STOLZ, Judge.
The appellee hired the appellant attorney on a contingent-fee basis to prosecute a securities case against a third party. During the pendency of the securities proceeding, the appellee allegedly discharged the appellant. The appellant then made a motion as part of the securities case to be paid his fee. From a denial of the motion, the appellant presents this interlocutory appeal.
An attorney who is hired under a contingent fee contract and later discharged has a right to payment of a reasonable attorney fee. Bearden v. Lane, 107 Ga. App. 424 (1) ( 130 S.E.2d 619) (1963). As a general rule, a discharged attorney who was employed on a contingent fee basis may not recover that fee by a summary proceeding or order in the cause in which the fee is earned. 7 CJS 1100, Attorney and Client, § 194; see McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 427 S.W.2d 767 (4) (Mo.App. 1968); In re Lomm, 195 So.2d 416 (1) (La.App. 1967); Shatzkin v. Shahmoon, 19 App. Div. 2d 658 (4) ( 242 NYS2d 72) (1963); Fields v. Potts, 140 Cal.App.2d 697 ( 295 P.2d 965) (1956); Marx v. Marx, 24 N. J. Super. 204 ( 93 A.2d 773) (1953). The attorney may bring an independent action, however. Patterson v. Drake, 126 Ga. 478 (8) ( 55 S.E. 175) (1906). Cases dealing with other than contingent fees are distinguished. White v. Aiken, 197 Ga. 29 (2) ( 28 S.E.2d 263) (1943); Head v. Aycock, 116 Ga. App. 739 ( 158 S.E.2d 685) (1967); Carter v. Wyatt, 113 Ga. App. 235 (8) ( 158 S.E.2d 74) (1966). Therefore, the trial judge properly dismissed the appellant's motion.
Judgment affirmed. Quillian, P. J., and Shulman, J., concur.
ARGUED JANUARY 10, 1977 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 23, 1977.