BELL, Chief Judge.
In this case, the trial court sustained the defendant's motion to suppress solely because of the refusal of the state to disclose the identity of a confidential informant whose information furnished the grounds for probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. In sustaining the motion the trial court heard no evidence. Held:
As a general rule, the public policy of this state supports the nondisclosure of the identity of an informant on whose information a search is based. Code § 38-1102; Chancey v. Hancock, 233 Ga. 734 ( 213 S.E.2d 633). Whether, as an exception to this general rule, disclosure should be required, is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge based on the evidence. Scull v. State, 122 Ga. App. 696 ( 178 S.E.2d 720); Estevez v. State, 130 Ga. App. 215 ( 202 S.E.2d 686). Here the trial judge heard no evidence as he was required to do under Code § 27-313 (b). The mere refusal of the state to disclose the identity of an informer standing alone does not authorize a trial judge to exercise his discretion as to whether disclosure should be required.
Judgment reversed. Clark and Stolz, JJ., concur.
BELL, Chief Judge.
ARGUED JUNE 7, 1976 — DECIDED JULY 9, 1976 — REHEARING DENIED JULY 22, 1976 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.