Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: We agree with Special Term that third-party plaintiff's responses to interrogatories served upon it by third-party defendants were not unresponsive nor may they be construed to be a willful failure to disclose information sufficient to impose the drastic remedy of preclusion (CPLR 3126; see Livingston v Mayes, 23 A.D.2d 814; Practice Commentary, Siegel, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3126, p 646-650). Although CPLR 3133 (subd [a]) requires that objections to interrogatories be made within 10 days after service of the interrogatories, where the objection to an interrogatory involves a CPLR 3101 immunity, the 10-day time limitation is inapplicable (Practice Commentary, Siegel, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3133, p 682; see Coffey v Orbachs, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 317, 320). Interrogatories Nos. 13 and 14 clearly deal with privileged matter (CPLR 3101, subd [b]). While it might have been better practice for the third-party plaintiff to have moved within the 10-day time period in CPLR 3133 (subd [a]) such time limitation does not override the more important considerations underlying the immunity provisions of CPLR 3101.