ALLEN, P.J.
Plaintiff petitioned Avon Township to have an 80-acre parcel south of Avon Road near Livernois rezoned from single family to multi-family residential use. Upon the denial of said request, plaintiff commenced suit in circuit court to compel rezoning on the grounds that defendant's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the subject property. The lower court sustained the reasonableness of the zoning restriction, and plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff's arguments one and two concern the proper standard of review in zoning ordinance cases. Plaintiff maintains that the correct standard is set forth in the concurrence by Justice LEVIN in Kropf v City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139; 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974), subsequently followed by three members of the Court in West v City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458; 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974). This approach views a zoning board's action on a request for rezoning as administrative, not legislative. Moreover, under this theory, the courts would look to the reasonableness of the proposed use of the property rather than simply the reasonableness of the use permitted by the zoning restriction.
The LEVIN view has recently garnered support. In Turkish v City of Warren, 61 Mich. App. 435; 232 N.W.2d 732 (1975), Judge QUINN, speaking for the full panel, endorsed the LEVIN concurrence in Kropf, supra, while recognizing that the Court of Appeals was bound by existing precedent. On August 19, 1975, in Sabo v Monroe Township, 394 Mich. 531; 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975), three members of the Supreme Court reversed the township board's rejection of plaintiff's request to rezone plaintiff's property so as to permit the construction of a mobile home park. In doing so, the majority of three held:
Also released on the same day and with the same division among the justices as Sabo, were companion cases Smookler v Wheatfield Township, 394 Mich. 574; 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975), and Nickola v Grand Blanc Township, 394 Mich. 589; 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975). The opinion in each read as follows:
"We affirm the Court of Appeals for the reason stated in our opinion in Sabo v Monroe Township."
"Even if present zoning is not unreasonable or confiscatory, a proposed use should be permitted if reasonable under all the circumstances. Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 164 ff.; 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974) (concurring opinion).
"We would require that the proofs now adduced in circuit court be presented administratively and restrict judicial review to whether the record evidence supports the administrative finding on the issue whether the proposed use is reasonable. Kropf v Sterling Heights, supra (concurring opinion)." Sabo, supra, at 536-537.
Justice LEVIN'S approach, though gathering strength, does not yet represent the current jurisprudential law in Michigan. While the viewpoint gathered three votes in Sabo, this is still not a majority of the Court. Where no opinion is endorsed by a majority of the members elected to the Supreme Court, the result is not binding as precedent. In re Curzenski Estate, 384 Mich. 334, 335; 183 N.W.2d 220 (1971). See also Palmer v Superior Twp, 60 Mich. App. 664; 233 N.W.2d 14 (1975). Though the law is obviously in flux we cannot at this point find that the trial court erred in applying the traditional standard of review reiterated by the majority of the Supreme Court in Kropf, supra, and followed by this Court in Ed Zaagman, Inc v City of Kentwood, 61 Mich. App. 693; 233 N.W.2d 146 (1975). In this connection we note that absent clarification, ambiguity appears in the suggested standard of review. Does this mean that the court would look only at the reasonableness of the proposed use without regard to the existing use, or does it mean that the court must be persuaded that the proposed use is more reasonable than the existing use?
Absent the applicability of the LEVIN position, plaintiff's fourth argument must also fail. "Plaintiffs challenge defendant's refusal to rezone their property on numerous grounds. Several of these deal with administrative, not legislative, decision-making and would be cogent if we applied the Kropf concurrence- West test: that the Superior Township board has no standards to guide it in deciding requests for rezoning; that rezoning decisions have been selective and, in this case, inconsistent with the master plan. However, since we are applying the test of the Kropf majority, these reasons are of no force." Palmer v Superior Twp, supra, 60 Mich App at 674; Ed Zaagman, Inc v City of Kentwood, supra.
If, for example, the court were to look only to the reasonableness of the requested use without balancing it against the existing use, variances would be more easily established and conceivably result in spot zoning by judicial rule. Well-recognized policy reasons work against opening the door to spot zoning.
Plaintiff points out that owing to the Clinton River flood plain and topography of the property, it is not possible under the existing zoning restriction to develop the maximum number of lots allowed; however, the maximum number of dwelling units could be constructed if the property was rezoned multi-family. It is argued that this factor creates such a disparity in property value as to constitute a confiscation, and, at least, indicates the unreasonableness of the ordinance. Therefore, says plaintiff, the ordinance is void as to plaintiff's property under the standard adopted by the majority in Kropf. We disagree. The fact that the land is worth more if used for developing multi-family dwellings does not suffice to render the zoning restriction unreasonable. Kropf, supra, at 160. Further, to be considered confiscatory, plaintiff must show that "all permitted uses are so devoid of feasibility that the restriction has accomplished the destruction of all usable value". Reibel v City of Birmingham, 23 Mich. App. 732, 739; 179 N.W.2d 243 (1970). The record shows it was feasible to develop single-family residences on the plaintiff's property. The estimated 1 to 3.6 disparity in value between single-family and multi-family use cannot justify the conclusion that the zoning restriction is confiscatory. Compare Land Development Corp v Township of Bloomfield, 55 Mich. App. 438; 222 N.W.2d 768 (1974).
We find no substance in the argument that the zoning ordinance limiting plaintiff's property to single family residential use bears no real relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. A zoning ordinance is presumed valid, and the trial court, after hearing all of the evidence, determined that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of overcoming the presumption. This Court cannot say that had we been sitting in the lower court's place, we would have reached a different result. Michaels v Village of Franklin, 58 Mich. App. 665; 230 N.W.2d 273 (1975).
Finally, we are convinced that the lower court did not rule plaintiff was precluded from attacking the zoning ordinance because of his awareness of the use restriction at the time the property was purchased.
Affirmed, but without costs, a public question being involved.
D.F. WALSH, J., concurred.