Labor — Jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board — Public Employe Relations Act, Act 1970, July 23, P.L. 563 — Unfair labor practice — Failure to comply with arbitration award — Adequate administrative remedy.
1. The Public Employe Relations Act, Act 1970, July 23, P.L. 563, gives to the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over charges of unfair labor practices, and the Board in its expertise provides the proper forum for the resolution of labor-management problems arising under a collective bargaining agreement. [453-4]
President Judge BOWMAN filed a concurring opinion, in which Judges ROGERS and BLATT joined, which was substantially as follows:
1. Courts of law or equity have no jurisdiction over a matter where an adequate administrative remedy has been provided by statute. [454]
2. Noncompliance with an arbitration award is an unfair labor practice under the Public Employe Relations Act, Act 1970, July 23, P.L. 563, and, although the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board will not review such award, the Board provides the proper forum to determine whether a party has refused to obey such award and has committed an unfair labor practice. [454-5]
OPINION BY JUDGE CRUMLISH, JR., May 13, 1976:
The defendants, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, and its members, have filed preliminary objections to the Retail Clerks Union, Pennsylvania State Store Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, et al., plaintiffs', complaint which seeks recoupment of monies withheld as cash shortages.
The objections consist of a demurrer interposing Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement, motion to strike based upon improper use of Pa. R.C.P. No. 2230, and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Since we sustain the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Labor Board) has exclusive jurisdiction, we limit discussion to that objection.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs invoked the grievance mechanism as the proper procedure by which the defendants were to determine the liability of bargaining unit members (employees) for cash shortages.
This grievance was eventually submitted to arbitration. The decision of the arbitrator delineated the appropriate procedure for the deduction of cash shortages from employees' paychecks. The defendants did not comply with the decision of the arbitrator and their conduct is characterized as a breach of the collective bargaining agreement and an unfair practice, thus making the defendants liable in assumpsit to the named plaintiffs and those similarly situated.
We do not agree. The Public Employee Relations Act (PERA) has given to the Labor Board exclusive power to prevent unfair practices. The plaintiffs, here, are attempting to circumvent the prescribed procedure by seeking a review and enforcement of a decision of an arbitrator. See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 23 Pa. Commw. 49, 350 A.2d 199 (1976). The Labor Board has the expertise and experience to understand and resolve the problems arising out of labor-management relations and it is there that the desired relief must be sought. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 17 Pa. Commw. 83, 330 A.2d 300 (1975).
Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P. S. § 1101.101 et seq.
Since plaintiffs have filed a Section 1201(a)(8) unfair practice charge, the Labor Board has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1301 of PERA, 43 P. S. § 1101.301.
See generally Lilian v. Commonwealth, ___ Pa. ___, 354 A.2d 250 (1976). There, appellants, Lilian et al., sought the repayment of portions of sales tax paid on the purchase of motor vehicles. In discussing the propriety of a suit in equity, where the General Assembly has provided for an administrative remedy, the Supreme Court said: "Where such an administrative remedy is statutorily prescribed the general rule is that a court — be it a court of equity or a court of law — is without jurisdiction to entertain the action."
This being so, we
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 1976, the preliminary objections of the defendants are hereby sustained and the complaint dismissed.
Judge KRAMER did not participate in the decision in this case.
CONCURRING OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE BOWMAN:
I agree with the result reached by the majority in dismissing the instant complaint in assumpsit by which plaintiffs sought to give effect to an arbitration award issued pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Where an administrative remedy is statutorily prescribed and found to be adequate, neither a court of equity nor a court of law has jurisdiction to entertain this common law action. Lilian v Commonwealth, ___ Pa. ___, 354 A.2d 250 (1976); see Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1504. Noncompliance with an arbitration award is an unfair labor practice under Section 1201 of the Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P. S. § 1101.1201; the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of unfair labor charges under Section 1301 of said Act, 43 P. S. § 1101.1301, and its provisions for judicial review and enforcement amply establish its adequacy. To the extent the majority opinion suggests or infers that in unfair labor practice proceedings before the Labor Board the arbitration award is subject to review, I register my disagreement as I conceive the only issue before the Labor Board in such proceedings is whether the Commonwealth has refused to obey the award. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. 49, 350 A.2d 199 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
Judges ROGERS and BLATT join in this concurring opinion.