MAJORANA v. CONSTANTINE

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Docket Number

No. 74-1185.

Attorney(S)

John T. Blakely, of Johnson, Blakely Pope, Clearwater, for appellant. Jerry C. Cobb, of Wightman, Rowe, Weidemeyer, Jones Turnbull, Clearwater, for appellee.

Judges

GRIMES, Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Arthur R. Long made certain gifts to his housekeeper, Hattie Majorana. After Mr. Long was declared incompetent, his guardian, T. Joseph Constantine, brought suit to set aside these gifts. The trial court found that a confidential relationship existed between Mr. Long and Majorana and that Majorana failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence arising from that relationship. Consequently, the court imposed a constructive trust on property Majorana purchased with the proceeds of the gifts. Majorana appealed, contesting the court’s interpretation of the burden of proof related to the presumption of undue influence.

Legal Issues Presented

What is the proper burden of proof placed upon a donee in a confidential relationship to rebut the presumption of undue influence in the context of inter vivos gifts?
Whether the trial court erred in applying a pre-existing standard for the burden of proof that required the donee to prove the good faith and voluntary conduct of the donor, rather than the standard articulated in In re Estate of Carpenter.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Rich v. Hallman, 106 Fla. 348, 143 So. 292 (1932)	Establishes that gifts made in a confidential relationship are prima facie void due to presumed undue influence, imposing on the donee the burden to show good faith and voluntary conduct.	The court cited this as the traditional rule governing gifts in confidential relationships, emphasizing the presumption of undue influence and the burden on the donee.
Adams v. Saunders, 139 Fla. 730, 191 So. 312 (1939); Lesperance v. Lesperance, 233 So.2d 859 (Fla.App. 3d Dist. 1970)	Reaffirmed the principle that gifts in confidential relationships generate a presumption of undue influence.	These cases supported the continued application of the presumption in Florida law.
In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971)	Clarified that in will contests involving confidential relationships, the burden on the beneficiary is to come forward with a reasonable explanation for their role, not to disprove undue influence; the ultimate burden of proof remains with the party asserting undue influence.	The court applied this principle analogously to inter vivos gifts, holding that the trial court erred by applying a stricter burden on the donee.
Pate v. Mellen, 275 So.2d 562 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1972)	Applied the Carpenter standard to inter vivos gifts, supporting the view that the burden on the donee is to come forward with reasonable explanation rather than disprove undue influence outright.	Used to bolster the court’s reasoning that the same principles apply to gifts as to wills in confidential relationships.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the traditional presumption that gifts made in confidential relationships are presumed to have been obtained by undue influence, placing a heavy burden on the donee to prove good faith and voluntary conduct of the donor. It recognized that the trial court applied this pre-Carpenter standard. However, the court noted that the Florida Supreme Court in In re Estate of Carpenter modified this approach for will contests, requiring only that the beneficiary come forward with a reasonable explanation for their involvement, while the burden of proof on undue influence remains with the party asserting it.

The court reasoned that although Carpenter concerned wills, the same legal principles logically extend to inter vivos gifts, as supported by Pate v. Mellen. Because the trial court applied an erroneous burden of proof standard inconsistent with this controlling precedent, the court reversed and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard.

Holding and Implications

Reversed and remanded.

The court reversed the trial court’s judgment because it applied an incorrect legal standard regarding the burden of proof in cases involving presumed undue influence in confidential relationships. The case was remanded for a new determination consistent with the principles articulated in In re Estate of Carpenter. This decision affects the parties by requiring reconsideration of the evidence under the proper standard but does not establish new precedent beyond clarifying the applicable burden of proof for inter vivos gifts in confidential relationships.

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HATTIE MAJORANA, APPELLANT, v. T. JOSEPH CONSTANTINE, AS GUARDIAN OF ARTHUR R. LONG, INCOMPETENT, APPELLEE.

GRIMES, Judge.

Arthur R. Long made certain gifts to his housekeeper. After Mr. Long was declared incompetent, his guardian brought suit to set the gifts aside. The court found that Mr. Long and the defendant had occupied a confidential relationship and that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence thereby created. The court imposed a constructive trust upon property which had been purchased by the defendant with the proceeds of the gifts. The defendant does not contest the finding of a confidential relationship but contends that the court misconstrued the burden placed upon her by reason of the presumption of undue influence.

In Rich v. Hallman, 1932, 106 Fla. 348, 143 So. 292, the Supreme Court said:

". . . [W]here a mutual confidential relation exists and a gift is made to one in whom the confidence is reposed, it is prima facie void because of such relation. The law presumes, in other words, when such relation exists, that the gift was obtained by undue influence or other improper means. When persons occupy positions of trust and confidence as did the parties to this cause, they are held to a strict measure of candor in their dealings, and any transactions between them predicated on a grossly inadequate consideration will be viewed as suspicious. Equity raises a presumption against the validity of such dealings, and imposes on the vendee or the donee the burden of showing the good faith and voluntary conduct of the donor or the vendor as the case may be. 12 R.C.L. 972, and cases cited."

This principle was reaffirmed in many subsequent cases. E.g., Adams v. Saunders, 1939, 139 Fla. 730, 191 So. 312; Lesperance v. Lesperance, Fla.App.3d 1970, 233 So.2d 859. However, in the case of In re Estate of Carpenter, Fla. 1971, 253 So.2d 697, our Supreme Court held that where a beneficiary of a will was shown to have been in a confidential relationship with the testator and actively participated in the execution of the will, the burden placed upon the beneficiary was only that of coming forward with the reasonable explanation for his active role in the decedent's affairs rather than that of disproving the undue influence. The court held that, as in the case of other presumptions, the burden of proof remained with the party upon whom it rested in the first place.

While Carpenter was a will contest and the case sub judice involved a suit to set aside inter vivos gifts, the same principles would seem to apply. Our sister court so held in Pate v. Mellen, Fla.App.1st, 1972, 275 So.2d 562.

The judge below was obviously following pre- Carpenter law when he stated in the final judgment:

"The Court finds the testimony and evidence presented by the Plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a confidential relationship existed between Arthur R. Long and Hattie Majorana, the Defendant. The Court further finds that the Defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the transfers made to the Defendant were void because of such relation. That is, the Defendant-donee failed to establish that the transfers were made in good faith and voluntary conduct of the donor."

Since the case was decided upon an erroneous conception of the burden raised by the presumption of undue influence, it is necessary for the case to be remanded for a determination according to the principles of Carpenter. In so doing, we do not purport to pass upon whether the defendant met the burden of coming forward with the evidence necessary to dispel the presumption.

Reversed and remanded.

BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.