarty. We disagree.
[2] While subdivision (b) of the above-quoted provision limits coverage to "property of the insured," this subdivision is separated from subdivision (c) by a semi-colon, thus indicating that the two provisions are to be construed separately and that ownership of the materials is not required under subdivision (c). Moreover, even assuming there is any uncertainty relative to the extent of coverage provided, the insurance contract must be construed against its author, Allstate. Beeson v. State Automobile Casualty Underwriters, 32 Colo. App. 62, 508 p. 2d 402, aff'd, 183 Colo. 284, 516 P.2d 623. This principle of construction applies not only in determining what losses of the insured are covered, but also in determining whether recovery is available to others besides the named insured. See Slonim v. Globe Indemnity Co., 20 N.J. Super. 594, 90 A.2d 138; Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 67 Wyo. 141, 215 P.2d 867. Hence, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the policy provides coverage for loss of materials located on the premises for purposes of altering the dwelling, irrespective of whether such materials are owned by the insured.
We have examined Allstate's contentions relative to jury instructions given and find them to be without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE SMITH and JUDGE BERMAN concur.