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Attorney(S)
  • Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, George N. Parris, Prosecuting Attorney, Don L. Milbourn, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and William Alan Dardy, for the people. George E. Montgomery, for defendant.
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  • McGREGOR, P.J.
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citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, George N. Parris, Prosecuting Attorney, Don L. Milbourn, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and William Alan Dardy, for the people. George E. Montgomery, for defendant.
Judges
  • McGREGOR, P.J.
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Smart Summary

Summary of People v. Lerma, Docket No. 22783 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1976)

Factual and Procedural Background

Lawrence Lerma was convicted by a jury of unlawfully taking possession of and driving away a motor vehicle in violation of MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645 (commonly referred to as the "joyriding" statute). During trial the defendant sought to present a defense based on voluntary intoxication. In its charge to the jury, the trial court instructed that voluntary drunkenness is not a defense except for crimes involving specific intent, and thereby precluded intoxication as a permissible defense for this offense. No further mention of intoxication was made in the remainder of the jury charge. The defendant appealed his conviction as of right. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether voluntary intoxication is a valid defense to a prosecution under the "joyriding" statute, MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645.
  2. Whether the statutory requirement that an offender act "willfully" in MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645 denotes a specific intent as an element of the offense (i.e., whether the crime is a specific intent crime).

Arguments of the Parties

People's Arguments

  • The prosecution primarily argued that the "joyriding" statute is a general intent crime and, accordingly, voluntary intoxication is not a defense. The people relied chiefly on People v. Stanley and People v. Davis to support the contention that the statute does not require specific intent (particularly noting that the statute was enacted to punish those who unlawfully took vehicles but did not possess the intent permanently to deprive the owner).
  • The prosecution also cited other federal and state decisions (e.g., Proctor v. United States; Schwab v. United States) for the proposition that the statute is not specific intent, though the opinion notes these decisions involved statutes that did not include the term "willfully" and thus were distinguishable.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant sought to have the jury consider voluntary intoxication as a defense at trial. The opinion indicates the defendant attempted to establish this defense during trial, but the trial court disallowed it in the jury charge. The Court of Appeals concluded the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider the intoxication defense because the statute requires a specific intent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
People v. Hawk, 22 Mich. App. 337, 177 N.W.2d 174 (1970) Left open the question whether intoxication is a defense under the "joyriding" statute. Noted as a case that did not resolve the intoxication issue because the evidence of intoxication there was meager; the present court takes up the question left open in Hawk.
People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955) Authority for the proposition that voluntary intoxication is a defense only for specific intent crimes. Listed among cases establishing that voluntary intoxication can be a defense only where a crime requires specific intent.
People v. Kelley, 21 Mich. App. 612, 176 N.W.2d 435 (1970) Same general proposition re: intoxication as a defense only for specific intent crimes; also cited elsewhere for discussion. Cited as supporting authority for the rule distinguishing specific vs. general intent for intoxication defenses.
People v. Widgren, 53 Mich. App. 375, 220 N.W.2d 130 (1974) Also cited for the doctrine that voluntary intoxication is a defense only to specific intent crimes. Included among Michigan cases that frame the intoxication-defense rule.
People v. Stanley, 349 Mich. 362, 84 N.W.2d 787 (1957) Interpreted the "joyriding" statute as not requiring an intent to steal (i.e., not requiring intent permanently to deprive the owner). The court explained Stanley is limited to the proposition that "intent to steal" is not an element; it does not preclude the statute from embodying some other specific intent (such as a willful intent) as an element.
People v. Davis, 36 Mich. App. 164, 193 N.W.2d 393 (1971) Followed Stanley and was relied upon by the people to argue joyriding is not a specific intent crime. The court found Davis not controlling on the specific-intent question because Davis followed Stanley's limited holding regarding intent to steal.
People v. Jewell, 138 Mich. 620, 101 N.W. 835 (1904) Used as an example of a definition of "willfully" meaning "an evil intent." Quoted as one of the varying definitions of "willfully" found in Michigan law.
City of Detroit v. Pillon, 18 Mich. App. 373, 171 N.W.2d 484 (1969) Used as an example of a definition of "willfully" meaning "a bad purpose." Referenced in discussion of the various definitions attributed to "willfully."
People v. Andrews, 45 Mich. App. 354, 206 N.W.2d 517 (1973) Used as an example of a definition of "willfully" meaning "a guilty knowledge." (This case also involved the joyriding statute.) Cited in the court's survey of how "willfully" has been characterized in Michigan jurisprudence.
Proctor v. United States, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 341; 177 F.2d 656 (1949) Federal authority cited by the people for the proposition that joyriding-type statutes are not specific intent crimes (but involved statutes without the term "willfully"). The court observed these federal decisions are distinguishable because the statutes construed did not contain the element "willfully."
Schwab v. United States, 327 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1964) Another federal decision cited by the people to suggest joyriding statutes are not specific intent crimes. The court noted Schwab is distinguishable for the same reason as Proctor (no "willfully" element in the statute there).
Stenzel v. United States, 261 F. 161 (8th Cir. 1919) Example of a court finding that a statute defined as the "willfully" doing of an act may be a specific intent crime. Used to show that some courts have interpreted "willfully" as denoting specific intent.
Embry v. State, 310 P.2d 617 (Okla. 1957) Example of a court holding contrary to Stenzel — that "willfully" did not render the offense a specific intent crime. Quoted to show divergent authority on whether "willfully" imports specific intent.
People v. Limon, 4 Mich. App. 440, 145 N.W.2d 287 (1966) Interpreted the joyriding statute to enumerate "done willfully" as a separate and distinct element of the crime. Relied upon by the court as authority that "willfully" is a distinct element satisfying the definition of specific intent in the context of the joyriding statute.
People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156 (1872) Authority holding that larceny is a specific intent crime (and thus that intoxication may be a defense to larceny). Used by the court to highlight the incongruity of denying an intoxication defense for joyriding while allowing it for larceny, given the close similarity of the offenses.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals framed the dispositive issue as whether the word "willfully" in MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645 denotes a specific intent such that voluntary intoxication would be a permissible defense. The court proceeded in a structured analytical fashion:

  1. The court first identified the established rule (as reflected in Michigan authorities cited) that voluntary intoxication is a defense only where the crime requires proof of specific intent; it is not a defense where only general intent need be shown.
  2. Because Michigan case law offers limited guidance on distinguishing "specific intent" from "general intent," the court adopted a pragmatic definitional approach. It summarized (citing secondary authority) that specific intent means "some intent in addition to the intent to do the physical act which the crime requires," whereas general intent refers to an intent simply to do the physical act or recklessly doing the act.
  3. The court refined the definition by reference to the mental-state categories in proposed criminal codes: specific intent crimes correspond to conduct that must be committed "purposefully" or "knowingly," while general intent crimes correspond to conduct committed "recklessly" or "negligently." Thus, a specific intent crime requires that the offender subjectively desire or know that the prohibited result will occur.
  4. Turning to the statutory term "willfully," the court surveyed Michigan authorities and other decisions which variously defined "willfully" as "an evil intent," "a bad purpose," or "a guilty knowledge," and noted that many decisions conclude that "willfully" implies knowledge and a purpose to do wrong.
  5. Based on this understanding, the court concluded that "willfully," when used in the "joyriding" statute, falls within the definition of specific intent (i.e., it denotes a mental state of knowledge and purpose to do wrong), so that a specific intent to take possession unlawfully of the vehicle is an ingredient of the crime.
  6. The court gave two principal reasons supporting this construction:
    • People v. Limon had previously treated "done willfully" as a separate and distinct element of the joyriding offense, which aligns with the standard definition of specific intent as an intent beyond the mere physical act.
    • Policy and fairness considerations: the only significant difference between joyriding and larceny is the requirement of intent to permanently deprive the owner for larceny. Since larceny is treated as a specific intent crime (entitling a defendant to raise intoxication), it would be incongruous to preclude the intoxication defense for a closely related offense simply because of semantic differences in statutory wording.
  7. Having determined the statute requires specific intent, the court concluded the trial court erred by precluding the intoxication defense in its jury instruction. Because the defendant was thereby denied the opportunity to have the jury consider his intoxication defense, reversal was required.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

The court held that MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645 (the "joyriding" statute) requires proof of a specific intent — the term "willfully" denotes a knowledge and purpose to do wrong — and therefore voluntary intoxication is a defense that the jury must be allowed to consider. Because the trial court's jury charge precluded intoxication as a defense, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.

Implications for the parties: The direct consequence was reversal of Lerma's conviction and remand for retrial with proper instruction permitting the jury to consider voluntary intoxication if supported by the evidence. The opinion does not set forth any broader policy declarations beyond these direct effects, although its interpretation of "willfully" for purposes of the joyriding statute necessarily guides how that statute is to be applied in future cases (as reflected by the court's express holding that the statute is a specific intent crime).

Opinion by McGregor, P.J. Reversed and remanded. (Leave to appeal denied, 396 Mich. 848.)

Show full summary ...

PEOPLE v. LERMA

McGREGOR, P.J.

Defendant, Lawrence Lerma, was convicted by a jury of taking possession and driving away a motor vehicle, contrary to MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645. Defendant now appeals that conviction as a matter of right.

This statute, commonly known as the "joyriding" statute, provides as follows:
"Any person who shall, willfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away, and any person who shall assist in or be a party to such taking possession, driving or taking away of any motor vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five [5] years."

During trial, the defendant attempted to establish a defense based upon intoxication. However, the trial court, in its charge to the jury, precluded intoxication as a permissible defense, stating:

"There has been some testimony that the defendant and his companion had wine to drink. Ladies and gentlemen, it is well settled law in this state that except in a crime involving specific intent that voluntary drunkenness is not a defense."

As a result, no other mention of defendant's intoxication was made during the remainder of the charge.

The primary issue raised by the defendant on appeal is whether voluntary intoxication can be a valid defense to the crime for which he was convicted. The resolution of this issue essentially involves the determination of whether the crime of "joyriding" is a specific intent crime, or, to be more precise, whether the word "willfully" in the statute denotes a specific intent as a necessary element of that crime.

This very same question was specifically left open in People v Hawk, 22 Mich. App. 337, 339; 177 N.W.2d 174 (1970):
"We find no need to consider whether, because of the statutory requirement that the offender act "willfully", intoxication would be a valid defense. The evidence of intoxication was meager; even if intoxication is a defense, the trial judge was not obliged to acquit the defendant on the sparse proofs presented." (Footnotes omitted.)

Preliminarily, we note that voluntary intoxication can be a defense only where the crime charged requires a specific intent to be proved, but not where a general intent need be proved. See People v Guillett, 342 Mich. 1; 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955), People v Kelley, 21 Mich. App. 612; 176 N.W.2d 435 (1970), People v Widgren, 53 Mich. App. 375; 220 N.W.2d 130 (1974).

The people, relying primarily on People v Stanley, 349 Mich. 362; 84 N.W.2d 787 (1957), and People v Davis, 36 Mich. App. 164; 193 N.W.2d 393 (1971), argue that the "joyriding" statute is not a specific intent crime, but rather, a general intent crime. However, these cases are not in point. In Stanley, cited and followed by this Court in Davis, the Supreme Court based its decision on the trial judge's reasoning that the Legislature passed MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645 in order to punish individuals who, although they had unlawfully taken an automobile, could not be punished under the larceny statute, since they did not possess the specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of his vehicle. Thus, Stanley was limited to a finding that the "intent to steal" was not an element of the "joyriding" statute. As a result, it does not preclude a finding that the statute could embody some other specific intent as a necessary element thereof.

This often amorphous distinction has been criticized. See People v Kelley, supra, pp 628-631.

Before determining whether the "joyriding" statute's requirement that an offender act "willfully" denotes a specific intent, it is, of course, necessary first to establish what is meant by the term "specific intent". Unfortunately, however, Michigan case law provides very little, if any, guidance in this regard. Perhaps this is understandable since it has been said that a specific intent cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a general intent. Nevertheless, binding precedent requires us to make an attempt.

See Hall, Intoxication in Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv L Rev 1045, 1064 (1944).

Specific intent has been defined as "meaning some intent in addition to the intent to do the physical act which the crime requires", while general intent "means an intent to do the physical act — or, perhaps, recklessly doing the physical act — which the crime requires". LaFave Scott, Criminal Law, p 343.

A much more workable definition would center upon the several mental states set forth in the various proposed criminal codes. Analyzed in this fashion, specific intent crimes would be limited only to those crimes which are required to be committed either "purposefully" or "knowingly", while general intent crimes would encompass those crimes which can be committed either "recklessly" or "negligently". Thus, in order to commit a specific intent crime, an offender would have to subjectively desire or know that the prohibited result will occur, whereas in a general intent crime, the prohibited result need only be reasonably expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.

Having thus determined what we believe specific intent crime to entail, it still remains to be determined whether the word "willfully" in the "joyriding" statute connotes such an intent.

In this regard, also, the Michigan cases furnish little guidance. "Willfully" has been variously defined as "an evil intent", "a bad purpose", or a "guilty knowledge". Additionally, cases from other jurisdictions are also of little use. However, most decisions have concluded that "willfully", at least when used in a criminal context, implies a knowledge and a purpose to do wrong. See 46 Words and Phrases, pp 8-9 (Permanent ed). As such, "willfully" would fall within our above definition of a "specific intent". Consequently, we hold that a specific intent to take possession unlawfully of the vehicle is a necessary ingredient of the "joyriding" statute.

See People v Jewell, 138 Mich. 620; 101 N.W. 835 (1904).

City of Detroit v Pillon, 18 Mich. App. 373; 171 N.W.2d 484 (1969).

People v Andrews, 45 Mich. App. 354; 206 N.W.2d 517 (1973). This case also involved the "joyriding" statute.

Plaintiff also directs our attention to Proctor v United States, 85 US App DC 341; 177 F.2d 656 (1949), and Schwab v United States, 327 F.2d 11 (CA 8, 1964), for the proposition that the "joyriding" statute is not a specific intent crime. However, these cases are distinguishable in that the statutes there construed did not contain the element "willfully". Moreover, some courts have found that crimes which are defined as the "willfully" doing of some act are specific intent crimes allowing the intoxication defense to be applied, while others are not. Compare Stenzel v United States, 261 F 161 (CA 8, 1919), with Embry v State, 310 P.2d 617 (Okla, 1957). See, generally, 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 87, p 168.

We believe that this result is appropriate for two reasons. First, in People v Limon, 4 Mich. App. 440; 145 N.W.2d 287 (1966), our Court enumerated "done willfully" as a separate and distinct element of the crime of "joyriding". Thus, "willfully", as interpreted in Limon, would fulfill the standard definition that a specific intent be some intent in addition to the intent to do the mere physical act which the crime requires. The intent to do only the required physical act — the taking or driving away of the motor vehicle without authority — would therefore be insufficient to constitute the crime of "joyriding", as the act must also be committed "willfully". Secondly, the only significant difference between the crime of "joyriding" and the crime of larceny is that the "joyriding" statute does not require that the offender intend permanently to deprive the owner of the possession of the property. It would therefore seem somewhat incongruous that a defendant charged with larceny could go free if his evidence showed intoxication, when the same defendant, if charged with joyriding would be completely precluded from raising that defense. We do not believe that the right to interpose a recognized defense should depend so heavily upon the semantics of which of two similar crimes a defendant is initially charged.

Larceny has been held to be a specific intent crime, thereby entitling the defendant to the intoxication defense. See People v Walker, 38 Mich. 156 (1872).

Holding as we do that MCLA 750.413; MSA 28.645, is a specific intent crime, we must, therefore, also hold that the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider his intoxication defense. Since this was not done, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

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PEOPLE v. LERMA
(Jan 8, 1976)