COMMONWEALTH v. ROSE, Pa., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

James M. McNamara, Public Defender, Doylestown, for appellant. Stephen B. Harris, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Kenneth G. Biehn, Dist. Atty. of Bucks County, Doylestown, for appellee.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Amos Paul Rose was convicted on May 30, 1972, by a jury of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving intoxication sufficient to reduce first degree murder to second degree. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974). On remand, Rose pled guilty to murder generally. At the subsequent degree-of-guilt hearing the parties stipulated to certain evidence from the prior trial; the defense presented expert testimony regarding the effect of appellant's intoxication on his mental state. The court found appellant guilty of murder in the first degree and again sentenced him to life imprisonment. This appeal followed, challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence to prove the intent to kill in light of intoxication evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential element of first degree murder — the intent to kill — in light of evidence that appellant was substantially intoxicated at the time of the killing.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant contended that the evidence of intoxication presented at the degree-of-guilt hearing (including expert testimony) was inconsistent with a finding of the requisite intent to kill for first degree murder and therefore the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.

Commonwealth's Arguments

The Commonwealth introduced evidence, including expert testimony and testimony regarding appellant's actions before and after the shooting (suggesting awareness of his actions and attempts to avoid detection), to show that appellant did possess the intent to kill despite his intoxicated condition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573 (1975)	Standard for sufficiency of the evidence; trier of fact's role in assessing credibility and weight of evidence.	Used to state the sufficiency test and to support that the fact-finder decides credibility and weight of evidence.
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975)	Standard for sufficiency of the evidence.	Cited in setting forth the test for sufficiency of evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 605, 334 A.2d 255 (1975)	Standard for sufficiency; trier of fact's role in credibility and weight.	Cited for the sufficiency standard and for the principle that the fact-finder assesses credibility and weight.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 457 Pa. 638, 326 A.2d 60 (1974)	Role of fact-finder in believing all, part, or none of the evidence.	Referenced to support that the fact-finder may accept or reject evidence in whole or in part.
Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 301 A.2d 837 (1973)	Role of fact-finder in weighing evidence.	Cited along with other cases to emphasize the fact-finder's discretion concerning credibility and weight.
Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974)	Instructional error at first trial; principle that proof of intent is unaffected in allocation of burden by defendant's attempt to show lack of capacity from intoxication.	Cited both as the prior decision reversing and remanding (for instructional error) and for the proposition that evidence of intoxication does not shift the burden of proof and that the Commonwealth retains the risk of non-persuasion.
Commonwealth v. Duncan, 437 Pa. 319, 263 A.2d 345 (1970)	Instructional entitlement when evidence of intoxication is presented.	Cited to show that a defendant is entitled to an instruction that intoxication evidence, if believed, may negate the intent to kill necessary for first degree murder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court applied the established sufficiency standard: viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing proper inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, the fact-finder must be able to reasonably conclude that every element of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the fact-finder (here the hearing court) is the exclusive judge of witness credibility and the weight of evidence, free to believe all, part, or none of testimony presented.

The court acknowledged that substantial intoxication, if believed by the fact-finder, may negate the specific intent to kill required for first degree murder and that a defendant presenting such evidence is entitled to an instruction to that effect (Commonwealth v. Rose; Commonwealth v. Duncan). However, the court reaffirmed that evidence of intoxication does not create any new presumption for the defendant nor shift any burden onto the Commonwealth; the Commonwealth remains responsible for proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt and may choose what evidence to introduce in response.

Applying these principles to the record, the court reviewed the evidence admitted at the degree-of-guilt hearing: appellant's blood alcohol content of approximately .24, competing expert testimony about whether such intoxication would preclude forming a specific intent to kill (Commonwealth expert Dr. Frederick Rieders testified he could not form a definitive opinion and stated that the ability to perform highly skillful tasks indicates preserved "associated thinking processes"; defense expert Stanley J. Broskey testified that a person with such intoxication would be unable to form specific intent), and testimony concerning appellant's conduct before and after the shooting that tended to show awareness and attempts to avoid detection. The court concluded that the Commonwealth introduced evidence sufficient for the fact-finder to find intent to kill despite the intoxication evidence and that it was not the appellate court's role to reweigh the evidence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial court's finding of guilt for first degree murder and the life sentence are affirmed. The opinion reiterates existing principles: evidence of intoxication, if believed, may negate the specific intent required for first degree murder and warrants a corresponding instruction, but such evidence does not create a presumption in favor of the defendant nor shift the Commonwealth's burden of proof. The Court did not announce a new precedent beyond applying these principles to uphold the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence in this case.

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COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Amos Paul ROSE, Appellant

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

Appellant Amos Paul Rose was convicted on May 30, 1972 in a jury trial of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974). We held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving intoxication sufficient to lower the crime from first to second degree murder.

On remand, appellant pled guilty to murder generally. At the degree of guilt hearing, the Commonwealth and the defense stipulated to certain evidence from the preceding trial. In addition, the defense presented expert testimony on the effect of defendant's level of intoxication on his mental state at the time of the shooting. The court found appellant guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced him to life imprisonment. This direct appeal ensued. We affirm.

Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 202(1), 17 Pa.C.S.A. § 211.202(1) (Supp. 1975).

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of murder in the first degree, the intent to kill. Specifically, he contends that the evidence of intoxication presented at the degree of guilt hearing is inconsistent with such a finding and requires reversal.

Murder in the first degree includes any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. The intent to kill must be read to include all three of these requirements. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 701, as amended (formerly codified in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4701) . Repealed by Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1641, No. 334 § 1. Reenacted as 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502 (Supp. 1975).

The evidence shows that at the time of the murder appellant's blood alcohol content was approximately twenty-four hundredths of one parent. The record contains testimony by two experts on the effect of such concentration on the appellant's mental state. Dr. Frederick Rieders, a toxicologist called by the Commonwealth at the trial, stated that he could not express an opinion on the matter because the effect would vary depending upon the individual and the circumstances involved. He further stated that if a person is able to perform highly skillful tasks, which are not conditioned reflexes, then the depressive effect of alcohol has not gone to the point of preventing the "appropriate associated thinking processes." Stanley J. Broskey, a forensic scientist called by the defense, took issue with this testimony, stating that any person thus intoxicated would be unable to form a specific intent to kill. There is also testimony concerning defendant's actions before and after the shooting tending to show an awareness of his actions and of the circumstances of the shooting and an attempt to avoid detection.

Appellant notes that this is more than twice the level established in the Vehicle Code to raise a presumption of being under the influence. See Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 624.1(c)(3), as amended, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 624.1(c)(3). However, the issue here is whether defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to form an intent to kill. The Vehicle Code section may be a guide for understanding blood alcohol concentrations as it relates to one's driving ability. It cannot be used to form a presumption of lack of intent to kill, an issue the legislature did not intent to address.

The test of sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing the proper inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could reasonably have found that all of the elements of the crime had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 625, 337 A.2d 573, 578 (1975); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 24, 334 A.2d 610, 613 (1975); Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 605, 608, 334 A.2d 255, 257 (1975). Moreover, it is the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced. Commonwealth v. Robson, supra; Commonwealth v. Murray, supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, 457 Pa. 638, 326 A.2d 60, 61 (1974); Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 257, 301 A.2d 837, 841 (1973). The fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Robson, supra; Commonwealth v. Smith, supra.

Evidence of substantial intoxication is submitted for the consideration of the fact-finder. If believed, it may negate the intent to kill necessary for a conviction of murder in the first degree, and a defendant is entitled to an instruction to that effect. Commonwealth v. Rose, supra; Commonwealth v. Duncan, 437 Pa. 319, 263 A.2d 345 (1970). However, such evidence creates no new presumption for the defendant and imposes no new burden on the Commonwealth. As with other defense evidence, the Commonwealth may offer any relevant evidentiary response that it chooses. In Rose we stated:

"[The burden to prove the specific intent to kill] is neither increased nor diminished by an attempt by a defendant to disprove the element of intent by a showing of lack of capacity, due to intoxication, to form such an intent. Whether the Commonwealth will, in a particular case, elect to carry that burden without introducing evidence to negate the existence of a disabling condition of intoxication, . . . will be for it to decide; as in every case, the risk of non-persuasion remains with the Commonwealth."

457 Pa. at 389, 321 A.2d at 884.

Here, the Commonwealth introduced evidence to establish that appellant, despite his intoxicated state, had the intent to kill at the time of the shooting. There is clearly sufficient evidence to support such a finding of fact, and it is not for us to reweigh the evidence presented to the hearing court.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. ROSE