MARTINEZ v. STATE

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Docket Number

No. 76-753.

Attorney(S)

Thomas F. Almon, Miami, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Linda Collins Hertz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Judges

PER CURIAM.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Victor Manuel Martinez appeals his conviction for second degree murder. The appeal arises from a trial in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, where Martinez was convicted. The appellant challenges several rulings made by the trial court during the proceedings, including jury instructions, evidentiary matters, and procedural rulings related to trial presentation.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the issue of flight when the appellant contended the evidence did not support such a charge.
Whether the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on the prosecution's failure to produce the victim’s criminal record (rap sheet) pursuant to the defense’s request.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defense to make an opening statement after the defense had already begun presenting its case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The jury instruction on flight was improper because the appellant's departure from the crime scene was to take his wounded child to the hospital, not to evade prosecution.
The trial court should have granted a new trial due to the prosecution’s failure to produce the victim’s criminal record, which was relevant to the appellant’s self-defense claim.
The trial court erred in denying the defense’s request to make an opening statement after the defense had started presenting its case, especially since the defense counsel admitted forgetting to make the statement earlier.

Appellee's Arguments

The evidence supported instructing the jury on flight, as the appellant fled the scene immediately after the shooting and engaged in conduct such as knocking a witness unconscious and concealing weapons.
The prosecution did not possess or have knowledge of the victim’s rap sheet; the information was obtained by the medical examiner independently. The defense could have obtained the rap sheet before trial, so the prosecution had no duty to produce it.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a late opening statement, especially given the defense counsel’s admission of oversight and the lack of prejudice resulting from the omission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1959)	Flight from crime scene may be considered as circumstance inferring guilt under proper jury instruction.	Supported the propriety of instructing the jury on flight given the evidence of appellant’s conduct.
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1975)	Same principle regarding flight as evidence of guilt.	Reinforced the court’s decision to include flight instruction.
Hargrett v. State, 255 So.2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)	Flight evidence justifies jury consideration.	Provided additional precedent supporting flight instruction.
State v. Coney, 294 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1974)	Prosecution’s duty to produce evidence depends on possession or knowledge; absence of such negates duty.	Confirmed prosecution was not obligated to produce victim’s rap sheet when it lacked possession or knowledge.
State v. Crawford, 257 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1972)	Prosecution need not furnish evidence reasonably attainable by defense through other means.	Supported denial of new trial based on prosecution’s failure to produce rap sheet.
Henderson v. State, 158 Fla. 684, 29 So.2d 698 (1947)	Trial court’s discretion in allowing opening statements; failure to do so not reversible absent prejudice.	Justified denial of late opening statement without finding ineffective assistance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence concerning the flight instruction and found sufficient basis to submit the issue to the jury. The eyewitness testimony that appellant fled immediately after the shooting and assaulted a witness, combined with police testimony about concealed weapons, supported the charge. The appellant’s explanation that he left to aid his wounded child did not negate this evidence.

Regarding the failure to produce the victim’s rap sheet, the court reasoned that the prosecution did not possess or have knowledge of the record. Since the defense could have obtained the rap sheet independently before trial, the prosecution had no duty to produce it. This analysis relied on established precedent concerning the scope of the prosecution’s disclosure obligations.

On the issue of the opening statement, the court found no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow the defense to make a belated opening statement after trial had commenced. The defense counsel admitted to forgetting the statement, and the court concluded that this omission did not render counsel ineffective or prejudice the defense.

Holding and Implications

The court AFFIRMED the conviction of Victor Manuel Martinez.

The decision upheld the trial court’s rulings on jury instructions, evidentiary obligations, and trial procedure. It did not establish new legal precedent but reinforced existing principles regarding flight evidence, prosecutorial disclosure duties, and trial court discretion over opening statements. The direct effect is the final affirmation of the appellant’s conviction.

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VICTOR MANUEL MARTINEZ, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.

PER CURIAM.

Victor Manuel Martinez appeals a second degree murder conviction.

Appellant first contends the trial court committed reversible error by including in the instructions to the jury a charge on flight on the ground that the evidence did not afford a basis for the charge. Specifically, appellant argues that the evidence demonstrated that he left the scene of the crime to take his wounded child to the hospital for treatment.

When a suspect endeavors to evade prosecution by flight from the vicinity of a crime, such fact may be shown as one of the circumstances inferring guilt which is to be considered by the jury under appropriate instructions. Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So.2d 684, 689 (Fla. 1959); Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666, 670 (Fla. 1975).

The testimony of the State's key eyewitness was that immediately after the shooting, the appellant fled from the bathroom (the scene of the crime) and knocked him unconscious in the process. In addition, the police officers testified that appellant had concealed two guns under the seat of his car. We conclude that was sufficient evidence to take to the jury the issue of whether appellant fled after the crime, and the court properly instructed the jurors with respect thereto. Cf. Hargrett v. State, 255 So.2d 298 (Fla.3d DCA 1971).

Appellant secondly argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial on the ground that the prosecution had failed to produce the criminal record or rap sheet of the victim pursuant to the defense's request to produce any criminal record which the deceased may have had in order to corroborate the appellant's contention that he shot the deceased in self-defense. We cannot agree.

It is apparent that the prosecution did not have within its actual or constructive possession any rap sheet on the victim nor did the prosecutor have any knowledge thereof, but rather this information was obtained by the medical examiner through a contact with the FBI. See State v. Coney, 294 So.2d 82, 87 (Fla. 1974). It further appears that after the conclusion of the trial defense counsel did, in fact, obtain the victim's rap sheet and could have obtained it before trial. Thus, the prosecution was under no duty to furnish the defense with the rap sheet when such evidence was otherwise reasonably attainable. See State v. Crawford, 257 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1972).

Last, appellant contends the trial judge committed reversible error in denying defense counsel's request to make an opening statement after the defense had commenced with the presentation of its case and its second witness was in the midst of testifying.

We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to allow defense counsel to make an opening statement at this late date where he frankly admitted he had forgotten to make it at the appropriate time. See Henderson v. State, 158 Fla. 684, 29 So.2d 698 (1947) and cases cited therein. Moreover, we cannot say that the failure to present an opening statement resulted in defense counsel being ineffectual.

Affirmed.