Order unanimously modified in accordance with memorandum and as modified affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: We do not find that Special Term's exercise of discretion was improvident in granting defendants' motion to open the default judgment. CPLR 5015 (subd [a]) empowers the court which rendered the judgment or order to relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just. An inherent power not limited by statute is also possessed by the court to relieve a party from a judgment entered on a default (Michaud v Loblaws, Inc., 36 A.D.2d 1013), and in its exercise a court may open its own judgments for sufficient reason and in the furtherance of justice (Ladd v Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325; Godfrey v Dreslin, 47 A.D.2d 594). Respondents presented a sufficient reason to excuse their default and their papers make a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense to the action. Since an opportunity to defend on the merits is in the interest of justice, it should be favored. (Ballard v Billings Spencer Co., 36 A.D.2d 71; Matter of Mento, 33 A.D.2d 650.) However, in view of the possibility of a lack of insurance coverage, Special Term should have imposed as conditions of the vacatur that the judgment stand as security (Pan American World Airways v Victoria Travel Agency, 39 A.D.2d 692; Epstein v Kutner, 38 A.D.2d 750; Treitel v Arnold Chait, Ltd., 20 A.D.2d 711) and that the sum collected by plaintiff's attorneys on execution ($1,192.90) not be transferred to the defendants as directed, but be held by the said attorneys as additional security pending the outcome of the trial.